In re Francisco P. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J223598
- Trial judge
- Richard R. Monroy
- Outcome
- modified — Affirmed as modified.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Alex C. McDonald, O'Rourke
Analysis
The juvenile court adjudicated the minor a ward of the court, imposed probation with specific conditions including a requirement to show proof of financial responsibility before driving, and calculated pre-disposition custody credits. On appeal, the court modified the judgment to correct the custody credits to 57 days but affirmed the imposition of the driving-related probation condition.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Calculation of pre-disposition custody credits“We will direct the juvenile court to amend the disposition order to correct the award of credits.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that the record clearly showed the minor was in custody from May 11, 2012, to July 6, 2012, totaling 57 days, and that the trial court's calculation was incorrect. The respondent conceded the error, and the court properly exercised its authority to correct the credits based on the clear record. |
Imposition of probation condition requiring proof of financial responsibility before driving“We conclude the imposition of condition 19 was well within the very broad discretion of the juvenile court and does serve a legitimate purpose to attempt to avoid future unlawful behavior.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The court applied the standard that probation conditions limiting non-criminal conduct are valid if reasonably related to the crime or preventing future criminality. It reasoned that given the minor's history of gang involvement and irresponsible behavior, requiring full legal compliance (including proof of insurance) before driving was a reasonable rehabilitative measure consistent with the court's quasi-parental role. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497 — Juvenile offenders are entitled to receive credit for all time in physical custody prior to disposition.
- relied: In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348 — An appellate court may correct the amount of custody credits where the record is clear that the juvenile court erred in its calculation.
- relied: In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963 — Juvenile courts have broad discretion to impose any reasonable conditions of probation that may properly enhance the reformation and rehabilitation of the minor.
- relied: In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029 — The juvenile court stands in the shoes of the parents when providing guidance to wards of the court.
- relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — A condition of probation which limits conduct that is otherwise not criminal will be valid if the limitation is reasonably related to the crime or preventing future criminality.
- relied: In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013 — A condition of probation which limits conduct that is otherwise not criminal will be valid if the limitation is reasonably related to the crime or preventing future criminality.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established standard for correcting custody credits based on a clear record and properly defers to the trial court's broad discretion in imposing probation conditions that are reasonably related to rehabilitation. The reasoning effectively connects the minor's history of irresponsible behavior to the legitimacy of the driving condition.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAfter a contested adjudication the juvenile court made true findings on witness intimidation by force, grand theft from the person, battery, and possession of drug paraphernalia, placed the Minor on probation with a Camp Barrett commitment, awarded predisposition custody credits, struck two driving-related probation conditions, and refused to strike condition 19 requiring proof of financial responsibility before any driving privilege. On appeal the People conceded the credits were miscalculated, the Court of Appeal directed the dispositional order be amended to reflect 57 days of credit, and otherwise affirmed, holding condition 19 was within the juvenile court's broad discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 and People v. Lent.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Calculation of predisposition custody credits in the dispositional order“Thus he is entitled to 57 days of custody credit. We will direct the juvenile court to amend the disposition order to correct the award of credits.” | de novo | error (other) | agree with court Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 and In re Randy J. entitle a minor to credit for all predisposition physical custody; the Minor was in juvenile hall continuously from May 11 to July 6, 2012, which is 57 days, the People conceded the error, and In re Antwon R. permits the appellate court to correct the award where the record is clear. The modification is plainly correct. |
Denial of the Minor's request to strike probation condition 19 (no driving privilege until proof of financial responsibility)“We conclude the imposition of condition 19 was well within the very broad discretion of the juvenile court and does serve a legitimate purpose to attempt to avoid future unlawful behavior.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Under Lent a condition restricting otherwise lawful conduct is invalid only if it is unrelated to the offense, concerns conduct not itself criminal, and is unrelated to future criminality; Vehicle Code section 16028 already requires drivers to carry proof of financial responsibility, so the condition largely restates a legal duty and burdens no lawful activity, and in any event it is reasonably related to preventing future unlawful conduct by a gang-affiliated minor who reoffended while on probation. Juvenile courts have broader latitude than adult courts (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b); In re Antonio C.), and the Minor's only objection below—that he was unlicensed—does not show an abuse of discretion. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — A probation condition restricting noncriminal conduct is invalid only if it has no relationship to the crime, relates to conduct not itself criminal, and is not reasonably related to future criminality.
- relied: In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497 — Juvenile offenders are entitled under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 to credit for all time in physical custody before disposition.
- relied: In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348 — An appellate court may correct an erroneous custody credit calculation where the record clearly shows the juvenile court erred.
- relied: In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963 — Juvenile courts have broad discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) to impose reasonable probation conditions that enhance the minor's reformation and rehabilitation.
- relied: In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029 — The juvenile court stands in the shoes of the parents when fashioning conditions to guide a ward.
- relied: In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013 — The Lent test applies to juvenile probation conditions limiting otherwise lawful conduct, which are valid if reasonably related to the offense or to preventing future criminality.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly accepted the conceded custody credit error and applied the governing Lent framework and the juvenile court's section 730 discretion to the single challenged condition, noting that the condition largely tracks an existing Vehicle Code duty and is reasonably related to preventing future unlawful conduct by a minor who reoffended while on probation. The analysis is brief but answers both of the Minor's arguments with the appropriate authorities.
Opinion
Filed 5/23/13 In re Francisco P. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re FRANCISCO P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D062272 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J223598)
v. FRANCISCO P., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard R.
Monroy, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Libby A. Ryan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Theodore M.
Cropley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Following a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court made true findings on allegations of threatening a victim by force (Pen. Code,1 § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)); grand theft from the person (§ 487, subd. (c)); battery (§ 242); and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1, subd. (a)). The court determined the maximum confinement potential was eight years.
Francisco P. (the Minor) was placed on probation, subject to a commitment to the Camp Barrett program for a period not to exceed 365 days and certain other conditions.
The Minor appeals contending the juvenile court incorrectly calculated his pre- disposition custody credits and that the court erred in declining to strike one of the probation conditions. The respondent properly concedes the custody credits were incorrectly calculated. We will order the juvenile court to correct the disposition order to award the Minor 57 days of predisposition custody credits. Otherwise we will affirm the juvenile court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the Minor does not challenge the admissibility or sufficiency of the evidence to support the true findings, we will only summarize the underlying offenses.
The Minor, who is affiliated with the Varrio Fallbrook Locos Sureno gang, physically assaulted another boy and took items of property from him. He also threatened the victim with physical harm if he reported the offenses.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 DISCUSSION
I
CUSTODY CREDITS
The Minor contends, and the respondent concedes, he is entitled to additional pre- disposition custody credits. He contends he is entitled to 57 days of such credit.
Juvenile offenders are entitled to receive credit for all time in physical custody prior to disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726; In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504-1505.) An appellate court may correct the amount of custody credits where the record is clear that the juvenile court erred in its calculation. (In re Antwon R. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 348, 350.)
The Minor was arrested and placed in juvenile hall on May 11, 2012 and remained there until the disposition hearing on July 6, 2012. Thus he is entitled to 57 days of custody credit. We will direct the juvenile court to amend the disposition order to correct the award of credits.
II
THE CONTESTED PROBATION CONDITION
At the time of the disposition hearing the court considered a series of proposed conditions relating to the Minor's ability to drive a vehicle. (Conditions 17-24.) The Minor was not then licensed to drive a vehicle, but was otherwise eligible to be licensed.
He objected to three of the proposed conditions: Condition 17 delaying licensing for one year; condition 18 requiring an abstract to be issued to the Department of Motor 3 Vehicles; and condition 19 requiring that the Minor not have a driving privilege until he gives proof of financial responsibility. The Minor's objection to the three conditions was that he did not have a driver's license.
The court struck conditions 17 and 18 but denied the request to strike condition 19. The Minor contends the trial court erred in denying his request to strike condition 19.
He argues the offense had nothing to do with driving and thus the condition does not have a relationship to the offense. He further contends the condition prohibits legal conduct and is not related to any rehabilitative purpose. We conclude the imposition of condition 19 was well within the very broad discretion of the juvenile court and does serve a legitimate purpose to attempt to avoid future unlawful behavior.
A. Legal Principles Juvenile courts have broad discretion to impose any reasonable conditions of probation that may properly enhance the reformation and rehabilitation of the minor.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b); In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 968.) The juvenile court "stands in the shoes of the parents" when providing guidance to wards of the court. (In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033-1034.)
A condition of probation, which limits conduct that is otherwise not criminal, will be valid if the limitation is reasonably related to the crime or preventing future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486; In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016.)
4 Vehicle Code section 16028 requires all drivers to show proof of financial responsibility when demand is made by a peace officer.
Thus the question presented here is whether condition 19 relates to the Minor's reformation and rehabilitation.
B. Analysis The probation conditions the court imposed, which are not challenged here, include not driving unless licensed and insured (condition 22). The challenged condition merely augments the requirement by also requiring the showing of financial responsibility, which can be shown with valid proof of insurance. Thus, condition 19 does not burden the Minor's exercise of any lawful activity. It is merely one of a group of conditions, most of which are unchallenged, requiring the Minor to only drive lawfully.
In this case the Minor was on probation when he committed the current offenses, which included violent and threatening behavior. He has been actively involved with a criminal street gang and has continued to behave in an irresponsible manner even where there has been juvenile court intervention. Given the pattern of irresponsibility, it was reasonable for the court to attempt to prevent future irresponsible behavior in the driving of vehicles. The fact he was not yet licensed to drive does not detract from the court's legitimate desire to correct the behavior underlying his offense, i.e., acting in an unlawful and potentially harmful manner.
In our view, requiring the Minor to fully comply with the law before he is permitted to drive a vehicle is entirely consistent with the quasi-parental role of the 5 juvenile court in dealing with a young person who could well end up in the adult criminal justice system if his behavior is not corrected. Condition 19 was lawfully imposed.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is directed to amend the dispositional order to reflect 57 days of predisposition custody credit. In all other respects the adjudication and dispositional orders are affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Byron B. E034871 · 2004-06-24
- People v. Antwon R. E028752 · 2001-02-27
- In Re Antonio C. F034727 · 2000-09-25
- People v. Abdirahman S. D028122 · 1997-10-24
- People v. Randy J. C014101 · 1994-02-04
- People v. Lent Crim. 17984 · 1975-10-30