P. v. Dunlap CA4/1

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:56Z · confidence high

The trial court sentenced the defendant to the upper term for assault with intent to commit rape and issued a three-year criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2. The Court of Appeal reversed the protective order as unauthorized because section 136.2 applies only during the pendency of a criminal case, and affirmed the rest of the judgment.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Issuance of a three-year criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 “The authority of section 136.2 exists only during the pendency of the criminal case. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that Penal Code section 136.2 grants authority for protective orders only while a criminal case is pending. Since the order was issued as part of the final judgment and no other statutory or inherent authority was shown, the order was unauthorized.

Authorities

• relied: People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 — Penal Code section 136.2 authority exists only during the pendency of the criminal case.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound but extremely brief. It relies on a single published authority to establish that the statutory basis for the protective order expired upon the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, thereby rendering the order unauthorized.

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A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The trial court accepted Dunlap's negotiated guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape, imposed the six-year upper term, and issued a three-year criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 barring contact with the victim. On appeal, with the People conceding, the Court of Appeal held the post-judgment protective order was unauthorized because section 136.2 applies only during the pendency of the criminal case, reversed the order, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Issuance of a three-year criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 as part of the judgment following a guilty plea and prison sentence “The authority of section 136.2 exists only during the pendency of the criminal case. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.) There is no other applicable statutory authority for the protective order”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court Whether a trial court has statutory authority to impose a protective order is a question of law. Section 136.2, as construed in Ponce and earlier cases such as Stone, authorizes orders only while the criminal proceeding is pending; a three-year order imposed at sentencing on a defendant sent to prison on a section 220 conviction had no statutory basis in 2013 (section 136.2(i) post-conviction orders were limited to domestic violence and certain other offenses not at issue here), and the court identified no showing supporting an inherent-authority order. The People's concession and the Ponce holding support the result.

Authorities

• relied: People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 — Section 136.2 authorizes protective orders only during the pendency of the criminal case; a post-judgment order against a defendant sentenced to prison is unauthorized absent other statutory authority or a showing supporting the court's inherent authority.
• missed: People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 — Section 136.2 protective orders are operative only during the pendency of criminal proceedings and may not extend beyond the conclusion of the case as a post-judgment order; the court relied on Ponce, which follows Stone, so omission is not material.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies Ponce, which holds that section 136.2 orders are limited to the pendency of the criminal case and cannot be imposed as a post-judgment restraining order absent other authority; the People's concession and the record described support reversal of the order alone. The opinion is extremely brief and does not discuss the due process argument or canvass alternative statutory bases, but the result is plainly correct.

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