People v. Williams CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE197202
- Trial judge
- Selena Dong Epley
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Cynthia Aaron, William S. Dato
Analysis
The trial court denied Williams's motion for resentencing and related relief, ruling that his juvenile record was not eligible for sealing due to statutory exclusions and that he was ineligible for Proposition 36 or Franklin hearings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, finding no arguable issues for reversal after an independent review of the record pursuant to Wende and Anders.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to seal juvenile record and motion for resentencing based on Proposition 36 and Franklin“We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal of the order from which this appeal arises.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The appellate court did not apply a specific standard of review (such as abuse of discretion) to the trial court's rulings. Instead, it relied on the Wende/Anders framework to conduct an independent review of the record for any arguable issues, concluding that none existed. This approach is standard for appeals where appointed counsel files a Wende brief, but it bypasses the typical analytical application of standards of review to specific legal errors. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 — Establishes the right to a hearing to consider additional information for youthful offender parole eligibility under Penal Code section 3051.
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires appointed appellate counsel to identify arguable issues or file a brief explaining why none exist, and mandates the court to independently review the record.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires appointed counsel to file a brief identifying arguable issues or explaining the absence of merit, and requires the court to independently review the record.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound in its adherence to Wende and Anders requirements for independent review. However, it is analytically thin, as it fails to explicitly address the specific legal arguments raised by the appellant (such as the applicability of Proposition 57 or the statutory exclusions to sealing) beyond stating that no arguable issues were found.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual disposition unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Williams's postjudgment motion seeking a Proposition 57 transfer hearing on his 1995 juvenile strike prior, sealing of the juvenile record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, Proposition 36 resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126, and a Franklin hearing, finding each claim barred or inapplicable. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Wende brief, Williams filed a supplemental submission largely attacking his original 2000 trial, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issues, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of request for a Proposition 57 juvenile fitness/transfer hearing on the 1995 juvenile adjudication used as a strike prior“As the court has fully considered and ruled on the underlying issue relating to Defendant’s right to a juvenile fitness hearing, the court will not revisit the issue in the present motion.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The trial court declined to revisit an issue repeatedly litigated and denied in prior motions and habeas petitions. Independently, Proposition 57 applies retroactively only to judgments not yet final (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.4th 299), and both the 1995 juvenile adjudication and the 2000 adult judgment (affirmed 2003) were long final. The result is correct even though the appellate opinion did not elaborate. |
Denial of motion to seal juvenile record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786“As Defendant’s juvenile adjudication in case number J87281 was based on these code sections, Defendant’s juvenile record is not subject to sealing.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 786, subdivision (d) bars sealing where the true finding was for a section 707(b) offense committed at age 14 or older; assault with a firearm (707(b)(13)) and a section 12022.5 enhancement (707(b)(17)) are listed offenses. The trial court's statutory reading is accurate, and the opinion correctly noted the order's mislabeling of the code as a clerical matter. |
Denial of Proposition 36 resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126“This code section is not applicable to Defendant’s case, as Defendant’s current sentence is based on a serious felony conviction.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 1170.126, subdivision (e) limits resentencing to inmates whose current indeterminate term was imposed for a felony that is not serious or violent. Williams's commitment offense was first degree residential burglary, a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18), so he is ineligible as a matter of law. The trial court's citation to '1192.7(18)' omits the subdivision letter but the substance is correct. |
Denial of request for a Franklin hearing based on inapplicability of Penal Code section 3051“In addition, Defendant was sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes law and, as such, is excluded from the provisions of Penal Code section 3051.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 3051, subdivision (h) expressly excludes persons sentenced under the Three Strikes law from youth offender parole hearings, so Williams has no entitlement to a Franklin proceeding regardless of his age at the time of the 2000 offense. The trial court's additional rationale that youth offender parole applies only to sentences 'up to 25 years to life' is imprecise given how section 3051 defines the controlling offense, but the subdivision (h) exclusion independently supports the ruling. The appellate court did not address the imprecision, but the outcome is correct. |
Appellate court's conduct of independent Wende/Anders review of the postjudgment order and rejection of appellant's supplemental brief“We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Whether Wende review is constitutionally required on appeal from a postjudgment order was unsettled when this opinion issued (the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Delgadillo came a month later), and this division had elected in prior cases to conduct independent review anyway. Choosing to review the full record benefited the appellant and cannot be error. The court also reasonably confined its review to the order appealed from rather than Williams's collateral attacks on his 2000 trial. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal independently reviews the entire record for arguable issues.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal wholly frivolous must file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
- relied: People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 — A youthful offender eligible for a section 3051 parole hearing is entitled to an opportunity to make a record of youth-related mitigating factors at or near sentencing.
- missed: People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 — Proposition 57's elimination of direct filing in adult court applies retroactively only to cases not yet final on appeal; it would have confirmed that Williams's long-final judgments are outside Proposition 57's reach.
- missed: In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 — An offender whose judgment is final may seek a Franklin proceeding by motion under Penal Code section 1203.01, but only if eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051; relevant to the proper framing of the Franklin request.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches the right result: each of the four claims fails as a matter of law on the face of the statutes the trial court cited, and the court properly limited its review to the order appealed from rather than Williams's attacks on his original trial. It is thin, however, offering no independent analysis of the issues counsel identified, not addressing whether Wende review applies to postjudgment appeals, and not noting the trial court's imprecise statement about section 3051's sentence-length limits.
Opinion
Filed 11/17/22 P. v. Williams CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080566
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE197202)
ANTHONY M. WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Selena D. Epley, Judge. Affirmed. Anthony M. Williams, in pro. per.; and William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. In December 2000, a jury convicted Anthony M. Williams of residential burglary (Pen. Code,1 § 459) and unlawful taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The jury found Williams had suffered two strike 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. priors (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Williams was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 35 years to life based on the strike priors and the serious felony priors. One of the serious felony/strike priors came from a juvenile case No. JDA87281. Williams appealed and this court affirmed the judgment as modified by striking the five-year term for the juvenile serious felony true finding.
(People v. Williams (Jan. 24, 2003, D038572, D038600).)2 In December 2021, Williams filed a motion to be resentenced on the theory his juvenile conviction should have been sealed and therefore unavailable to qualify as a strike. In April 2022, Williams filed a motion to seal his juvenile record and to seek a transfer hearing under Proposition 57. Williams requested a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). He also requested resentencing of his three strikes sentence based on the contention the juvenile court finding of his prior serious felony should have been sealed. The trial court denied the motion in a written order. The court stated in pertinent part: “On April 18, 2022, Defendant filed the present motion in the Juvenile Division of the San Diego Superior Court setting forth case number JDA 87281. The Defendant’s juvenile case was adjudicated in 1995. As the juvenile case is final, the juvenile division does not have jurisdiction to consider and rule on the present motions filed by Defendant. Further, the issue relating to the use of Defendant’s juvenile adjudication is only relevant to his adult conviction. Thus, the motion was transferred to the East County Division where case number SCE 197202 was adjudicated.
2 We granted Appellant’s request for judicial notice of our records in these cases.
2 “In his motion, Defendant raises the same issue with regard to his right to have a juvenile fitness hearing. This issue has been raised multiple times through motions and petitions for writ of habeas corpus. All motions and petitions have been denied. As the court has fully considered and ruled on the underlying issue relating to Defendant’s right to a juvenile fitness hearing, the court will not revisit the issue in the present motion.
“Additionally, Defendant contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to seal his case pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, as he successfully completed probation. In Defendant’s juvenile matter, the court made a true finding that Defendant committed assault with the personal use of a firearm in violation of Penal Code sections 245(a)(2) and 12022.5. [Welfare and Institutions Code3] section 786(d) states that a court shall not seal a record if the true finding was based on an offense listed in Section 707(b), which was committed when the juvenile was 14 years of age or older.
“Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) lists assault with a firearm and an offense described in 12022.5 as exclusions to the sealing of the juvenile court record.[4] As Defendant’s juvenile adjudication in case number J87281 was based on these code sections, Defendant’s juvenile record is not subject to sealing.
“Defendant further argues that he is entitled to a resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126. This code section is not applicable to Defendant’s case, as Defendant’s current sentence is based on a serious felony conviction. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1170.126(c) and 1192.7(18).)
3 We acknowledge the court intended rather than the “Penal Code,” the reference is to “Welfare & Institutions Code,” section 786, subdivision (d).
4 “See [Welfare and Institutions Code] subdivisions (b)(13) and (17), respectively.” 3 “Defendant’s final claim is that he is entitled to a Franklin Hearing to obtain additional information to be considered at a youthful offender parole hearing. A youthful offender parole hearing applies to Defendants sentenced up to 25 years to life. Here, Defendant was sentenced to 30 years to life. In addition, Defendant was sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes law and, as such, is excluded from the provisions of Penal Code section 3051. (See Pen. Code, § 3051 (h)). Thus, Penal Code section 3051 and the Franklin case are not applicable to Defendant.
“Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motions are DENIED.”
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating counsel has not been able to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Williams the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. He has responded with a written submission along with numerous exhibits. We will address his submission later in this opinion.5 DISCUSSION As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified the following possible issues that were considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: 1. Whether Williams was entitled to a fitness and transfer hearing of his juvenile serious felony prior under Proposition 57. 2. Whether the court erred in failing to seal his juvenile prior.
5 We discussed the facts of the offenses in our prior opinion. We will not repeat that discussion here. 4 3. Whether Williams was entitled to a resentencing hearing under Proposition 36. 4. Whether Williams was entitled to a hearing pursuant to Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261. In his supplemental brief, Williams focuses on his original trial and some of his multiple challenges he has previously filed with the courts. The difficulty with his supplemental brief is this appeal arises from the denial of his “motion” for resentencing and related relief. Most of his submission and numerous exhibits are not pertinent to the current appeal and its limited record. We have examined the supplemental brief very carefully and find it does not identify any arguable issues for reversal on this appeal. We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal of the order from which this appeal arises. Competent counsel has represented Williams on this appeal.
5 DISPOSITION The order of May 27, 2022, denying Williams’s motion for resentencing and related relief is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
DATO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Franklin S217699 · 2016-05-26
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12