People v. Brown CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD293281
- Trial judge
- Daniel F. Link
- Outcome
- reversed in part — Reversed in part and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), O'Rourke, Buchanan
Analysis
The trial court imposed $2,866.26 in victim restitution without holding a hearing or considering the defendant's ability to pay. The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order in part, remanding for a hearing on the amount, but affirmed the exclusion of ability-to-pay considerations.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of a hearing on the amount of victim restitution“The court therefore abused its discretion in denying Brown’s request for such a hearing.” | abuse of discretion | error | agree with court agree with court |
Exclusion of defendant's ability to pay from restitution determination“We therefore reject Brown’s contention that his ability to pay should be considered here.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771 — Victim restitution is a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment, and ability to pay is not a proper factor in setting the award.
- relied: People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7 — Restitution orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312 — A defendant's inability to pay shall not be a consideration in determining the amount of a victim restitution order.
- relied: People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314 — A defendant's ability to pay victim restitution is not a proper factor to consider in setting a restitution award.
- misapplied: People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126 — The court noted this case was relied upon by the defendant but distinguished it as being superseded by statutory amendments that bar consideration of ability to pay.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court sentenced Brown to 365 days in county jail and two years' probation after his guilty plea to residential burglary, and ordered $2,866.26 in victim restitution while refusing defense counsel's request for a restitution hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order as to the $2,866.26, holding Brown was statutorily entitled to a hearing under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(1), but rejected his claim that the court must consider his ability to pay, and remanded for a restitution hearing.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of defendant's request for a restitution hearing on the $2,866.26 in victim restitution“As the Attorney General concedes, the plain language of section 1202.4, subdivision (f), affords a defendant “the right to a hearing” on the amount of victim restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).) The court therefore abused its discretion in denying Brown’s request for such a hearing.” | abuse of discretion | error (procedure) | agree with court Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(1) expressly gives the defendant the right to a hearing to dispute the amount of restitution. Counsel requested a hearing and the court flatly refused based solely on submitted documents; the Attorney General conceded the point. The appellate court correctly held this was error and remanded for the hearing. |
Imposition of victim restitution without considering defendant's ability to pay“We therefore reject Brown’s contention that his ability to pay should be considered here.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Section 1202.4, subdivision (g) expressly provides that a defendant's inability to pay shall not be a consideration in determining the amount of a victim restitution order, and the court correctly noted that Hartley predates the 1995–1996 amendments adding that provision. Evans, Allen, and Abrahamian all confirm that ability to pay is not a proper factor for victim restitution, which is a civil remedy rather than punishment. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771 — Victim restitution is a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment, and a defendant's ability to pay is not a proper factor in setting a victim restitution award.
- relied: People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7 — A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312 — Under section 1202.4, subdivision (g), a defendant's inability to pay shall not be considered in determining the amount of a victim restitution order.
- relied: People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314 — Ability to pay is not a proper consideration in setting victim restitution.
- relied: People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126 — Cited by appellant for the proposition that ability to pay must be considered before ordering restitution; the court distinguished it as predating the 1995–1996 amendments to section 1202.4 adding subdivision (g).
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion applies the plain text of section 1202.4, subdivisions (f)(1) and (g), to resolve both issues and correctly distinguishes the pre-amendment Hartley decision with current appellate authority. The reasoning is brief but complete for the narrow issues presented, and the disposition of a limited remand for a restitution hearing is appropriate.
Opinion
Filed 6/30/23 P. v. Brown CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080858
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD293281)
ISAIAH BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel F. Link, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with directions. Patrick Dudley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appallant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, and Donald W. Ostertag and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Isaiah Brown pleaded guilty to first-degree residential burglary. (Pen.
Code,1 § 459.) The trial court sentenced him to 365 days in county jail and 1 Further unspecified section references are to the Penal Code. two years’ probation, and imposed fines, assessments, and restitutions, including $2,866.26 in victim restitution. On appeal, Brown contends his due process right was violated when the court imposed the victim restitution without conducting a hearing and considering his ability to pay. The Attorney General concedes Brown was entitled to a hearing but not consideration of his ability to pay the victim restitution. We conclude the Attorney General has the better argument. Accordingly, we reverse the restitution order as to the $2,866.26 in victim restitution and remand for a hearing on the issue.
BACKGROUND2 In July 2022, Brown pleaded guilty to residential burglary (§§ 459 & 460, subd. (a)). At sentencing the following month, Brown stipulated to $870 in victim restitution to one of the victims. The court sentenced Brown to 365 days of county jail and two years’ formal probation with certain conditions and awarded 380 days of custody credits. It further ordered Brown to pay two amounts of victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), $870 and $2,866.26, to two victims, and imposed other assessments and fines. After the court imposed $2,866.26 in victim restitution, Brown’s counsel asked, “And, your honor, I apologize. Is the court—the court’s not willing to give us a restitution review?” The court responded, “[N]o . . . [¶] . . . Documents were submitted. I don’t -- That’s enough for the court.” Brown appealed. DISCUSSION Under section 1202.4, when “a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct,” the court “shall” impose victim restitution 2 We briefly summarize the facts here to the extent relevant to the limited issues at hand. 2 on the defendant “based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f); see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13).) Victim restitution is a civil remedy, enforceable as if it were a civil judgment, rather than a criminal punishment. (People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771, 776 (Evans).) We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion. (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) Brown contends the imposition of $2,866.26 in victim restitution— without a hearing and determination of his ability to pay—violated his due process right.3 He thus asks for a remand directing the court to hold such hearing and make such determination. The statute squarely addresses both issues. As the Attorney General concedes, the plain language of section 1202.4, subdivision (f), affords a defendant “the right to a hearing” on the amount of victim restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).) The court therefore abused its discretion in denying Brown’s request for such a hearing. Section 1202.4, subdivision (g), further provides, a “ ‘defendant’s inability to pay shall not be a consideration in determining the amount of a [victim] restitution order.’ ”4 (People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 322, quoting § 1202.4, subd. (g); accord Evans, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [“a defendant’s ability to pay victim restitution is not a proper factor to consider 3 Brown does not contest the other victim restitution of $870.
4 Brown relies on People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126 (Hartley) for the proposition that his ability to pay must be considered before the court could order victim restitution. However, Hartley preceded the 1995 and 1996 amendments to section 1202.4, which added subdivision (g), barring courts from making such consideration. 3 in setting a restitution award”]; People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 338 [same].) We therefore reject Brown’s contention that his ability to pay should be considered here. DISPOSITION The restitution order is reversed in part as to the $2,866.26 in victim restitution. The matter is remanded to the trial court to hold a restitution hearing under section 1202.4, subdivision (f). The order is otherwise affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Millard D047681, D049268 · 2009-06-22
- People v. Hartley F002710 · 1984-12-21