Reed v. Arkansas
REED v. THE ARKANSAS
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Hall (author)
Analysis
The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the Fifth Article of the complaint as redundant and immaterial. The court also granted the defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to elect between a Jones Act claim and a General Maritime Law unseaworthiness claim before trial, citing the legal inconsistency between the two causes of action.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to strike the Fifth Article of the complaint is granted.“the matters alleged in the Fifth Article are redundant and immaterial, and the motion to strike the Fifth Article is granted.” | unsure The order provides no factual basis for why the Fifth Article is redundant or immaterial, making it impossible to verify the correctness of the decision based solely on the text provided. |
Motion to compel plaintiff to elect between the First Cause of Action (Jones Act) and the Second Cause of Action (Unseaworthiness) is granted.“The motion in the instant case is proper at this time and it is granted.” | agree with court The court relies on *Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson* and the statutory language of 46 U.S.C. 688 to mandate an election. While the court cites *Peterson* for the proposition that the causes are inconsistent, *Peterson* actually held that the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims could be maintained in the same action and that the seaman was not required to elect between them at the pleading stage. The court's reliance on *Peterson* to support a mandatory pre-trial election is a misapplication of the cited authority. However, the court also cites 46 U.S.C. 688, which explicitly states the seaman 'may, at his election, maintain an action.' The court's interpretation that this requires a pre-trial election to avoid prejudice and inconsistent evidence is a procedural determination. Given the explicit statutory language cited by the court ('at his election'), the court's decision to enforce this election pre-trial is defensible under the statute, even if the case law cited is mixed or misapplied. The court distinguishes *German v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp.* but does not explain why it is not binding or persuasive in a way that overrides the Supreme Court precedent it cites. The decision follows the statutory text the court relies on. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The court's reasoning for the election is grounded in the statutory text of 46 U.S.C. 688 and the practical concerns of prejudice and inconsistent evidence. However, the court misapplies *Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson*, which actually allowed the joinder of Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims without a mandatory election at the pleading stage. The court's reliance on *Peterson* to support the opposite conclusion is a significant legal error. Despite this, the court's decision is supported by the plain language of the statute it cites ('at his election') and the procedural necessity to prevent prejudice. The order is 'sound with gaps' because it reaches a defensible result based on the statute but relies on a misapplication of key Supreme Court precedent and fails to adequately address the conflict with *German* beyond stating it cannot be reconciled.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incomplete possible biasOpinion — Hall
HALL, District Judge.
As indicated at. the oral argument, the matters alleged in the Fifth Article are redundant and immaterial, and the motion to strike the Fifth Article is granted.
The defendant moves to compel the plaintiff to elect between the First Cause of Action under the Jones Act and the Second Cause of Action for unseaworthiness under the General Maritime Law.
*994The First Cause of action is triable to a jury and the Second is not. The First is a cause in personam, and the second is in rem. The degree of proof required for recovery under the first is greater than under the second, inasmuch as the plaintiff is required to prove negligence to recover under the Jones Act, whereas a plaintiff can recover regardless of fault, or lack of it, on the second count. What would be material and competent evidence on one cause of action may not be admissible at all on the other, or if admitted may be highly prejudicial if they were tried together before a jury. The causes of action are thus' legally inconsistent. It was held in Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 49 S.Ct. 75, 73 L.Ed. 220, that a cause of action under the Jones Act is inconsistent with a cause of action for unseaworthiness, and that an election must be made by the seaman. To the same effect are Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 48 S.Ct. 457, 72 L.Ed. 827; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 1075; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748; Engel v. Davenport et al., 271 U.S. 33, 46 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed. 813; Skolar v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 2 Cir., 60 F.2d 893; and McGhee v. U. S., 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 287. In the latter case the court stated, 165 F.2d at page 290, “We do not mean that a seaman may go to trial on both causes of action simultaneously, and recover upon one or the other as the evidence turns out.” The language of the Statute is plain that there must be an election by the seaman. It says, 46 U.S.C. 688, “Any seaman * * * may, at his election, maintain an action for damages * * I am unable to reconcile the plain language of the Statute and the above cited cases with the Third Circuit case of German v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 156 F.2d 977.
Clearly an election must be made. Under the above cases, it cannot be made, either at the conclusion of the evidence, or after judgment. It, therefore, must and should be made before trial. It is just and proper that it should be made sufficiently in advance of trial to allow a defendant to prepare, and to know upon which cause of action he must prepare. For the same reason it is proper that the election be made before the defendant is required to plead. The motion in the instant case is proper at this time and it is granted.
The motion to dismiss will go off calendar to be reset after plaintiff has made his election and filed the same with the clerk.
Cited by
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