Peavy v. Cal. Victim Compensation etc. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2020-00028849-CU-WM-CTL
- Trial judge
- John S. Meyer
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- William S. Dato (author), Judith D. McConnell, Cynthia Aaron
Analysis
The trial court denied Peavy’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate, finding that the Victim Compensation Board’s denial of his lost income claim was supported by substantial evidence because he provided no medical records linking his disability to the October 7, 2018, domestic violence incident. The Court of Appeal affirmed, agreeing that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that Peavy failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the Board’s denial of the lost income claim“We agree with the superior court’s assessment of the evidence. None of the medical records reported that Peavy was injured as a result of domestic violence that occurred on October 7, 2018. Therefore, the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard of review to the administrative decision. The record clearly shows that no medical records linked the claimed disability to the specific crime, and the appellant conceded in his reply brief that the required medical evidence did not exist, making the Board’s denial supported by the whole record. |
Authorities
- relied: Blazevich v. State Bd. of Control (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1121 — Establishes that the standard of review for a judgment denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate is the same as the trial court’s review of the administrative board’s determination, which is whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.
- misapplied: Brady v. Maryland (1962) 373 U.S. 83 — The opinion notes that Peavy’s reliance on this case is misplaced because it involves the government’s suppression of evidence in a criminal case, not the Board’s obligations in a civil compensation claim.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard to the administrative record and relies on the appellant’s own concession that the required medical evidence was absent. It effectively addresses the appellant’s arguments by pointing to the lack of medical verification required by the regulations.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe superior court denied Gary Peavy's petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the Victim Compensation Board's denial of his lost income claim, finding that none of his medical records attributed any injury to the October 7, 2018 domestic battery. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding substantial evidence supported the Board's finding because no treating provider certified that Peavy's disability resulted directly from the qualifying crime, and rejecting his argument that the independent judgment standard applied.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for writ of administrative mandate; Board's finding that Peavy failed to prove lost income was a direct result of the qualifying crime“None of the medical records reported that Peavy was injured as a result of domestic violence that occurred on October 7, 2018. Therefore, the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 649.32 requires a treating provider's certification that the disability resulted directly from the crime, and Gov. Code § 13959(c) places the burden on the applicant. The medical records attributed Peavy's complaints to a tasing, a five-year-old condition, and a slip and fall, and he expressly denied domestic violence; Peavy himself conceded in his reply brief that the required documentation did not exist. The result follows directly from the regulation and record. |
Superior court's application of the substantial evidence standard rather than independent judgment review, and refusal to admit new evidence at the writ hearing“Thus, we reject his contention that the superior court erred by failing to apply an independent judgment standard of review or to “admit” new evidence for the first time at the hearing.” | de novo | correct | agree with court Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(c) independent judgment applies only where the administrative decision affects a fundamental vested right, and Blazevich holds an applicant has no vested right to crime victim compensation, so the substantial evidence standard was proper. The court's rejection of the new-evidence argument, however, rests solely on the vested-rights point and does not engage § 1094.5(e), which governs when a court may receive evidence outside the administrative record regardless of the standard; the result is nonetheless defensible because Peavy conceded no supporting medical evidence exists. |
Peavy's contentions that the Board denied him due process, failed to investigate, and failed to compensate an exacerbated preexisting condition“Because of this disposition, it is unnecessary to address Peavy’s contentions that the Board denied him due process by failing to follow its own hearing procedures, failed to properly investigate his lost income claim” | unclear | not reached | agree with court Because the dispositive defect was the complete absence of the medical certification required by regulation, and Peavy conceded such evidence does not exist, the procedural and investigative complaints could not change the outcome. Declining to reach them is a reasonable exercise of appellate economy. |
Rejection of Peavy's reliance on Brady v. Maryland“Peavy’s reliance on Brady v. Maryland (1962) 373 U.S. 83 is misplaced because that case involves the government’s suppression of evidence favorable to an accused in a criminal case, not the Board’s obligations in considering a lost income application.” | de novo | correct | agree with court Brady concerns a prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant and has no application to an administrative benefits claim where the applicant bears the burden of proof. The court's parenthetical date (1962) is a minor error; Brady was decided in 1963, but this does not affect the analysis. |
Authorities
- relied: Blazevich v. State Bd. of Control (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1121 — An applicant has no vested right to crime victim compensation, so judicial review of a Board denial is for substantial evidence rather than independent judgment.
- relied: Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 — Distinguished: the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to a criminal accused violates due process; the rule does not govern an administrative agency's handling of a victim compensation claim.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies the regulatory requirement of a treating provider's certification of direct causation, applies the proper substantial evidence standard under Blazevich, and rests on a record in which every medical entry attributes Peavy's complaints to other causes and he conceded the required evidence does not exist. It skips a direct treatment of Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(e) on the new-evidence argument and contains a minor miscitation of Brady's year, but neither affects the plainly correct result.
Opinion
Filed 6/28/22 Peavy v. Cal. Victim Compensation etc. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GARY L. PEAVY, D079193 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-00028849- CU-WM-CTL) CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION CLAIMS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed. Gary L. Peavy, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Danielle F. O’Bannon, Assistant Attorney General, Richard F. Wolfe and Tim J. Vanden Heuvel, Deputy Attorneys General for Defendant and Respondent. Under California law a crime victim may seek compensation from the Victim Compensation Board (Board) for certain economic losses. (Gov.
Code,1 § 13950 et seq.) A lost income claim requires medical evidence to “verify” the disability is “a direct result” of the crime. (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 2, § 649.32, subd. (g).) Judicial review of a final Board decision is by s petition for a writ of mandate filed in the superior court. (§ 13960, subd. (a).) In this case, Gary Peavy appeals from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate challenging the Board’s denial of his lost income claim. We affirm because Peavy submitted no medical evidence to support a finding that his claimed disability was a direct result of any crime.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Domestic Violence Incident On October 7, 2018, Peavy’s girlfriend, Diane N., caught him driving with another woman.2 She followed Peavy’s car until he parked in front of a police station. Exiting her car she yelled, “[H]e fucking over me! Every time I turn around he’s with a different woman!” She shoved and grabbed Peavy’s left shoulder. A police officer witnessed the melee and arrested Diane for domestic battery. According to the police report, Peavy had “no visible or reported injuries” and he declined to press charges.
B. Summary of Peavy’s Medical Treatment Three days later on October 10, Peavy sought medical attention at a hospital emergency room—but not for a left shoulder injury from a battery. Rather, he complained of right shoulder pain from being tased earlier that 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. 2 Dates are in 2018 unless otherwise specified. 2 day.3 Based on a “clinical history” of “electrical injury to his right shoulder,” a physician excused him from work for seven days. On October 16 (nine days postbattery), Peavy was seen by Kevin Mould, M.D. as a follow up to the October 10 exam and treatment. The physician’s notes state Peavy was seen for neck, back, shoulder, and leg pain “s/p [status post] ‘hit with an electrical device.’ ” (Italics added.)4 Under “Social History,” the medical records states that Peavy denied being a victim of domestic violence:
“Domestic Violence: VICTIM PHYSICAL/VERBAL ABUSE Victim of verbal or physical abuse? No Date Assessed: 10/16/2018.”
About three weeks postincident (October 26), Peavey was examined by John Qian, M.D. for complaints of “constant” pain in the back, left shoulder, neck, and knees that he had been experiencing “for 5 years.” He told Dr. Qian that the pain became worse after being “tased by a friend this past month . . . .” There is nothing in Dr. Qian’s report about the October 7 domestic violence incident. On November 13, another physician (Sunny Wang, M.D.) examined Peavy for complaints of worsening back pain after he slipped and fell “4 days ago.” Dr. Wang’s report does not mention anything about any domestic violence injury.
3 Peavy was employed as a bus driver. Apparently, he was tased by a coworker in a prank that might charitably be described as being ill-conceived. 4 The medical records also note that Peavy was “suing [a] correctional facility” for injuries to his back and neck he claims occurred “while incarcerated.” 3 C. Peavy’s Victim’s Compensation Claim In April 2019, Peavy filed an application with the Board seeking lost income from October 11 to October 17, which he claimed was caused by injuries he received in the battery. At his request, the Employment Development Department sent the Board a disability claim Peavy had previously filed. It was signed by Dr. Qian, who stated the disability was caused by an accident or trauma occurring on-the-job beginning in November 2009. In February 2020, the Board denied Peavy’s claim, determining there was insufficient evidence that he missed work “as a direct result of the qualifying crime.” Peavy later pursued an administrative appeal of that decision.5 He claimed that Dr. Qian “checked the wrong boxes” on the disability form. In June 2020, the Board rejected his appeal citing “a lack of . . . evidence the claimant missed work during the period as a direct result of the crime.” After the Board denied Peavy’s request for reconsideration, he filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court.6 The petition’s proof of service bears the signature of Diane N.—the woman who committed the battery. It also indicates that she lives on Orlando Street in El Cajon. Some of the paystubs and a W-2 show that is Peavy’s address too.
5 In the administrative appeal, Peavy enlarged the time of the claimed disability from seven days to four months. 6 Peavy was self-represented before the Board, in the superior court, and remains so on appeal. 4 D. The Writ Petition In his writ petition, Peavy explained that his medical records contain nothing about the October 7 crime because he “feared for his life in this case if the abuser found out” he was pursuing a lost income claim.7 After the Attorney General filed opposition and the court conducted an unreported hearing, the petition was denied in a minute order stating in part:
“None of the medical records reported that [Peavy] was injured as a result of domestic violence that occurred on October 7, 2018.”
DISCUSSION The standard of review of a judgment denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate is the same as that of the trial court when it reviews the determination of the administrative board. We must determine if the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c); see also Blazevich v. State Bd. of Control (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1121, 1125 (Blazevich).)8 The Legislature has declared it to be in the public interest to assist state residents in obtaining compensation for pecuniary losses suffered as a result of criminal acts. (§ 13950, subd. (a).) Accordingly, under specified circumstances the Board may compensate a crime victim for loss of income directly resulting from crime. (See Gov. Code, § 13957.5, subd. (a)(1).) The 7 Given that Diane N. (the “abuser”) signed the proof of service and she and Peavy shared the same address—that explanation might be met with considerable skepticism. 8 Peavy does not have a vested right to crime victim benefits. (Blazevich, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1125.) Thus, we reject his contention that the superior court erred by failing to apply an independent judgment standard of review or to “admit” new evidence for the first time at the hearing. 5 person seeking compensation has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 13959, subd. (c).) First and foremost, the loss must be “verif[ied]” by the applicant’s treating health care provider, who “shall” include a “certification that the disability resulted directly from the qualifying crime.” (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 2, § 649.32, subds. (b) & (g).) We agree with the superior court’s assessment of the evidence. None of the medical records reported that Peavy was injured as a result of domestic violence that occurred on October 7, 2018. Therefore, the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. In his reply brief, Peavy “admits he was unable to get the required” documents to support his lost income claim. He maintains that it was only “after researching it” did he “realize it was the [d]omestic [v]iolence that had cause[d] [his] injury and no medical staff would change their diagnosis 128 days later.” Thus, even Peavy concedes the requisite medical evidence was not before the Board and does not exist.9 9 Because of this disposition, it is unnecessary to address Peavy’s contentions that the Board denied him due process by failing to follow its own hearing procedures, failed to properly investigate his lost income claim, and erroneously failed to compensate him for a preexisting condition exacerbated by the crime. Peavy’s reliance on Brady v. Maryland (1962) 373 U.S. 83 is misplaced because that case involves the government’s suppression of evidence favorable to an accused in a criminal case, not the Board’s obligations in considering a lost income application. 6 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Blazevich v. State Board No. A020045 · 1987-05-11