California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. United States
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHANGE v. UNITED STATES el al. (four cases)
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Hall (author)
Analysis
The court considered motions to dismiss four consolidated cases where insurance carriers sought personal injury damages under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. The court granted the motions, holding that the carriers' election to seek compensation under the Act assigned control of the litigation to them and barred recovery of additional damages for late filing.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to dismiss cases 5877, 5878, 5879, and 5880 granted.“The motion to dismiss each of the above cases is granted.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the principle that the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in California (one year) applies to these claims. It further correctly reasoned that under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, the election to seek compensation assigns control of the litigation to the employer and carrier, making them responsible for timely filing. The dismissal follows from the expiration of the limitations period and the statutory assignment of control. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but logically sound. It identifies the applicable statute of limitations, addresses the libelants' argument regarding 'exceptional circumstances' and control of litigation, and resolves it by pointing to the specific statutory provision (33 U.S.C.A. § 933) that assigns control to the carrier upon election of compensation. It relies on a prior memorandum in a sister case (No. 5876) for the specific application of the limitation period, which is a standard procedural practice in consolidated or related dockets. The reasoning directly answers the motion with the relevant statutory authorities.
Opinion — Hall
HALL, District Judge.
In cases 5877, Dodson; 5878, Whyatt; 5879, Corbin, and 5880, Howard, •deaths did not occur, but the libelants’ insurance carriers seek, by their amended libel to recover not only the employer’s liability for compensation under the Longshoremen’s Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., but an additional sum as damages for personal injuries to the awardee. The period of the Statute of Limitations in California for personal injuries, California Code Civ.Proc. § 340, subd. 3, is the same as for death, Hence the one year period of limitation applies.
Libelants assert an “exceptional circumstance,” with relation to these four cases in that by virtue of th-e control of the litigation being in the employer and its insurance carrier, it would amount to a penalty upon the injured party by applying the one year Statute. But the answer to this lies in the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The libelants made their election under that Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 933 (a, bj, to seek compensation. Whatever rights they had were assigned to the employers and their carrier, and by the specific terms of the Act, the employers and the carrier are then given control of the litigation. Such an election precludes recovery of the additional compensation if a suit is not filed in time. The one year period of limitation applicable in case No. 5876, D.C., 74 F.Supp. 401, is applicable and controlling here. Reference is made to the memorandum this day filed in case No. 5876.
The motion to dismiss each of the above cases is granted.
Cites, in this corpus
- California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. United States No. 5876 · 1947-10-08
Cited by
- Calfornia Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. United States 4850 · 1947-10-08