In re I.M. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063298 · 2013-05-31 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J517887B
Trial judge: Cynthia Bashant
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: dependency
Panel: Cynthia Aaron (author), Alex C. McDonald, Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:53Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the mother reunification services for her son I.M., finding by clear and convincing evidence that she had not made reasonable subsequent efforts to treat the problems leading to her daughter's removal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, determining that substantial evidence supported the finding that the mother's post-termination efforts were insufficient.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). “It is clear that there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that, after the May 31, 2012, termination of services in E.J.'s case, Jessica made no reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to E.J.'s removal.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard to the clear and convincing evidence findings required by statute. The record cited in the opinion, including positive drug tests and failure to engage with offered services after the sibling's service termination, sufficiently supports the conclusion that the mother did not make reasonable subsequent efforts.

Authorities

relied: K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388 — Defines the 'reasonable effort to treat' standard as requiring efforts more than lackadaisical or half-hearted, but not synonymous with a cure.
relied: A.A. v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237 — Establishes that the court's findings regarding the denial of reunification services are reviewed for substantial evidence.
relied: In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94 — Clarifies that the 'reasonable efforts' required under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) must be subsequent to the termination of services or parental rights in the prior dependency case.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the applicable legal standard and applies the substantial evidence review to the specific factual findings. It effectively addresses the appellant's argument regarding prior efforts by citing authority that limits the statute to 'subsequent' efforts.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing for newborn I.M., the juvenile court removed him from his parents, granted the father reunification services, and denied services to the mother, Jessica G., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), based on the termination of services and parental rights in the dependency of I.M.'s half sibling E.J. and Jessica's failure to make subsequent reasonable efforts to treat her drug, anger and domestic violence problems. The Court of Appeal, calling the appeal frivolous, held substantial evidence supported the no-reasonable-effort finding, rejected the argument that efforts made during E.J.'s case counted as 'subsequent' efforts, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of reunification services to the mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), based on the finding that she had not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the half sibling's removal “It is clear that there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that, after the May 31, 2012, termination of services in E.J.'s case, Jessica made no reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to E.J.'s removal.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The opinion correctly states the K.C. formulation that reasonable effort is not cure but must be more than lackadaisical or half-hearted, and the recited record (positive drug tests for mother in December 2012 and for the newborn in October 2012, failure to appear for testing, failure to follow up with the parenting provider or therapist referrals, refusal of domestic violence resources, continued relationship with a violent drug-using partner) amply supports the finding under deferential substantial-evidence review. The one soft spot is the acknowledged uncertainty about whether Jessica had entered the KIVA residential program by mid-January 2013, but a possible last-minute entry days before the hearing does not undermine the finding, and the appellant bore the burden on the record.
Rejection of the mother's argument that efforts made while receiving services in E.J.'s dependency may be counted as 'reasonable efforts' under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) “Those criteria specifically refer to "[subsequent]" efforts, i.e., subsequent to the termination of services (id., subd. (b)(10)) or parental rights (id., subd. (b)(11)) in the prior dependency.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court did not expressly state a standard, but it resolved the point as a matter of statutory text, which is reviewed independently. The plain language of both subdivisions requires that the parent 'has not subsequently made a reasonable effort,' and In re Lana S. supports reading 'subsequently' as after the triggering event. The court did not separately note that for (b)(11) the triggering event (termination of parental rights on November 8, 2012) left only a two-month window, but (b)(10), with a May 31, 2012 trigger, independently supports the denial, so the omission is immaterial.
No best-interests finding under section 361.5, subdivision (c) to override the bypass provisions “Jessica does not contend that reunification is in I.M.'s best interests.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court The appellate court properly treated the best-interests exception as forfeited or not at issue because the mother did not argue it; the parent bears the burden of proving best interests by clear and convincing evidence under subdivision (c), as In re William B. states.

Authorities

relied: K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388 — The 'reasonable effort to treat' standard in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) is not synonymous with cure, but the parent's efforts must be more than lackadaisical or half-hearted.
relied: A.A. v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237 — A juvenile court's findings supporting denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) are reviewed for substantial evidence.
relied: In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220 — Even where a bypass provision applies, the court may order services if the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the child's best interests under section 361.5, subdivision (c).
relied: In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94 — The 'subsequently made a reasonable effort' language in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) refers to efforts made after the termination of services or parental rights in the prior dependency.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion identifies the correct statute and standard, cites apposite Court of Appeal authority on reasonable efforts and on the meaning of 'subsequently,' and marshals a detailed record showing continued drug use and inaction after May 2012 that plainly satisfies substantial-evidence review. It is brief and does not separately analyze the shorter post-termination-of-rights window relevant to subdivision (b)(11) or the unresolved KIVA entry, but neither point affects the result because subdivision (b)(10) independently supports the denial.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 5/31/13 In re I.M. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re I.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D063298 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J517887B) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSICA G., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia Bashant, Judge. Affirmed.

Katherine A. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Erica R. Cortez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jessica G. appeals following the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her son, I.M. Jessica contends that the court erred in denying her reunification services. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Jessica began using marijuana when she was nine years old, around the time that her stepfather began sexually abusing her. She began using methamphetamine when she was 11 years old. Jessica became a dependent of the juvenile court in 2007, when she was 15 years old, as a result of physical and sexual abuse and neglect. She received services as a dependent child but did not cooperate with the Agency. She ran away from her foster placement in 2007, when she was in the 10th grade, and dropped out of high school. In 2008, while still absent from her placement, Jessica gave birth to her daughter E.J.

In July 2010, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a petition on behalf of one-year-old E.J. The petition alleged that E.J. had bruises on her ears, consistent with slapping; bruises on her right thigh, arms, left hand and left shoulder; diffuse bruising on her buttocks; and patterned bruises on her right arm consistent with a finger mark.

Jessica admitted that she had caused E.J.'s injuries and that she had physically abused E.J. for approximately one month. Jessica said that she had heard her stepfather's voice and this had caused her to become frustrated with E.J. In September 2010, the 2 court made a true finding on E.J.'s petition, removed her from Jessica's custody and granted Jessica reunification services.

Between July 2010 and May 2012, Jessica was offered individual therapy, including anger management; drug treatment; and parenting education. She received inpatient substance abuse treatment from October 2010 until January 2011, when she left the program. In February 2011, Jessica was admitted to another program, but failed to attend. In May, Jessica attended the Parent Care Program for a few weeks, then quit.

That month, the court found that Jessica had made progress in services.1 In July 2011, Jessica began therapy. In September 2011, she entered the CRASH (Community Resources And Self Help) inpatient drug treatment program, which included parenting classes. In January 2012, Jessica completed the CRASH program. Two weeks later, she resumed using marijuana. Jessica was terminated from the CRASH aftercare program for missing sessions. In February, while pregnant with I.M., Jessica refused to submit to a drug test. In March, while still pregnant, Jessica tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines. In April, Jessica's therapy was terminated due to her lack of commitment. In May, the social worker contacted Jessica after having been unable to reach her for several months. Jessica told the social worker that she had been involved in domestic violence with Tony M., a gang member who used drugs, and falsely reported that she had suffered a miscarriage. Jessica agreed to resume drug treatment, but failed to do so.

1 The only record of the finding, a minute order, states: "PARENTS HAVE (MADE SOME) made substantive progress with the provisions of case plan." 3 By May 2012, the Agency had made services available to Jessica for most of the preceding five years. Because her participation in services had been inconsistent and she had failed to demonstrate that she had addressed protective issues, on May 31 the court terminated services at the 12-month review hearing in E.J.'s case. On the day of the hearing, the social worker asked Jessica to speak to a substance abuse specialist. Jessica said that she would do so and that she would resume attending Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. In August 2012, she had two negative drug tests. In October, when Jessica gave birth to I.M., he tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana. Jessica was living with I.M.'s father, Tony, with whom she had a history of using drugs. Jessica agreed to voluntary services, but then failed to appear for a drug test.

On November 2, 2012, the Agency filed a dependency petition on behalf of I.M.

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (j).)2 The petition alleged that Jessica had subjected I.M.'s sister, E.J., to serious physical harm, as described above. Jessica had failed to complete her reunification plan in E.J.'s case. Jessica had had a positive drug test in March and had refused to test for the Agency. Tony had recently used heroin and marijuana and had been arrested on drug charges in October.

I.M. was detained with the paternal grandparents. Before the November 5, 2012 detention hearing, the Agency referred Jessica to an in-home parenting course. Jessica met with the parenting service provider, but subsequently failed to return the provider's calls. On November 7, the Agency mailed Jessica a list of therapists. On November 8, 2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 4 the court terminated parental rights in E.J.'s case. On November 9, Jessica admitted that she had been a perpetrator as well as a victim in the domestic violence with Tony. She acknowledged that she angered easily and said that she did not "know how to deal with anger." On November 13, the social worker told Jessica that she could obtain substance abuse treatment referrals at the courthouse.

On November 15 or 16, 2012, Jessica and Tony had an altercation outside the paternal grandparents' home. On November 20, Jessica had a negative drug test. On November 24, she reported to law enforcement officers that Tony had punched her. A deputy sheriff offered Jessica domestic violence resources, but Jessica said that she did not need them. Jessica said that she was going to obtain a restraining order, but did not do so. A detective called her to follow up on the case, but Jessica did not return the telephone call.

On December 11, 2012, the social worker gave Jessica bus tokens and a list of therapists, and again provided the contact information of the parenting service provider.

On December 27, during an intake appointment at McAllister Institute, Jessica tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana. On January 15, 2013, the social worker attempted to contact Jessica at the KIVA residential treatment facility, and a counselor said that she would give Jessica a message. The record does not state whether Jessica had in fact entered KIVA and, if so, how long she had been there and whether she was progressing.

On January 16, 2013, the court entered true findings on I.M.'s dependency petition. The court ordered I.M. removed from Jessica and Tony's custody (§ 361, subd.

5 (c)(1)), and placed with a relative. The court granted Tony reunification services and denied Jessica services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11)), noting that "the Agency has gone above and beyond trying to offer [Jessica] services [a]nd that's been unsuccessful up until now."

DISCUSSION

"Reunification services need not be provided to a parent . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence," that the court terminated reunification services for a sibling or half sibling because the parent failed to reunify after the sibling's or half sibling's removal (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)), or the parent's rights over a sibling or half sibling were terminated (id., subd. (b)(11)), and that, in either situation, the parent "has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . ."3 (Id., subd. (b)(10) & (11).) "The 'reasonable effort to treat' standard 'is not synonymous with "cure." ' [Citation.] The statute provides a 'parent who has worked toward correcting his or her problems an opportunity to have that fact taken into consideration in subsequent proceedings.' [Citation.] To be reasonable, the parent's efforts must be more than 'lackadaisical or half-hearted.' [Citation.]" (K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393.) We review the court's findings for substantial evidence. (See A.A. v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237, 242.)

3 If a parent proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the child's best interests, the court may grant services even if section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) apply. (Id., subd. (c); In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227.) Jessica does not contend that reunification is in I.M.'s best interests. 6 This appeal is frivolous. It is clear that there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that, after the May 31, 2012, termination of services in E.J.'s case, Jessica made no reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to E.J.'s removal. In fact, by the time of the January 16, 2013, dispositional hearing in the instant case, Jessica had done virtually nothing to resolve her drug problem or her domestic violence and anger issues.

When she gave birth to I.M. in October 2012, he tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana. The Agency offered Jessica voluntary services, including an in-home parenting course, therapy and substance abuse treatment. Jessica failed to appear for a drug test and failed to return calls from the parenting service provider. There is no indication that Jessica made any attempt to enter therapy. Instead, she remained in a violent relationship, refused an offer of domestic violence resources and did not obtain a restraining order or cooperate with law enforcement officials. Ten days before the dispositional hearing, Jessica tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana.

We reject Jessica's argument that any efforts that she may have made while receiving services in E.J.'s dependency can be counted as "reasonable efforts" under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). Those criteria specifically refer to "[subsequent]" efforts, i.e., subsequent to the termination of services (id., subd. (b)(10))

or parental rights (id., subd. (b)(11)) in the prior dependency. (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 98, 108.)

7 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

MCDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus

A.A. v. Superior Court No. D062114 · 2012-09-12
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. C.G. No. D061155 · 2012-06-22
K.C. v. Superior Court C063449 · 2010-03-18
In Re William B. G039351 · 2008-05-14