People v. Navarro CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS317638
- Trial judges
- Dwayne K. Moring; Michael J. Popkins
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Laurence D. Rubin
Analysis
The trial court denied Navarro's petition for pretrial mental health diversion based solely on his failure to prove his substance abuse disorder was a 'significant factor' in the offenses. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, directing a new hearing under the retroactively applied amended statute which shifts the burden to the People to rebut the presumption of eligibility.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of second petition for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36“The trial court denied diversion based solely on Navarro’s failure to establish that his substance abuse disorder was a “significant factor” in the commission of his charged offenses pursuant to section 1001.36, former subdivision (b)(1)(B).” | abuse of discretion | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The trial court relied on a statutory factor ('significant factor') that was removed by Senate Bill 1223, which the appellate court determined applies retroactively. Because the trial court based its denial wholly on this no-longer-applicable factor, it constituted an abuse of discretion under People v. Carmony. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 — Amended statutes may apply retroactively to pending appeals if they are remedial or procedural in nature and do not increase punishment.
- relied: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — A trial court's reliance on improper factors in making a discretionary ruling may constitute an abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581 — Determining whether clear and convincing evidence exists regarding the connection between a mental disorder and an offense is quintessential factfinding best left to the trial court.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Supports the use of memorandum opinions for matters appropriately resolved without full briefing or oral argument under constitutional and administrative standards.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies that the legislative amendment (SB 1223) changed the statutory standard from a defendant's burden to prove a 'significant factor' to a presumption of eligibility that the prosecution must rebut. It correctly applies People v. Frahs to establish retroactivity and People v. Carmony to establish that reliance on the repealed factor was an abuse of discretion. The decision to remand rather than decide eligibility on the record is consistent with People v. Oneal, which designates this specific factual inquiry as quintessential factfinding for the trial court.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Navarro's second petition for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 solely because he failed to show his substance abuse disorder was a 'significant factor' in his charged offenses under former subdivision (b)(1)(B). While the appeal was pending, Senate Bill 1223 amended the statute to presume a connection between the diagnosed disorder and the offense, and the Court of Appeal, with the People's concurrence, held the amendment retroactive, reversed the denial order, and remanded for a new eligibility hearing under the amended statute.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 for failure to establish that the substance abuse disorder was a 'significant factor' in the commission of the charged offenses“Accordingly, the trial court, through no fault of its own, erred in denying Navarro’s Petition based wholly on a factor that no longer applies.” | abuse of discretion | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court Under Frahs, ameliorative amendments to section 1001.36 apply retroactively to nonfinal cases, and the Estrada presumption extends to SB 1223's shift of the connection element to a rebuttable presumption that the People must overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court's sole ground for denial no longer exists under the amended statute and none of the charged offenses is excluded under subdivision (d), reversal and remand for a new hearing is the appropriate remedy; the court properly declined to decide eligibility itself, since whether the People can rebut the presumption is a factual question for the trial court. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 — Ameliorative amendments to the mental health diversion statute, section 1001.36, apply retroactively to all cases not yet final on appeal under the Estrada rule.
- relied: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — A trial court abuses its discretion when it relies on impermissible or improper factors in making a discretionary ruling.
- relied: People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581 — Determining whether a defendant's mental disorder was connected to the offense for purposes of section 1001.36 is quintessential factfinding best undertaken by the trial court.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may appropriately resolve matters by memorandum opinion consistent with the California Constitution and Standards of Judicial Administration.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies Frahs to hold that SB 1223's ameliorative amendment to section 1001.36 is retroactive to this nonfinal case, and it properly remands rather than deciding eligibility itself because rebuttal of the new presumption is a factual question. The reasoning is brief but adequate given the parties' concession, and the disposition follows directly from the cited authorities.
Opinion
Filed 8/23/23 P. v. Navarro CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080567
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS317638)
JOSE DAVID NAVARRO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Dwayne K. Moring and Michael J. Popkins, Judges. Reversed and remanded with directions. David G. Steward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Jose David Navarro appeals from the trial court’s order denying his second petition for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 (Petition). The trial court denied diversion based solely on Navarro’s failure to establish that his substance abuse disorder was a “significant factor” in the commission of his charged offenses pursuant to section 1001.36, former subdivision (b)(1)(B). Mindful of our obligations under article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution and section 8.1 of the California Standards of Judicial Administration, we find this matter appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion. (See generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.) Effective January 1, 2023, and while Navarro’s appeal was pending, Senate Bill 1223 amended section 1001.36, former subdivision (b)(1)(B), in a manner favorable to defendants seeking diversion. (Compare § 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(B), eff. June 30, 2022, through Dec. 31, 2022, with § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2), eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) Section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), now presumes a defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder has a connection to his offense and allows the trial court to deny diversion if the People rebut that presumption. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1223 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 23, 2022, p. 6.) The parties concur that the amendment is retroactive and that remand to the trial court for a new hearing to determine Navarro’s eligibility for mental health diversion is warranted. We agree. Amended section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), applies retroactively to the trial court’s order denying Navarro’s Petition. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.) Moreover, none of the offenses with which Navarro was charged appears in section 1001.36, subdivision (d), which 2 specifies the offenses that preclude a defendant from placement in a diversion program. Accordingly, the trial court, through no fault of its own, erred in denying Navarro’s Petition based wholly on a factor that no longer applies. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [recognizing trial court’s reliance on improper factors may constitute abuse of discretion].) On this record, we can reach no definitive conclusion as to Navarro’s eligibility for placement in a diversion program under the new standard, and thus we express no view concerning the proper resolution of Navarro’s Petition. Rather, determining whether the record contains “clear and convincing evidence that [Navarro’s substance abuse disorder] was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to [Navarro’s] involvement in the alleged offense[s]” is “quintessential factfinding” best undertaken by the trial court. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 589.) DISPOSITION We reverse the order denying Navarro’s Petition and remand the matter with directions that the trial court conduct a new hearing to consider Navarro’s eligibility for placement in a diversion program under section 1001.36 as amended by Senate Bill 1223.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Carmony No. S115090 · 2004-07-08
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17