Cielo Homeowners Assn. v. Bennett CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from orders
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2009-00063244-CU-OR-NC
- Trial judge
- Cynthia A. Freeland
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell, William S. Dato
Analysis
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to tax costs, finding that the defendant waived her claim for costs by failing to file a verified memorandum of costs as required by court rules, despite a non-party signing a document that was not properly verified by the party. The Court of Appeal affirmed the orders, holding that the defendant's failure to file a compliant verified memorandum constituted a waiver of her right to recover costs.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Granting the motion to tax costs based on the defendant's failure to file a verified memorandum of costs.“The court appropriately treated the request for costs as waived because Bennett never filed a memorandum of costs with the court.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Granting relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) to accept the late-filed motion to tax.“Section 473, subdivision (b), gave the court discretion to entertain the untimely motion, which is an “other proceeding,” if it concluded the tardiness was due to attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 — Appeals from non-final orders are generally not permitted.
- relied: Drake v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826 — One cannot appear in propria persona for another person.
- relied: J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958 — A nonattorney parent could not represent a minor child.
- relied: Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924 — Failure to file a verified memorandum of costs results in waiver of the claim for costs.
- relied: Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 — Self-represented litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.
- relied: Douglas v. Willis (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 287 — There is no mandatory relief for a late-filed motion to tax under section 473, subdivision (b).
- relied: Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 244 — When a law firm name is printed on pleadings, any attorney from that firm may appear without filing a substitution of counsel.
- relied: Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 — Court orders are presumed correct.
- relied: Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557 — Orders of lower courts are presumed correct with all inferences indulged to support them.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the procedural rule that a verified memorandum of costs must be filed by the party to avoid waiver, and it properly defers to the trial court's factual findings regarding the attorney's mistake under section 473. The court effectively addresses the appellant's argument about unauthorized practice by clarifying that the non-party's signature did not satisfy the verification requirement for the party.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAfter Bennett won costs on a prior appeal, her nonparty husband signed and served the cost memorandum; the trial court granted Cielo section 473(b) relief to file a late motion to tax, ordered Bennett to file her own verified memorandum within 30 days, and when she did not, granted the motion to tax and alternatively deemed costs waived. The Court of Appeal affirmed both orders, holding the husband's memorandum did not satisfy rule 8.278(c)(1), Bennett's failure to file a verified memorandum waived costs, and the 473(b) relief was within the court's discretion.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Treating Bennett's failure to file a verified memorandum of costs (after being given 30 days to do so) as a waiver of appellate costs and granting the motion to tax“The court appropriately treated the request for costs as waived because Bennett never filed a memorandum of costs with the court.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Rule 8.278(c)(1) requires the party claiming costs to serve and file a verified memorandum within 40 days of the remittitur. The only document in the record was signed by James, a nonparty who cannot act for Bennett (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6125, 6126; Drake). The trial court gave Bennett a chance to cure and she never filed anything, so Hydratec's waiver rule applies. The opinion does not state a standard of review, but the result follows under any standard. |
Granting Cielo discretionary relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b) to accept its motion to tax filed three days late“Section 473, subdivision (b), gave the court discretion to entertain the untimely motion, which is an “other proceeding,” if it concluded the tardiness was due to attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Douglas v. Willis recognizes that a late motion to tax may be relieved under the discretionary (not mandatory) prong of section 473(b). Counsel supplied detailed, unrebutted reasons for the three-day delay, and the court credited them. The opinion also fairly notes Bennett cannot argue the rules were inflexible when she herself received an extension. The court could have added that rule 3.1700(b)(3) independently permits a 30-day extension, but the omission does not undermine the result. |
Finding that attorney James Judge was an attorney of record whose mistake could support 473(b) relief despite another attorney having appeared at hearings“It also means Judge, who was a principal of the firm, was an attorney of record whose mistake could be considered by the court under section 473, subdivision (b).” | de novo | correct | agree with court Rule 2.111(1) and Ellis Law Group establish that when a firm is listed in the caption, any attorney of that firm may appear without a substitution. The firm was consistently in the caption and Judge's name appeared from the original complaint, so his declaration of mistake was properly considered. |
Factual finding that counsel's explanation of the late filing was credible“Bennett does not challenge the court’s conclusion that the reasons Judge offered to demonstrate his mistake were credible, and we have no reason to question this factual finding.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The finding was unchallenged on appeal, and under Jameson and Denham the order is presumed correct with all intendments indulged in its favor. The declaration described trial commitments, medical limitations, and staff departures, which is adequate support. |
September 17, 2021 order denying Bennett's motion to dismiss“Because there was no final judgment at the time Bennett filed her appeal of the September 17, 2021 order, we dismissed that appeal.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court Under Griset and the one final judgment rule, an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss is not independently appealable before judgment. The court correctly confined its review to the orders on the motion to tax. |
Authorities
- relied: Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 — Appeal lies only from a final judgment or statutorily appealable order; interlocutory orders are not separately appealable.
- relied: Drake v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826 — One cannot appear in propria persona on behalf of another person; a nonattorney cannot represent another party.
- relied: J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958 — A nonattorney parent may not represent a minor child in litigation.
- relied: Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924 — Failure to file a timely memorandum of costs results in waiver of the right to recover costs.
- relied: Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 — Self-represented litigants are held to the same rules of procedure as represented parties.
- relied: Douglas v. Willis (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 287 — Mandatory relief under section 473(b) does not apply to a late-filed motion to tax costs, though discretionary relief remains available.
- relied: Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 244 — When a law firm is named in the caption, any attorney from that firm may appear for the client without filing a substitution or association.
- relied: Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 — Trial court orders are presumed correct on appeal.
- relied: Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557 — A lower court order is presumed correct and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it where the record is silent.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies rule 8.278(c)(1), the unauthorized-practice bar, and Hydratec to hold that a memorandum signed only by a nonparty husband is no memorandum at all, and it properly treats the 473(b) ruling as discretionary under Douglas v. Willis. It does not articulate a standard of review for the waiver ruling and omits rule 3.1700(b)(3), which expressly authorizes extensions of cost-memorandum and motion-to-tax deadlines and would have made the extension analysis simpler, but the result is well supported.
Opinion
Filed 3/10/23 Cielo Homeowners Assn. v. Bennett CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CIELO HOMEOWNERS D079743 ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2009- v. 00063244-CU-OR-NC)
PAMELA BENNETT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed. Pamela Bennett, in pro. per. for Defendant and Appellant. The Judge Law Firm and James Arthur Judge for Plaintiff and Respondent. On remand from an appeal in which the defendant was awarded costs, defendant Pamela Bennett’s husband James,1 a nonparty, completed a 1 Because Pamela and James Bennett share a surname, we refer to James by his first name for clarity. memorandum of costs that he served on the opposing party, Cielo Homeowner’s Association (Cielo). Cielo responded with a motion to tax that it filed three days late, accompanied by a request for relief for its tardiness under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 473, subdivision (b). The court stated there was nothing in the register of actions indicating Bennett had filed a verified memorandum of costs, so it directed her to file a verified memorandum within 30 days. It also granted Cielo the requested relief and accepted the late-filed motion to tax. When Bennett failed to file a verified memorandum of costs as directed, the court granted Cielo’s motion to tax. Alternatively, it construed Bennett’s failure to file the memorandum as a waiver. Bennett contends the court erred because it violated procedural rules and because Cielo failed to sufficiently challenge the substance of the claims. We conclude that Bennett failed to file a verified memorandum of costs and therefore waived her claim. Thus, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 28, 2009, Cielo filed a lawsuit against Bennett alleging two causes of action.3 When Bennett did not appear at trial on September 6, 2019, the court struck her answer and entered a default against her. The court eventually entered judgment in Cielo’s favor, and Bennett appealed that judgment on June 4, 2020. On January 13, 2021, we reversed that judgment in our unpublished opinion, Cielo Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Bennett (Jan. 13. 2021, 2 Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified. 3 The details of the underlying civil suit are not relevant to the issue before us. 2 D076824), remanded the matter, and instructed the court to vacate the judgment, reinstate the answer, and set a new trial date. We awarded Bennett her costs on appeal. We issued the remittitur March 19, 2021. On March 23, 2021, the superior court vacated the judgment and reinstated the answer. On April 27, 2021, James signed a memorandum of costs on appeal and had it served that day. On May 20, 2021, Cielo filed a motion to tax costs. The motion acknowledged it was filed three days after the deadline and sought relief under section 473 due to attorney inadvertence and error. It also sought the extension under the American with Disabilities Act.4 The motion challenged several of the claimed costs. On September 17, 2021, Bennett filed an opposition to the motion to tax, contending it was untimely and addressing the arguments substantively. The October 1, 2021 order states that the register of actions did not show that Bennett had filed a verified cost memorandum with the court.5 The court directed her to file a verified cost memorandum no later than 4 The attorney of record took responsibility for the error and explained he was engaged in a trial in the days leading up to the deadline, working at a reduced capacity from March 2020 to March 2021 due to complications from a congenital brain disease following his return to work. He also explained the lead associate handling the matter during his absence left for another job around this same time, leaving him to absorb that caseload as a sole practitioner, and the paralegal who assisted him was out of the office in the days leading up to the deadline. 5 The version of the register of actions printed March 28, 2022 includes a listing of the “Memorandum of Costs on Appeal filed by Bennett, Pamela on April 27, 2021.” However, there is no memorandum of costs in the record on appeal that is signed by Bennett; the document file-stamped April 27, 2021 is signed by James. 3 November 1, 2021, and it continued the matter to November 12, 2021, which was also the date set for trial. Bennett did not file a verified memorandum of costs, and she did not appear November 12. The court granted the motion to tax costs. It also construed Bennett’s failure to file her verified memorandum of costs with the court as a waiver.6 Bennett appealed the October 1 and November 12, 2021 orders relating to the motion to tax.
DISCUSSION
In her opening brief, Bennett attempts to challenge a September 17, 2021 order denying her motion to dismiss. Because there was no final judgment at the time Bennett filed her appeal of the September 17, 2021 order, we dismissed that appeal. (See Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696-697.) Accordingly, we address only the portions of the briefing that relate to the court’s orders granting the motion to tax. California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(c)(1) requires a party to serve and file a verified memorandum of costs within 40 days of issuance of the remittitur. We issued the remittitur on March 19, 2021. Thus, Bennett was required to serve and file a verified memorandum of costs by April 28, 2021. Bennett did not do this. James, who is not a party to this action and cannot represent Bennett (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6125, 6126 [prohibiting unauthorized practice of law]; Drake v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831 [explaining 6 The court also commenced trial and adjourned it until January 14, 2022. 4 “one cannot appear in ‘propria’ persona for another person”]; see J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 965 [nonattorney parent could not represent minor child]), served a copy of a memorandum of costs that he signed on April 27, 2021, but nothing was signed by Bennett.7 There is a file- stamped copy of the document James signed in the record, and the March 2022 print-out of the register of actions indicates it was filed. However, the October 1 court order states that “the Register of Actions does not show that Defendant filed a verified cost memorandum with the court.” The document in the record before us does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(c)(1) because it was not completed by a party to the action.8 The court gave Bennett an opportunity to correct the error when it directed her to file a verified memorandum of costs within 30 days. Bennett never filed a memorandum of costs. The court appropriately treated the request for costs as waived because Bennett never filed a memorandum of costs with the court. (See Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924, 928-929.)
7 The court told James at an August 9, 2019 hearing that Bennett had to appear because she was representing herself and no other person, other than a licensed attorney, could represent her. It repeated this in its September 17, 2021 order: “[T]he court will not entertain arguments by [James] Bennett on Defendant’s behalf should the Bennetts appear at the hearing on this matter. . . . [Section] 371 is inapplicable where, as here, the Bennetts have not been sued together – Defendant is the only named defendant in this case. [James] Bennett is not an active licensee of the State Bar of California and is thus not authorized to practice law in California.” 8 Self-represented litigants are treated like any other party and entitled to the same consideration as other (represented) litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) “Thus, as is the case with attorneys, [self-represented] litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Id. at p. 1247.) 5 The court also granted the motion to strike costs after applying its discretion under section 473, subdivision (b), to “relieve a party from a[n] . . . order or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Section 473, subdivision (b), gave the court discretion to entertain the untimely motion, which is an “other proceeding,” if it concluded the tardiness was due to attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Ibid.; see Douglas v. Willis (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 287, 290 [finding no mandatory relief for late- filed motion to tax under section 473, subd. (b)].) Bennett implies there was no attorney mistake because the attorney claiming error was James Judge, and attorney David Mangikyan had been appearing at hearings and signing pleadings.9 While an individual attorney makes appearances and can, individually, serve as an attorney of record, in this case the Judge Law Firm, ALC, was consistently listed in the caption on pleadings as attorney of record. The caption identifies “the attorney for the party in whose behalf the paper is presented . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.111(1).) “ ‘[W]hen a law firm name is printed on the first page, in addition to an individual attorney’s name and State Bar number, the court will then permit any attorney from that firm (who is a California State Bar member) to appear for the named client without the need to file a form of association or substitution of attorneys.’ [Citation.]” (Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 244, 258.) The inclusion of The Judge Law Firm, ALC in captions as attorney for 9 Bennett requested we strike the respondent’s brief signed by Judge for the same reason. We denied that request. 6 Cielo means there was no need for Judge to file a substitution of counsel.10 It also means Judge, who was a principal of the firm, was an attorney of record whose mistake could be considered by the court under section 473, subdivision (b). Bennett does not challenge the court’s conclusion that the reasons Judge offered to demonstrate his mistake were credible, and we have no reason to question this factual finding.11 (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 [explaining court orders are presumed correct]; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [order of lower court presumed correct with “ ‘[a]ll intendments and presumptions . . . indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent’ ”].) Extending time to file the motion to tax allowed the court to consider Cielo’s substantive attacks. Yet, because Bennett did not file a memorandum of costs, there were effectively no costs to strike or tax. Consistent with this conclusion, we do not reach the substantive questions Bennett raises in her appeal.
10 Judge’s name appears on captions dating back to the original complaint. The notice requesting Mangikyan’s disassociation was filed July 2, 2021, but it does not indicate on what date Mangikyan left the firm. It simply requested Mangikyan’s name be removed, and no further contact be made with him. 11 Accepting Bennett’s argument that the court had no discretion to extend the deadline because of mandatory language in the Rules of Court would mean concluding it likewise did not have discretion to grant Bennett an extension of time to file the memorandum of costs because California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(c)(1) states that the party claiming costs must file the verified memorandum within 40 days. Yet, the court granted Bennett an extension of time. 7 DISPOSITION The October 1 and November 12, 2021 orders are affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent Cielo on appeal.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Jameson v. Desta S230899 · 2018-07-05
- Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC C072820 · 2014-10-03
- Nwosu v. Uba No. H026182 · 2004-10-01
- Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission S077219 · 2001-05-24
- Douglas v. Willis B077774 · 1994-08-03
- Drake v. Superior Court D019658 · 1994-01-27
- Jw v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty. B069928 · 1993-08-05
- Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. F010885 · 1990-09-06
- Denham v. Superior Court L.A. 29704 · 1970-05-06