gno.law

The F. S. Loop

District Court, S.D. California · No. 4095-Y · 1945-02-20 · Published

THE F. S. LOOP

Proceeding
district
Area
other
Panel
Yankwich (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-14T01:06Z · confidence high

The court considered exceptions to a libel in rem filed by claimants against the vessel F.S. Loop, which sought a maritime lien for watchman wages and supplies furnished at the owner's request. The court sustained the exceptions and dismissed the libel, holding that watchman wages do not create a maritime lien and that the watchman was not an agent with sufficient management authority to bind the vessel for supplies.

What the court decidedThe model
Exceptions to the libel in rem sustained and libel dismissed
“The exceptions to the libel in rem, filed by Herbert C. Bryant, John B. Bane, Clayton J. Corbett, Roy A. Owens, and Walter M. Gleason, heretofore argued and submitted, are sustained and the libel in rem is ordered dismissed.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the established admiralty rule that wages for a watchman or caretaker do not give rise to a maritime lien, as the watchman is not a seaman or master. Furthermore, the court correctly determined that the watchman did not have the authority to bind the vessel for supplies because he was not a person to whom the management of the vessel was entrusted, relying on the Supreme Court's definition in Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co. The dismissal follows logically from these legal principles applied to the facts alleged in the libel.

The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sound. It correctly identifies the two main claims (wages and supplies) and applies the correct legal standards to each. It cites the relevant statute (46 U.S.C.A. § 972) and controlling Supreme Court precedent (Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog) to support its conclusion that a watchman lacks the authority to create a lien for supplies and is not entitled to a lien for wages. The reasoning directly answers the exceptions raised by the claimants.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Yankwich

YANKWICH, District Judge.

The exceptions to the libel in rem, filed by Herbert C. Bryant, John B. Bane, Clayton J. Corbett, Roy A. Owens, and Walter M. Gleason, heretofore argued and submitted, are sustained and the libel in rem is ordered dismissed.

The libel is chiefly for wages as a watchman. It is the established rule in admiralty that the wages of a watchman or caretaker of a vessel do not give rise to a maritime lien. 46 U.S.C.A. § 972; The Fortuna, D.C.Wash. 1912, 206 F. 573; The Sinaloa, D.C.Cal. 1913, 209 F. 287; The William Leishear, D.C.Md. 1927, 21 F.2d 862. Nor can the libelant claim a lien for such wages and for moneys advanced under the provisions of Sections 490, 491 of the Harbors and Navigation Code of California, St.1937, p. 805. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1005, Subsection T, 46 U.S.C.A. § 975, — the same statute which in subsection Q provides for the maritime lien which is now embodied in 46 U.S.C.A. § 972 — superseded all the provisions of state statutes covering liens on vessels enforceable by suits in rem in admiralty. The Saratoga, 2 Cir., 1913, 204 F. 952; The Juniata, D.C.Md. 1902, 277 F. 438; Burdine v. Waldon, 5 Cir., 1937, 91 F.2d 321.

*106 Under the allegations of the libel, the gasoline and supplies, for which claim is made, were allegedly furnished at the request of the owner. When one who claims to be the agent of the owner furnishes such supplies, no maritime lien arises. The Eurana, 3 Cir., 1924, 1 F.2d 684; The Poznan, 2 Cir., 1925, 9 F.2d 838, 847. Furthermore, I do not think that a watchman can be called a “person to whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted.” These words imply a broader direction and control of the vessel than is implied in the mere act of watching a vessel out of commission. See: Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 1940, 310 U.S. 268, 277-280, 60 S.Ct. 937, 84 L.Ed. 1197.

Hence the ruling above made. Formal order, to be prepared by counsel for the claimants, to follow.