Baird v. Associated Piping & Engineering Co.
BAIRD v. ASSOCIATED PIPING & ENGINEERING CO., Inc.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Connor (author)
Analysis
The court determined that the plaintiff was a non-exempt employee until July 15, 1943, and an exempt executive thereafter, awarding the plaintiff $222.36 in liquidated damages and $150 in attorney fees. The court ordered the plaintiff to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded costs to the plaintiff.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Award of liquidated damages for the period March 15, 1943, to July 15, 1943“The court finds that the overtime compensation and liquidated damages during the period of March 15 to July 15, 1943, amounted to $222.36.” | agree with court The court applied the Fair Labor Standards Act to the specific period where the plaintiff was found to be non-exempt. The calculation of damages is a factual determination based on the recited pay rates and the statutory requirement for liquidated damages. |
Denial of overtime compensation and liquidated damages for the period July 15, 1943, to June 30, 1944“It is clear to the court that he was an exempt employee from and after July 15, 1943, to June 30, 1944, and not, therefore, entitled to liquidated damages or compensation for overtime.” | agree with court The court found the plaintiff met the criteria for the executive exemption under the FLSA based on his duties (managing a division, hiring/firing, discretion) and salary level. This is a factual determination consistent with the statutory exemptions. |
Award of attorney fees“The court finds that a reasonable attorney fee for plaintiff’s attorney is $150 and said sum is allowed under 29 U.S.C.A. §216.” | agree with court The FLSA authorizes the court to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party. The court exercised its discretion to set the fee at $150. |
Award of costs“Costs will ¡be allowed the plaintiff.” | agree with court Costs are typically awarded to the prevailing party. Since the plaintiff recovered damages and fees, they are the prevailing party. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the FLSA by distinguishing between the non-exempt period and the exempt period based on the plaintiff's duties and salary. The factual findings regarding the executive exemption are supported by the specific details of the plaintiff's job responsibilities (managing a division, hiring, discretion over materials). The award of fees and costs is standard for a prevailing plaintiff in an FLSA case. The order is procedurally complete in directing the preparation of findings and conclusions.
Opinion — Connor
J. F. T. O’CONNOR, District Judge.
The plaintiff brings this action to recover $1,069.28 liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant from March 15, 1943, to June 30, 1944, at the following rates of pay:
From March 15, 1943, to July 1, 1943, at $225 per month.
From July 1, 1943, to July 15, 1943, at $250 per month.
From July 15, 1943, to January 15, 1944, at $300 per month.
From January 15, 1944, to June 30, 1944, at $350 per month.
The court finds that the plaintiff was a non-exempt employee from March 15, 1943, to July 15, 1943, and was entitled to liquidated damages as provided by the Act. The court finds that the overtime compensation and liquidated damages during the period of March 15 to July 15, 1943, amounted to $222.36.
The court finds further that a reasonable attorney fee for plaintiff’s attorney is $150 and said sum is allowed under 29 U.S.C.A. §216.
The court finds that from and after July 15, 1943, the plaintiff was exempt from the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act; that he was from and after that date, until the time of his discharge by the defendant, in charge of the M. C. Division; that he attended morning meetings with the executives; that he made recommendations with respect to his department or division; that he employed secretaries and a switchboard operator, and generally assisted and directed employees in his division; that he used his own discretion in obtaining materials and determining whether materials should be sold from the stock in the warehouse of the defendant, or purchased from others; that the important question of shipment and the date of delivery and the quantities of material required for various projects were under his direction and control. It is clear to the court that he was an exempt employee from and after July 15, 1943, to June 30, 1944, and not, therefore, entitled to liquidated damages or compensation for overtime.
The court also gives some consideration to the fact that from July 15, 1943, to January 15, 1943, compensation of plaintiff was increased to $300 per month or a raise of $50 per month; and from January 15, 1943, to June 30, 1944, his compensation was increased to $350 per month or a raise of another $50 per month.
The plaintiff will prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law, serve the same upon the defendant, and file the same with the court within ten days from the date of this order.
Costs will ¡be allowed the plaintiff.