People v. Lamarca CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Imperial County · No. JCF004354
- Trial judge
- Poli Flores, Jr.
- Outcome
- reversed in part — Affirmed in part, sentence vacated, and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Truc T. Do
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in prison for felony false imprisonment, doubling the agreed-upon upper term due to a prior strike. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing to apply the retroactive changes made by Senate Bill 567.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Selection of the upper term sentence and doubling of the term due to a prior strike“The current sentence was imposed before the effective date of Senate Bill 567, and thus does not utilize the procedural and substantive considerations of the new statute. We will remand for resentencing.” | unclear | error | agree with court The appellate court determined that the sentence was invalid because it was imposed under the pre-2022 version of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), which has since been amended by Senate Bill 567. The court applied the retroactivity principle from In re Estrada to conclude that the new, more lenient statutory framework must be applied to the defendant's sentence, necessitating a remand for resentencing rather than affirming the trial court's original calculation. |
Trial court's understanding of discretionary authority regarding upper term selection“Regarding Lamarca’s claim the court did not understand its discretionary authority, we agree with the Attorney General that such issue can be considered on remand if appropriate.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The appellate court declined to independently review whether the trial court misunderstood its discretion under the old statute. Instead, it deferred this issue to the remand proceedings, reasoning that the trial court would have the opportunity to address the defendant's arguments in the context of the new sentencing hearing required by Senate Bill 567. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Retroactive application of a statute that reduces punishment or eliminates a penalty to cases where the sentence has not yet been executed.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound in applying the well-established retroactivity rule from In re Estrada to the specific legislative change in Senate Bill 567. It correctly identifies that the pre-amendment sentence does not reflect the new statutory considerations and that a remand is the appropriate remedy.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court sentenced Lamarca, after a no contest plea to felony false imprisonment with an admitted strike, to a stipulated upper term of three years doubled to six years following his violation of pre-sentencing release conditions. On appeal, the Attorney General conceded and the Court of Appeal agreed that Senate Bill 567's amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) apply retroactively under Estrada, so it vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing while otherwise affirming the judgment.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of the upper term (three years, doubled for the strike prior) under the version of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) in effect before Senate Bill 567“The current sentence was imposed before the effective date of Senate Bill 567, and thus does not utilize the procedural and substantive considerations of the new statute. We will remand for resentencing.” | unclear | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court Retroactive application of ameliorative sentencing legislation to nonfinal judgments under In re Estrada is well settled, and the Attorney General conceded the point, so remand for resentencing under the amended statute is a defensible result. The opinion does not, however, address that the upper term was a stipulated term under the plea agreement, which raises a question under People v. Stamps about the proper remedy and whether the People may withdraw from the bargain; the court left that to the trial court by remanding for a full new sentencing hearing. |
Claim that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion in selecting the upper term“Regarding Lamarca’s claim the court did not understand its discretionary authority, we agree with the Attorney General that such issue can be considered on remand if appropriate.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court Because the sentence was vacated in its entirety and the matter remanded for a new hearing under the amended statute, the court reasonably declined to decide whether the trial court misunderstood its discretion under the superseded version of section 1170, subdivision (b); the issue is mooted by the remand. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Absent a contrary legislative intent, statutory amendments that reduce punishment or confer sentencing leniency apply retroactively to all judgments not yet final on the amendment's effective date.
- missed: People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 — Ameliorative sentencing legislation applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments entered on negotiated pleas, but the trial court may not unilaterally modify the terms of a plea bargain while keeping the rest of the bargain intact; on remand the defendant may seek relief and the People may withdraw from the agreement if the court is inclined to grant it. Relevant here because the upper term was a stipulated term of the plea agreement.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies Estrada to hold Senate Bill 567 retroactive to a nonfinal sentence and sensibly leaves the discretion issue for the new hearing, reaching a result the parties jointly requested. It skips any discussion of the fact that the upper term was stipulated in the plea agreement and does not cite People v. Stamps or explain how the amended statute interacts with a negotiated sentence, leaving the trial court without guidance on the plea-bargain question.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 9/15/22 P. v. Lamarca CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D079657
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF004354)
RICHARD LAMARCA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Poli Flores, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part, sentence vacated, and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene Sevidal, Warren J. Williams, and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Richard Lamarca pleaded no contest to one count of felony false imprisonment (Pen. Code,1 § 236). The remaining count was dismissed. Lamarca also admitted a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The parties agreed to an upper term sentence of three years, doubled due to the strike prior, to be suspended pending a grant of probation. Lamarca was released pending sentencing, subject to certain conditions. Lamarca violated the terms of his release and was taken into custody. He was ultimately sentenced to the specified six-year term. Lamarca appeals contending the trial court erred in selecting the upper term for the offense. He contends the trial court did not understand the nature of its discretion in considering an upper term sentence. He also argues the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in light of newly enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which makes material changes in the discretionary authority of trial judges considering selection of an upper term sentence. The Attorney General responded, conceding Lamarca is entitled to a new sentencing hearing in light of new legislation. We agree with the parties that Lamarca is entitled to retroactive application of Senate Bill 567 and thus is entitled to have the matter remanded to the trial court.
DISCUSSION2 Senate Bill 567 makes significant changes to section 1170, subdivision (b) regarding the selection of an upper terms. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) As the parties agree, the changes apply retroactively to the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Given the limited nature of this appeal, we find it unnecessary to discuss the facts of the underlying offense.
2 current sentence. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.) The current sentence was imposed before the effective date of Senate Bill 567, and thus does not utilize the procedural and substantive considerations of the new statute. We will remand for resentencing. Regarding Lamarca’s claim the court did not understand its discretionary authority, we agree with the Attorney General that such issue can be considered on remand if appropriate. DISPOSITION The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a new sentencing hearing consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
DO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- In Re Estrada Crim. 8524 · 1965-12-23