gno.law

United States v. Blasingame

District Court, S.D. California · No. 7 · 1900-11-14 · Published

UNITED STATES v. BLASINGAME

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Weleborn (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-14T01:15Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a demurrer to an information charging a violation of the Act of June 4, 1897, which criminalized violations of future regulations to be made by the Secretary of the Interior for forest reservations. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that the statute constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer.

What the court decidedThe model
Demurrer to the information sustained
“The demurrer to the information will be sustained.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that the statute in question (Act of June 4, 1897) delegated the power to define criminal conduct to the Secretary of the Interior without providing an intelligible principle or standard for the exercise of that power. Under the non-delegation doctrine as understood in 1900, Congress could not delegate its legislative power to create criminal offenses to an executive officer. The court distinguished this from Field v. Clark and Re Kollock, where the delegation involved filling in details or executing existing laws, rather than creating new substantive criminal rules. The reliance on U.S. v. Eaton and state cases further supports the conclusion that the delegation was invalid. The decision follows from the constitutional principles applicable at the time.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly applies the non-delegation doctrine as it was understood in 1900. The court distinguishes the present case from Field v. Clark and Re Kollock by noting that those cases involved the execution of existing legislative policies or the filling in of details, whereas the statute at issue here delegated the power to create new criminal offenses to the Secretary of the Interior. The court also cites U.S. v. Eaton, which, while not precisely on point, supports the distinction between executive and legislative power. The reliance on state cases is appropriate as persuasive authority. The reasoning is clear and the conclusion follows from the law.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion — Weleborn

WELEBORN, District Judge.

I am of opinion that the act entitled “An act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and for other purposes” (Act June 4, 1897) 30 Stat. 11), in so far as it declares to be a crime any violation of the rules and regulations thereafter to be made by the secretary of the interior for the protection of forest reservations, is, in substance and effect, a delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer. While the supreme court of the United States, in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294, and also in Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444, 41 L. Ed. 813, held that there was no unconstitutional delegation of power in either case, yet, applying and observing here the principles and distinctions there enunciated and recognized, it is impossible to escape the conclusion which I have announced. U. S. v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 12 Sup. Ct. 764, 36 L. Ed. 591, although not precisely like the case at bar, may also be aptly cited in support of said conclusion. Clear statements and pertinent applications of the doctrine announced by the supreme court of the United States in the two cases first above cited, that legislative power can be exercised only by that branch of the government to which the constitution commits it, will be found *655in People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624, Ex parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21, and Board of Harbor Com’rs v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491, 26 Pac. 375, 22 Am. St. Rep. 321.

The demurrer to the information will be sustained.

Cites, in this corpus

Cited by