United States v. One Airplane
UNITED STATES v. ONE AIRPLANE, etc. (HAHN, and Intervener)
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- McCormick (author)
Analysis
The government filed a libel action to forfeit an airplane under the War-Time Passport Act of 1918 and the Tariff Act of 1922. The court dismissed the libel, ordering the return of the airplane to the claimant upon payment of storage charges and costs.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Dismissal of the libel for forfeiture under the War-Time Passport Act of 1918“In my opinion under the evidence in this matter, which is a libel brought by the government for 'the purpose of forfeiting an airplane under the provisions of the Acts of May 22, 1918 (22 USCA §§ 223-226), and March 2, 1921 (22 USCA § 227), the proceeding must be dismissed.” | agree with court The court relied on the principle that penal statutes, including forfeiture provisions, are strictly construed against the government and that subsequent legislation (the Act of March 2, 1921) repealed the 1918 Act's penal provisions. The court cited *Flora v. Rustad* and *Johnson v. Keating* to support the view that the forfeiture provisions were inoperative. This reasoning is consistent with the legal principles of the era regarding the repeal of penal statutes by subsequent legislation. |
Dismissal of the libel for forfeiture under the Tariff Act of 1922“With respect to the other ground of libel, I am of the opinion that under the evidence in this proceeding no forfeiture of the airplane can be decreed under the Tariff Act of 1922 (42 Stat. 858).” | agree with court The court found that the evidence did not support forfeiture under the Tariff Act. The government did not seriously urge this contention. The court's decision to dismiss based on the lack of evidentiary support is a standard application of the burden of proof in civil forfeiture cases. |
Order for return of the airplane to the claimant“The libel herein will be dismissed upon payment by claimant of all storage charges and costs, whereupon the airplane in controversy wiR be returned to E. M. Hahn, claimant and intervener herein.” | agree with court This is a standard procedural disposition following the dismissal of the government's claim. The court ordered the return of the property to the claimant, subject to the payment of costs and storage fees, which is a reasonable and equitable remedy. |
The order itself: sound — The court's reasoning is sound. It correctly identifies the legal issue (whether the forfeiture provisions of the 1918 Act were repealed by the 1921 Act) and relies on persuasive authority from other circuits and the principle of strict construction of penal statutes. The court also addresses the alternative ground of forfeiture under the Tariff Act, finding it unsupported by the evidence. The order is well-reasoned and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion — McCormick
McCORMICK, District Judge.
In my opinion under the evidence in this matter, which is a libel brought by the government for 'the purpose of forfeiting an airplane under the provisions of the Acts of May 22, 1918 (22 USCA §§ 223-226), and March 2, 1921 (22 USCA § 227), the proceeding must be dismissed.
It would appear that all 'penal provisions, which include those concerning forfeiture of vehicles in the War-Time Passport Act of May 22, 1918, have not been continued in force by the Act of March 2,1921. Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.(2d) 335 (8th C. C. A.). See, also, U. S. v. Phelps (D. C.) 14 F.(2d) 679, and U. S. ex rel. Porter v. Yale (D. C.) 14 F.(2d) 682, and that subsequent legislation has supplanted the penal and forfeiture provisions of said War-Time Passport Act of 1918 so as to render such provisions inoperative and ineffectual. Johnson v. Keating, 17 F.(2d) 50 (1st C. C.A.).
I have been unable to find any construction or interpretation of said War-time Passport Act by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, except Koyama v. Burnett, 8 F.(2d) 940, and there is nothing in that decision that manifests a ruling in conflict with the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the First and Eighth Circuits above cited. There is not apparent to me any real distinction between the penal provisions of the act imposing sentence upon the person of an offender and those that forfeit vehicles used to violate its provisions. Moreover, when reasonable doubt exists as to whether provisions of a statute that are penal in effect have been repealed, such doubt should be resolved against the government. See McFarland v. U. S. (6th C. C. A.) 19 F.(2d) 805 and 807.
With respect to the other ground of libel, I am of the opinion that under the evidence in this proceeding no forfeiture of the airplane can be decreed under the Tariff Act of 1922 (42 Stat. 858). This contention was not seriously urged by the government, but in any event in my opinion it has no merit.
The libel herein will be dismissed upon payment by claimant of all storage charges and costs, whereupon the airplane in controversy wiR be returned to E. M. Hahn, claimant and intervener herein.