Gan Seow Tung v. Carusi
GAN SEOW TUNG v. CARUSI
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Hall (author)
Analysis
The court considered the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940. The court denied the motion to the extent it challenged the statute's availability and venue, but granted the motion to the extent it required the joinder of the Attorney General, allowing the plaintiff ten days to amend the complaint.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to dismiss denied on the ground that Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 is not available to the plaintiff.“The defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. § 903, is not available to plaintiff, is not well taken.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the plain language of the statute, which explicitly permits suits in the district where the person 'claims' a permanent residence. The court rejected the government's argument that this would create a 'dual system' or require implied repeal, noting that the statute is a special remedy for a specific class of persons. The reasoning that a contrary construction would render the right to sue outside D.C. a 'practical nullity' is a valid interpretive principle (avoiding absurd results). The court also correctly dismissed the reliance on legislative history (debate between two congressmen) as insufficient to override the plain text of the statute. |
Motion to dismiss granted on the ground that the Attorney General was not joined as a party, with leave to amend.“The motion to dismiss on the ground the Attorney General has not been made a party is granted with ten (10) days to amend.” | agree with court The court interpreted the statutory reference to the 'Head of the Department' and 'agency' by looking to the organizational structure of the Department of Justice as defined in Title 8 U.S.C.A. Sections 100-102. The court reasoned that since the Immigration and Naturalization Service and its Commissioner are 'in' the Department of Justice and act under the direction of the Attorney General, the 'Head of the Department' must be the Attorney General. This is a logical statutory interpretation based on the administrative hierarchy described in the cited statutes. Granting leave to amend is a standard procedural remedy when a party is omitted but can be joined. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It addresses the two distinct grounds for dismissal separately. For the first ground, it applies standard canons of statutory construction (plain meaning, avoidance of absurdity/nullity) and correctly discounts weak legislative history. For the second ground, it uses the statutory definitions of the administrative structure to identify the proper party. The reasoning is clear and directly answers the arguments presented in the motion.
Opinion — Hall
HALL, District Judge.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. § 903, is not available to plaintiff, is not well taken. The statute is a special statute, and is plain and clear in its terms. It can be given effect without an implied repeal of the exclusion acts or the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202, or any other statutes called to my attention in the brief of the Government. While it may give the courts greater latitude of review than a Writ of Habeas Corpus, it provides no more of a dual system than already exists in the right to Habeas Corpus. It is a special act to provide a special remedy for a limited class of persons who “claim a right or privilege as a national * * * is denied * * * upon the ground” such person is not a national. It permits suit to be brought in the district where such person “claims” a permanent residence. The complaint meets these requirements and in addition alleges actual residence in the district. The only facts before me are those in the complaint. To construe the statute as contended for by the Government would be to make the right to sue outside of the District of Columbia a practical nullity, and by a process of over-refined construction of a statute which is plain in language and meaning, deny the right, which is the core of the section, to relief in the district — not of actual residence — but of claimed residence. The debate between two congressmen on the floor of the house at the time of the adoption of the Nationality Code — a very comprehensive statutory scheme — concerning the meaning of Section 503 thereof, is not the measure of the content of the Section, and to so hold would open the door to almost any meaning of any statute by statements made other than in an adversary proceeding by parties who have rights at stake.
The motion to dismiss on the ground that the Attorney General is not joined as a party is well taken. Section 100, Title 8 U.S.C.A., creates the Immigration and Naturalization Service “in’! the Department of Justice. By Section 101, the Commissioner is made an officer “in” the Department of Justice, and by the same Section he “shall perform all his duties under the direction of the Attorney General.” By Section 102, the Commissioner “shall have charge of the administration of all laws relating to * * * immigration,” etc., “under the direction of the Attorney General.” Other sections contain similar provisions, but the quoted portions are enough to demonstrate that the “Head of the Department” involved in the present proceeding means the “Head of the Department of Justice” which is the Attorney General. And, the word “agency” in the statute obviously means an agency not “in” any department, of which there seems to be many.
The motion to dismiss on the ground the Attorney General has not been made a party is granted with ten (10) days to amend. The restraining order to remain in force till further order of the Court. No indication is intended as to whether the previous defendants should or should nor be continued as defendants.
Cited by
- Gan Seow Tung v. Clark Civ. No. 6528 · 1949-03-18