Weir v. Super. Ct. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- writ
- Trial judge
- Frederick Maguire
- Outcome
- writ granted — Petition granted.
- Area
- other
- Panel
- Joan K. Irion (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Judith D. McConnell
Analysis
The trial court ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to render the petitioner competent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate to vacate that order, finding it was not supported by substantial evidence as conceded by the prosecution.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication“the order in this case is not supported by substantial evidence” | substantial evidence | error | agree with court The appellate court found the trial court's order invalid because the medical evidence provided did not address the specific need for antipsychotic medication, and the prosecution conceded the lack of substantial evidence. |
Authorities
- relied: Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166 — Establishes the constitutional liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic drugs and the four-factor test for involuntary medication to restore competency.
- relied: People v. O'Dell (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 562 — Confirms that Penal Code section 1370 was amended to comply with Sell and outlines the statutory requirements for forced medication orders.
- relied: Carter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 992 — Holds that an order for forced medication is invalid if there is no medical evidence to support it.
- relied: Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218 — Supports the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance when the law is well-settled and the matter requires accelerated review.
- relied: Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29 — Supports the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance under Code of Civil Procedure section 1088.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the Sell factors and California statutory requirements to the conceded lack of medical evidence. The procedural choice to issue a peremptory writ is supported by the urgency of the liberty interest and the prosecution's concession.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe superior court found Weir incompetent to stand trial, committed him to Patton State Hospital, and authorized involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication based on a psychologist's report that did not address the need for such medication or Weir's capacity to make medication decisions. The Court of Appeal, with the Attorney General conceding error, issued a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance directing the superior court to vacate the forced-medication portion of its order and set the matter for further hearing under Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B).
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication under Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)“The Attorney General agrees the order in this case is not supported by substantial evidence.” | substantial evidence | error (fact finding unsupported) | agree with court Under Sell and section 1370(a)(2)(B), a forced-medication order requires medical evidence and specific findings, including that the defendant lacks capacity to make medication decisions. The only evidence was Dr. Takamura's report, prepared without a face-to-face examination, which did not address antipsychotic medication at all; Carter and O'Dell hold such an order invalid without supporting medical evidence. The Attorney General's concession and the record described support the court's conclusion. |
Propriety of issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance“Because the prosecution has conceded Weir's entitlement to relief, the law is well- settled, and the matter requires accelerated review, we conclude a peremptory writ in the first instance is proper.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court This is the appellate court's own procedural determination rather than review of a trial court ruling. Palma notice was given, the People conceded, the law is settled, and petitioner was being medicated against his will, satisfying the Alexander/Ng criteria for an accelerated peremptory writ. |
Authorities
- relied: Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166 — A defendant has a significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic drugs; involuntary medication to restore competence is permitted only on findings of important governmental interests, that medication will significantly further those interests, that less intrusive alternatives are unlikely to work, and that medication is medically appropriate.
- relied: People v. O'Dell (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 562 — Section 1370 was amended in 2004 to comply with Sell; a forced-medication order unsupported by medical evidence is invalid.
- relied: Carter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 992 — An order for involuntary antipsychotic medication under section 1370 is invalid where no medical evidence supports the required findings.
- relied: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — Procedure for notice before issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.
- relied: Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate where petitioner's entitlement to relief is clear and the matter requires accelerated review.
- relied: Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29 — Criteria for issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly identified the Sell framework as codified in section 1370(a)(2)(B) and applied Carter and O'Dell to hold that a forced-medication order resting on a report silent about antipsychotic medication and capacity lacks substantial evidence. Given the People's concession and the ongoing deprivation of liberty, the accelerated peremptory writ with remand for a proper hearing was the right disposition and answered the only argument raised.
Opinion
Filed 5/16/13 Weir v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ZACHARY L. WEIR, D063771 Petitioner, (San Diego County Super. Ct. Nos. MH107755, SCD241752, v. SCD241929 & CD242246)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
PROCEEDINGS in mandate after superior court ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. Frederick Maguire, Judge. Petition granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
The People filed three felony complaints charging Zachary L. Weir with drug offenses, burglary, identity-theft and other crimes. On August 9, 2012, defense counsel expressed doubts about Weir's competency, and the court suspended criminal 1 We take judicial notice of the record in the companion appeal, D063067. proceedings under Penal Code section 13682 and issued an order to have Weir evaluated.
Although Dr. Michael Takamura was unable to conduct a face-to-face examination of Weir, who refused to participate, the doctor reviewed medical records and correspondence and opined that Weir suffered from a severe mental disorder that would impair him from fully understanding and making decisions in the action. On October 10, the court adjudged Weir to be mentally incompetent and issued an order committing him to Patton State Hospital and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. Weir appealed the judgment of incompetency, order for commitment, and authorization for involuntary administration of medication (D063067).
In this petition, Weir asserts he is currently being required to take medication against his will. He argues the order authorizing forced administration of antipsychotic medication is not supported by substantial evidence—that it was based solely on Dr.
Takamura's report and, except for a passing reference to the fact that Weir had taken antidepressant and anti-anxiety medications in the past and believed they hurt (rather than helped) him, the report contains no discussion, analysis or findings related to the need for antipsychotic medication or other drugs.
We requested an informal response to the petition and issued Palma notice.
(Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
DISCUSSION
"[A]n individual has a 'significant' constitutionally protected 'liberty interest' in 'avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.' " (Sell v. United States 2 All references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 178 (Sell).) The interest is so fundamental that it may be overcome only by "an 'essential' or 'overriding' state interest[.]" (Id., at pp. 178-179.) As outlined in Sell, the government may involuntarily medicate a mentally ill criminal defendant to render him competent to stand trial only if the court finds important governmental interests are at stake; forced medication will significantly further the state interests in timely prosecution and a fair trial; alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results; and administration of the medication is medically appropriate. (Id. at pp. 180-181.)
In 2004, the California Legislature amended section 1370 to comply with the dictates of Sell. (People v. O'Dell (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 562, 570; Pen. Code, § 1370, as amended by Stats. 2004, ch. 486, § 2.) The statute authorizes the court to issue an order for a treatment facility to administer antipsychotic medication against the will of the defendant to render him or her competent to stand trial conditioned on certain findings. (§1370, subd. (a)(2)(B).) The order for forced medication is invalid, however, if there is no medical evidence to support it. (Carter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 992, 1003; People v. O'Dell, supra, at p. 572.)
The Attorney General agrees the order in this case is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the People assert the basis for the order appears to be Dr.
Takamura's report, which does not address the issue of whether Weir requires antipsychotic medication, and there is nothing in the record to show that the trial court heard evidence and determined that Weir lacked the capacity to make decisions about medication as is required by statute. The Attorney General concedes that Weir is entitled 3 to relief and asks us to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings under section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B).
Because the prosecution has conceded Weir's entitlement to relief, the law is well- settled, and the matter requires accelerated review, we conclude a peremptory writ in the first instance is proper. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1088; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993)
5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another ground in Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4; Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35.)
DISPOSITION
Let a writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate that portion of its October 10, 2012, order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to petitioner Weir, and set the matter for further hearing. This opinion is made final immediately as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3).)
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Carter v. Superior Court B182641 · 2006-07-27
- People v. O'DELL C046576 · 2005-02-03
- Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital S106256 · 2003-08-18
- Alexander v. Superior Court S026431 · 1993-10-14
- Ng v. Superior Court S025119 · 1992-12-03
- Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. L.A. No. 31725 · 1984-06-07