In re Marie B. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063055 · 2013-04-16 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. NJ14254
Trial judge: Michael J. Imhoff (commissioner)
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: dependency
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), McINTYRE, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:56Z · confidence high

The trial court continued juvenile court jurisdiction over the child for an additional six months, finding that conditions requiring supervision still existed due to the severity of the original protective issue and the parents' limited experience. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's decision.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Order continuing juvenile court jurisdiction for an additional six months “Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision to continue jurisdiction for an additional six months.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard, which is the appropriate standard for reviewing a juvenile court's decision to continue jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 364, subdivision (c). The court identified specific evidence in the record, including the severity of the original protective issue (the death of the sibling), the father's admitted anger issues and lack of insight, the mother's denial, and the parents' limited parenting experience, to support the conclusion that the trial court's finding was reasonable. The reasoning is consistent with established California dependency law regarding the burden of proof and the deference owed to the juvenile court's findings.

Authorities

relied: Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285 — The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the agency establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.
relied: In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167 — A juvenile court's decision whether to continue jurisdiction is reviewed under the substantial evidence test.
relied: In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031 — A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence.
relied: In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112 — The reviewing court must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court and view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.
relied: In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412 — The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the applicable standard of review (substantial evidence) and the statutory burden (preponderance of evidence) for continuing jurisdiction. It then applies these standards to the specific facts of the case, citing the severity of the original protective issue and the parents' ongoing challenges as sufficient to support the trial court's decision.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The juvenile court, at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 364 family maintenance review hearing, placed Marie with both parents but continued dependency jurisdiction for another six months based on the death of her sibling from nonaccidental injuries caused by the father, the father's untreated anger issues and refusal to discuss the death in therapy, the mother's dependence on the father and denial regarding the death, the parents' limited parenting experience, and Marie's young age. On the mother's appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the substantial evidence standard and affirmed, holding the Agency carried its burden to show conditions justifying continued supervision still existed or were likely to exist if supervision were withdrawn.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Order continuing dependency jurisdiction under section 364, subdivision (c) rather than terminating jurisdiction after placing the child with both parents “Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision to continue jurisdiction for an additional six months.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court Section 364(c) places the burden on the Agency to show by a preponderance that conditions justifying jurisdiction still exist or are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. The record described—a sibling's death from abuse admitted by the father, the father's anger problems and refusal to address the death in therapy, the mother's continued dependence and denial, the father's return to the home only at this hearing, the parents' limited parenting experience, and the child's vulnerability—readily supports that finding under the deferential standard. The court's reference in its final sentence to a 'best interests' finding is imprecise relative to the statutory test, and the opinion does not directly engage L.V.'s point that the court found no risk in allowing Christopher into the home, but the newly combined household is itself a reason supervision was warranted, so the result is correct.

Authorities

relied: Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285 — Under section 364(c) the court must terminate jurisdiction unless the agency proves by a preponderance that conditions justifying jurisdiction still exist or are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.
relied: In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167 — A juvenile court's decision whether to continue jurisdiction is reviewed for substantial evidence.
relied: In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031 — Juvenile court findings and orders supported by substantial evidence must be upheld on appeal.
relied: In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112 — The reviewing court indulges all reasonable inferences and views the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's orders.
relied: In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412 — The appellant bears the burden of showing the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly states the section 364(c) framework and burden, applies the substantial evidence standard with the proper authorities, and identifies specific record facts supporting continued supervision. It is slightly imprecise in characterizing the dispositive finding as one of 'best interests' rather than the statutory 'conditions still exist' test, and it does not expressly answer the mother's argument that the court had found no risk in placing Christopher in the home, though the result is clearly defensible.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/16/13 In re Marie B. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re MARIE B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D063055 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. NJ14254) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.V., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J.

Imhoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.

L.V. appeals an order continuing juvenile court jurisdiction in the dependency case of her daughter, Marie B. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2008, when Marie's older sister, A.B., was three weeks old, she died as a result of nonaccidental injuries. A.B.'s autopsy showed she had brain and retinal hemorrhages, multiple bruises and broken ribs. Her father, Christopher B., and L.V. were her only caretakers. Christopher admitted playing roughly with A.B. and that he had caused her death. L.V. denied that she or Christopher had harmed A.B.

L.V. and Christopher were employed by the United States Marine Corps.

Christopher had been deployed to Iraq four times during the past eight years and, before A.B. was born, he had been on deployment for seven months.

Marie was born one year after A.B.'s death in December 2009. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on her behalf under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (f),1 alleging Christopher and L.V. had caused A.B.'s death through abuse or neglect. The court found the allegations true, declared Marie a dependent child of the court, removed her from parental custody and placed her in relative care. It ordered reunification services for L.V., but ordered she live separately from Christopher. It denied services for Christopher.

This court reversed the order denying Christopher reunifications services, holding the juvenile court had abused its discretion by denying him services while ordering them for L.V. This court reasoned that since L.V. was strongly allied with Christopher and it was anticipated that she would reunite with Marie, the danger to Marie potentially could 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 be reduced if Christopher along with L.V. participated in services to address the serious protective issues that had caused A.B.'s death. (In re Marie B. (Sept. 22, 2010, D057312)

[nonpub. opn.].)

In December 2010, the juvenile court ordered services for both parents. L.V. and Christopher maintained separate residences as required by the court, but saw each other several times each week. They had regular, loving visits with Marie. Christopher's psychological evaluation and history revealed he had problems with anger, but he did not see a reason for treatment. L.V.'s evaluation showed she was highly dependent on Christopher and was in denial as to the causes of A.B.'s death. L.V.'s therapist reported L.V. had difficulty expressing negative emotions so that she could grieve for A.B.

At the six-month review hearing in June 2011, the court continued services and permitted L.V. to begin overnight visits with Marie on the condition Christopher not be in the home. Christopher was allowed unsupervised contact with Marie in the home of the maternal grandparents.

L.V. began overnight visits with Marie in October 2011. At the 12-month review hearing in January 2012, the court continued services and continued Marie in relative care.

In March 2012, Marie began a 60-day trial visit with L.V. Both parents continued as active duty Marines. They both had extensive therapy, and Christopher completed a 52-week child abuse/safe parenting class. In April, the court ordered Marie placed with L.V. and gave the social worker discretion to allow L.V. to supervise Christopher's visits with Marie.

3 In September 2012, L.V. ended her career in the Marine Corps. Christopher remained on active duty with court martial proceedings pending concerning A.B.'s death.

Both parents were participating in in-home parenting education and hoped they would be able to reunite as a family.

The social worker recommended the court continue jurisdiction based on Marie's young age, the severity of the original protective issue, Christopher's refusal to discuss A.B.'s death in therapy, L.V.'s position regarding A.B.'s death and the parents' limited parenting experience.

At the family maintenance review hearing in November 2012, it was stipulated that if Christopher were to testify he would state his military proceedings had been continued and no trial date had been set, maintaining two households had been a financial hardship and he had been actively participating in parenting Marie. An investigator for minor's counsel would state that during a 30-minute visit she observed Marie as happy and comfortable with both parents. After considering the evidence presented and argument by counsel, the court ordered Marie placed with both parents, continued dependency jurisdiction and set the next family maintenance hearing in six months.

DISCUSSION

L.V. contends the court erred by continued jurisdiction in the case. She argues there were no remaining protective issues; the court had found no risk to allowing Christopher to live in the home; she had safely supervised Christopher's visits with Marie; and Marie had thrived in her care for eight months.

4 Under section 364, subdivision (c) and California Rules of Court, rule 5.710(b)(1), if the court determines the child may safely be returned to the parent, it terminates jurisdiction unless the social worker establishes that conditions still exist that require supervision. "The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the [social services agency]

establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn." (§ 364, subd. (c); Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 304.) If the court determines continued supervision is required, it continues the matter for six months, at which time it holds a review hearing. (§ 364, subd. (d); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5. 710 (b)(1).)

A juvenile court's decision whether to continue jurisdiction is reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172.) A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also ' . . . view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision to continue jurisdiction for an additional six months. A.B. died in December 2008 while in the care of her parents. The juvenile court found allegations true under section 300, subdivision (f), and 5 Christopher admitted causing her death. His psychological evaluation and history showed he had problems with anger, but did not see a reason for treatment. After participating in services, he admitted that at the time of A.B.'s birth he needed to have better parenting skills, including having more patience. L.V. continued to depend on Christopher and had a difficult time accepting his role in A.B.'s death. Both parents had limited parenting experience in that Marie had been in the care of the maternal grandparents for much of her life. Also, Marie was a very young child and thus especially vulnerable. L.V. has not shown a lack of substantial evidence to support the court's finding that it was in Marie's best interests to continue dependency jurisdiction.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MCINTYRE, J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Bridget A. v. Superior Court No. B195282 · 2007-03-05
Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services v. Hazel L. Civ. 60483 · 1981-09-30
Mervin v. Gustave G. Civ. 4772 · 1979-11-02
In Re Luwanna S. 40732 · 1973-02-21