P. v. Cobb CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D062364 · 2013-05-20 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE319550
Trial judge: Allan J. Preckel
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:54Z · confidence high

The trial court admitted statements made by the defendant to a police officer, ruling that Miranda warnings were not required because the initial questions occurred during a detention rather than custody and the subsequent statements were voluntary. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding no error in the admission of the statements.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Admission of pre-arrest statements ('to defend himself') “In the present case, it is clear that the deputy's questions were asked before Cobb was arrested and prior to Cobb being placed in custody. Accordingly, a Miranda warning was not required at that point.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The court correctly applied the two-step review process for Miranda challenges, first reviewing the factual basis for custody under the substantial evidence standard and then applying de novo review to the legal conclusion. The conclusion that the initial encounter was a detention rather than custody is supported by the facts that the officer asked a limited question immediately after the seizure, consistent with the exception for reasonable inquiries during a detention.
Admission of post-arrest statements ('It's Lakeside, homie...') “Here, the testimony at trial clearly shows the deputy did not ask postarrest statements or make any remarks that might have triggered Cobb's statements.2 Thus, we are satisfied that the court correctly admitted Cobb's statements into evidence.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court correctly identified that Miranda protections apply only to custodial interrogation. Since the record established that the officer did not ask questions or make remarks intended to elicit a response, the defendant's spontaneous statements were not the product of interrogation and thus did not require Miranda warnings.

Authorities

relied: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 — Establishes the requirement for warnings and waiver during custodial interrogation.
relied: People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354 — Establishes the substantial evidence standard for reviewing the factual basis of a trial court's decision on a Miranda challenge.
relied: People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876 — Establishes the de novo standard for reviewing the legal decision to admit statements under Miranda.
relied: People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081 — States that the presence of custody is the sine qua non of the Miranda warning system.
relied: People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612 — Supports the principle that custody is a prerequisite for Miranda protections.
relied: Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420 — Holds that Miranda warnings are not required for routine traffic stops or temporary detentions, only upon arrest.
relied: People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107 — Clarifies that limited inquiries during a detention do not elevate the detention into custody.
relied: Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291 — Defines interrogation to include express questioning and its functional equivalent, and holds that voluntary statements without interrogation are not covered by Miranda.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established two-step standard of review for Miranda challenges and accurately distinguishes between detention and custody based on the specific facts of the encounter. It also correctly applies the functional equivalent test from Rhode Island v. Innis to determine that the post-arrest statements were voluntary and not the result of interrogation.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

Following a jury conviction for unlawful possession of a billy club (Pen. Code, § 22210), the trial court granted Cobb probation after having deferred ruling on his self-drafted Fifth Amendment suppression motion and allowing the deputy's testimony about Cobb's pre-arrest and post-arrest statements to come in without objection. The Court of Appeal held that the pre-arrest question during a Terry-type detention did not require Miranda warnings and the post-arrest remark in the patrol car was volunteered rather than the product of interrogation, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Admission of Cobb's pre-arrest statements (that he carried the pipe 'to defend himself' because his friend had 'gotten jumped') made while prone at gunpoint during the initial detention, over a Miranda objection “In the present case, it is clear that the deputy's questions were asked before Cobb was arrested and prior to Cobb being placed in custody. Accordingly, a Miranda warning was not required at that point.”	mixed	correct	agree with court Berkemer v. McCarty and People v. Farnam permit a limited number of investigative questions during a detention without Miranda warnings, and a single question about why an armed man was carrying a pipe at 3:25 a.m. falls within that rule. The opinion's custody analysis is thin, however: it does not weigh the drawn firearm and prone-position order under the totality-of-circumstances test, and does not cite California authority such as People v. Pilster addressing when force during a detention converts it into custody. The result is nonetheless well supported because the encounter was brief, occurred in public, and involved one safety-related question before arrest.
Admission of Cobb's post-arrest statement in the patrol car ('It's Lakeside, homie. You know how it is out here. Can you have some discretion?') as a volunteered statement not resulting from interrogation “Here, the testimony at trial clearly shows the deputy did not ask postarrest statements or make any remarks that might have triggered Cobb's statements.”	mixed	correct	agree with court Under Rhode Island v. Innis and Miranda itself, volunteered statements not made in response to express questioning or its functional equivalent are admissible even from a suspect in custody. The undisputed trial testimony was that the deputy was outside the car doing paperwork and said nothing to prompt the remark, so there was no interrogation and the Innis functional-equivalent doctrine is not triggered.
Trial court's deferral of ruling on the written suppression motion pending foundation at trial, with the statements then admitted without renewed objection “The trial court deferred ruling on the motion until testimony was presented. The court directed the prosecutor to lay an appropriate foundation for the statements.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court The appellate court noted the lack of a contemporaneous objection (and that Cobb himself elicited part of the testimony on cross-examination) but declined to apply forfeiture because the Attorney General did not raise it, and instead reached the merits. Reaching the merits was a permissible choice and did not prejudice Cobb; the opinion does not separately evaluate whether the trial court ever made an express ruling, treating admission as an implied ruling.

Authorities

relied: Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420 — A temporary investigative detention, though a Fourth Amendment seizure in which the suspect is not free to leave, is not Miranda custody; warnings are required once the suspect is formally arrested or restrained to a comparable degree.
relied: Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291 — Interrogation under Miranda means express questioning or its functional equivalent—words or actions police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response; volunteered statements are not covered.
relied: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 — Custodial interrogation requires advisement of rights and waiver; volunteered statements of any kind are not barred.
relied: People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354 — Appellate courts defer to the trial court's express or implied factual findings when supported by substantial evidence.
relied: People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876 — The legal question whether statements were admissible under Miranda is reviewed independently.
relied: People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107 — Police may ask a moderate number of questions during a detention to determine whether to arrest without converting the detention into custody.
relied: People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612 — Custody is a prerequisite to the Miranda warning and waiver requirement.
relied: People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081 — Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation; absent custody no warnings are required.
missed: People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395 — Whether a detention involving handcuffing or other force has become Miranda custody depends on the totality of circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person, including the length, location, and degree of restraint; use of handcuffs or force does not automatically create custody.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies Berkemer and Innis to a brief public detention with one investigative question followed by an unprompted post-arrest remark, and its result is well supported. It skips a fuller totality-of-circumstances analysis of the gun-drawn, prone-position detention and does not cite California authority on when force during a detention becomes custody, leaving the custody holding adequately but not thoroughly reasoned.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 5/20/13 P. v. Cobb CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D062364

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE319550)

JOSHUA LEE COBB,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Allan J.

Preckel, Judge. Affirmed.

Charles R. Khoury Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Stephanie H.

Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Joshua L. Cobb of unlawful possession of a billy club (Pen.

Code,1 § 22210). Cobb was granted probation subject to certain conditions.

Cobb appeals contending the trial court erred in admitting certain statements made by Cobb in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (l966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We are satisfied the trial court correctly admitted the challenged statements and affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At about 3:25 a.m. on March 27, 2012, a San Diego Sheriff's Deputy entered the parking lot of a 7-11 store in Lakeside. The deputy saw Cobb in the parking lot carrying a 24-inch long piece of pipe in his left hand. Cobb had a beer bottle upside down in his right hand. When Cobb saw the patrol car he moved the pipe more in line with his body in an apparent attempt to hide it from view.

The deputy got out of his car, drew his weapon and ordered Cobb to get down on the ground. Cobb got down on the ground in a prone position. The deputy asked Cobb why he was carrying the pipe to which Cobb responded "to defend himself" and stated his friend had "gotten jumped." Cobb was then placed under arrest, handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol car.

While the deputy was outside of the car, filling out paperwork, Cobb leaned forward and said to the deputy, "It's Lakeside, homie. You know how it is out here. Can you have some discretion?" The deputy did not respond.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 DISCUSSION Alleged Miranda Violation Prior to jury selection, Cobb, who was then representing himself, filed a written motion to suppress evidence on Fifth Amendment grounds. Although the motion is somewhat rambling, it appears to challenge the admissibility of his statements to the deputy on Miranda grounds. The trial court deferred ruling on the motion until testimony was presented. The court directed the prosecutor to lay an appropriate foundation for the statements. Thereafter, during the trial the deputy testified to the statements set forth above without any objection. Cobb now contends the statements were admitted in violation of Miranda.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a challenge to evidence based on Miranda we first review the factual basis for the trial court's decision under the substantial evidence standard of review.

There we defer to the express or implied findings of the trial court. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Once the facts have been determined we review the decision to admit the statements under the de novo standard of review. Under that standard we independently determine whether the statements were lawfully admitted into evidence. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918.)

The application of the above standard of review is complicated somewhat because Cobb failed to object when the testimony was actually given. Indeed part of the 3 testimony was elicited on cross-examination by Cobb. We note the respondent has not raised the issue of forfeiture so we will resolve the issue on the record before us.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

When a person is subjected to custodial interrogation for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements, the person must first be warned of the rights established in Miranda, and make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. The sine qua non of the Miranda warning and waiver system, however, is the presence of custody. (People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.)

Thus the first question to be decided is custody.

Where a person has been placed under arrest, that person is in custody. However, temporary detention, although a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, is not the equivalent of custody. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442.) During a detention, police may ask a reasonable number of questions in order to determine whether or not the suspect should be arrested. Such limited inquiries do not elevate a detention into custody. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 169.) The question is whether the detention has become so restrictive, or lasted so long, that a reasonable person would believe that he or she is in custody.

Once a person is in custody, the question arises as to whether the person is being interrogated. Voluntary statements made without interrogation do not fall within the Miranda protective system. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 299-300;

Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478.)

4 III

ANALYSIS

Undoubtedly Cobb was forcibly detained by the deputy. The deputy displayed a firearm and ordered Cobb to the ground. However, this occurred in a night time encounter between the deputy and Cobb who was armed with a weapon. Almost immediately the deputy inquired as to the reason Cobb had the pipe, which may have been a lawful reason. While Cobb was not free to leave, by definition anyone detained is not "free to leave." As the court in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. at page 442, noted Miranda advisements are not immediately required when a person is detained. In that case the defendant was not free to leave when first questioned. It was only when the suspect was placed under arrest that the court found the Miranda requirements had been triggered.

In the present case, it is clear that the deputy's questions were asked before Cobb was arrested and prior to Cobb being placed in custody. Accordingly, a Miranda warning was not required at that point.

The second set of statements made by Cobb occurred while he was handcuffed and seated in the patrol car. The undisputed testimony at trial was that the deputy did not ask Cobb any question which prompted his response.

In Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, the court recognized that certain police actions might be sufficiently compelling on a suspect to become a substitute for interrogation. In that case the police officers had engaged in discussions among themselves, in the presence of the suspect, about their concerns for the safety of children 5 in a nearby school if they were unable to find the missing murder weapon, a shotgun.

After the statements by police, Innis directed police to the location where he had left the weapon. Even then the court concluded the remarks were not made with the actual intention of triggering a response, nor did they have reason to believe Innis would respond to their remarks.

Here, the testimony at trial clearly shows the deputy did not ask postarrest statements or make any remarks that might have triggered Cobb's statements.2 Thus, we are satisfied that the court correctly admitted Cobb's statements into evidence.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

IRION, J.

2 In his opening brief, Cobb makes numerous references to the preliminary hearing transcript. However, the decision on admissibility of the statements in this case was based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Accordingly, we ignore the references to the preliminary hearing transcript. 6

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Farnam S010808 · 2002-07-31
People v. Weaver S004665 · 2001-08-20
People v. Mosley B124811 · 1999-07-29
People v. Glaser S042656 · 1995-10-12
People v. Mickey S004567. Crim. 23341 · 1991-10-31