People v. Miller CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE249592
- Trial judge
- Patricia K. Cookson
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Laurence D. Rubin (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Michele M. Castillo
Analysis
The trial court denied Miller's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding he failed to make a prima facie case because the record of conviction established he was the actual killer who acted with intent to kill, and that the statute did not apply to his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that the record of conviction unequivocally established Miller was the actual killer and that his argument regarding intellectual disability was unrelated to the scope of the resentencing petition.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6“The record of conviction establishes the jury convicted Miller as the actual killer who acted with an intent to kill rather than for any type of imputed malice theory.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6 is limited and the court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956 — Where the record of conviction unequivocally establishes that defendant was the 'actual killer,' defendant is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Appellate counsel may file a brief asking the court to exercise its discretion to independently review the record for error.
- relied: People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276 — The substantial evidence standard of review applies to trial court findings under section 1172.6.
- relied: People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735 — The substantial evidence standard of review applies to trial court findings under section 1172.6.
- relied: People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453 — Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.
- relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.
- relied: Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 — Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.
- relied: People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512 — The trial court may examine the charging document when reviewing the record of conviction for a section 1172.6 petition.
- relied: People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 — The trial court may examine jury instructions when reviewing the record of conviction for a section 1172.6 petition.
- relied: People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 — The trial court may examine verdict forms when reviewing the record of conviction for a section 1172.6 petition.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the substantial evidence standard and relies on binding authority (Lewis, Garcia) to conclude that the record of conviction, which showed Miller was the sole defendant convicted of second-degree murder with intent to kill and no imputed malice instructions, precludes relief under section 1172.6. It also correctly identifies that the intellectual disability argument is outside the scope of the prima facie inquiry for this specific statutory resentencing petition.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Arthur Lee Miller's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage, finding the jury convicted him as the sole participant and actual killer who intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, and that the statute does not reach his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. On appeal under People v. Delgadillo procedures, the Court of Appeal held the record of conviction (a single malice-with-intent-to-kill instruction, no imputed-malice instructions, a sole defendant) showed Miller ineligible as a matter of law, rejected his intellectual-disability argument as unrelated to section 1172.6, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 petition as to the second degree murder count at the prima facie stage (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) because the record of conviction shows Miller was the actual killer convicted on a sole theory of express malice“The record of conviction establishes the jury convicted Miller as the actual killer who acted with an intent to kill rather than for any type of imputed malice theory.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Under Lewis the court may consult the record of conviction, including jury instructions, at the prima facie stage. Only one theory (malice with intent to kill, CALJIC No. 8.30) was given, no felony-murder, natural-and-probable-consequences, aiding-and-abetting, or other imputed-malice instructions were given, and Miller was the only person charged. That establishes ineligibility as a matter of law (Garcia). The appellate court's stated substantial-evidence standard is wrong for a prima facie denial, which is reviewed de novo, but the result is the same under either standard. |
Denial of the petition as to the attempted voluntary manslaughter count on the ground section 1172.6 does not apply to that offense“As to the jury finding you guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, this petition is not applicable. The statute does not apply to attempted manslaughter; so, therefore, the petition is denied.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) extends relief only to persons convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under felony murder or natural and probable consequences theories. Attempted voluntary manslaughter is not an enumerated offense, and in any event no imputed-malice theory was presented at trial. The appellate court's treatment of this count is cursory (it says only that the offenses are 'not within the purview' of the statute), but the conclusion is correct. |
Whether the trial court's statements at the prima facie hearing constituted impermissible factfinding under Lewis rather than a summary of the jury's verdict“Any statement by the trial court denying Miller’s petition merely summarized the jury’s second-degree murder verdict and the attendant allegations the jury found true.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The trial court's remarks tracked the jury's findings (sole suspect, personal and intentional discharge causing death) rather than weighing evidence or assessing credibility. Lewis permits reliance on the record of conviction, including verdicts and instructions, and the court did not resolve disputed facts. Even if the statements were loosely phrased, the jury instructions independently establish ineligibility, so any error would be harmless. |
Rejection of Miller's supplemental argument that his intellectual disability prevented him from forming specific intent, rendering his convictions invalid“This contention is unrelated to the denial of Miller’s resentencing petition.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 1172.6 is a narrow vehicle for persons convicted under now-invalid imputed-malice theories; it is not a mechanism to relitigate sufficiency of the evidence of intent or the validity of a long-final judgment. The court correctly declined to treat the claim as bearing on prima facie eligibility, and under Delgadillo it addressed the issue raised in the supplemental brief as required. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.4th 952 — The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is limited; the court may consult the record of conviction but may not engage in factfinding involving weighing of evidence.
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Procedures for appeals from denial of section 1172.6 petitions where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues; the court must address issues raised in a defendant's supplemental brief.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956 — Where the record of conviction unequivocally establishes the defendant was the actual killer, the defendant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 — Jury instructions are part of the record of conviction that may be reviewed at the prima facie stage.
- relied: People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512 — The charging document is part of the record of conviction.
- relied: People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 — Verdict forms may be consulted as part of the record of conviction.
- misapplied: People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276 — Substantial evidence review applies to a trial court's factual findings after a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing, not to a prima facie denial under subdivision (c).
- misapplied: People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735 — Substantial evidence review applies to findings made after an evidentiary hearing on a resentencing petition; it does not govern review of a prima facie stage denial.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reached the correct result: a sole defendant tried on a single express-malice theory with no imputed-malice instructions is ineligible under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and the Lewis and Garcia authorities support that holding. But the opinion misstates the standard of review as substantial evidence, relying on cases addressing post-evidentiary-hearing findings rather than the de novo standard applicable to a prima facie denial, and it gives almost no analysis of the attempted voluntary manslaughter count.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
inconsistent with cited authorityOpinion
Filed 7/20/23 P. v. Miller CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080999
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE249592)
ARTHUR LEE MILLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed. Arthur Lee Miller, in pro. per.; Patrick Dudley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Arthur Lee Miller shot James E. in the back of the head, killing him. Miller then approached and pointed his gun at Richard A. Richard ran as Miller pursued him. Miller tried to shoot Richard several times but his gun would not fire. On November 18, 2005, a jury convicted Miller of second degree murder (count 1; Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and attempted voluntary manslaughter (count 2; §§ 664 & 192, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that Miller personally used a handgun in the commission of both crimes (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), personally used a handgun in the commission of the attempted voluntary manslaughter (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and intentionally discharged a handgun in the commission of the murder which proximately caused great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Miller to a total prison term of 55 years, six months to life. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v. Miller (Dec. 21, 2007, D048704) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2022, Miller petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). After appointing counsel for Miller, the trial court held a hearing and denied the petition based on Miller’s failure to make a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court stated: “The Court finds, Mr. Miller, that you have not established prima facie evidence showing that you’re entitled to relief. You were the only suspect involved in this crime. The jury found that you personally killed the victim when they found you to personally and intentionally discharge a firearm, causing the victim’s death. You were the only participant in the murder and you yourself intentionally fired the gun, causing the victim’s death. You’re not entitled to relief as to that charge.
“As to the jury finding you guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, this petition is not applicable. The statute does not apply to attempted manslaughter; so, therefore, the petition is denied.”
Miller appealed, and we appointed counsel to represent him. After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief asking that we exercise 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 our discretion to independently review the record for error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Counsel identified two possible issues: “Was the trial court’s statement a recollection of the trial proceedings contrary to People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) or a factual statement summarizing the jury verdict?” And, “[a]ssuming the former, was it prejudicial?” (Id. at pp. 970–975.) We invited Miller to submit a supplemental brief. He did, arguing he suffers from an intellectual disability preventing him from forming the specific intent to commit second degree murder. We find the record shows Miller is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6, and we affirm the trial court’s order denying the petition for resentencing. DISCUSSION Standard of Review In reviewing trial court findings under section 1172.6, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576–578; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318– 319.) Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition. A. Legal background Senate Bill No. 1437 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018), which became effective on January 1, 2019, “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 3 underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Although the court may rely on the record of conviction, including a prior appellate court opinion, in determining whether defendant has made a prima facie showing, the court “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.) B. Analysis In reviewing the record of conviction for a section 1172.6 petition, the trial court may examine, among other items, the charging document (People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512, 524–525), jury instructions (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599) and verdict forms (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106). The record of conviction here shows Miller is the only person charged in the case. The court instructed on a single second degree murder theory—that Miller unlawfully killed a human being with both malice aforethought and the intent to kill. The jury convicted Miller of it, finding true additional allegations involving the personal discharge and use of a firearm. (CALJIC No. 8.30.)
4 The court did not give any jury instructions on principals, aiders and abettors, felony murder, natural and probable consequences, conspiracy, target and nontarget offenses, or any other theories of imputed malice. The record of conviction establishes the jury convicted Miller as the actual killer who acted with an intent to kill rather than for any type of imputed malice theory. (See People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973 [where record of conviction “unequivocally establishes that defendant was the ‘actual killer,’ ” defendant is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law].) Any statement by the trial court denying Miller’s petition merely summarized the jury’s second-degree murder verdict and the attendant allegations the jury found true. Miller contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition because he suffers from an intellectual disability that prevented him from forming the specific intent to commit second degree murder rendering his guilty verdicts invalid. This contention is unrelated to the denial of Miller’s resentencing petition. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that Miller suffered convictions for offenses not within the purview of section 1172.6.
5 DISPOSITION The order denying defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Delgadillo S266305 · 2022-12-19
- People v. Lewis S260598 · 2021-07-26
- People v. White D063369 · 2014-01-28
- People v. Elliot S057063 · 2005-11-28
- People v. Johnson Crim. 20710 · 1980-02-29