People v. Quillar CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE171374
- Trial judge
- Roderick W. Shelton
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), O'Rourke, William S. Dato
Analysis
The trial court denied Quillar's petition to reduce a prior felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, reasoning that the conviction was not charged in the current case and the petition should have been filed in the original case. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a Proposition 47 proceeding is not the proper vehicle for collateral attacks on prior convictions and that Quillar could not challenge his prior felony enhancements because the judgment containing them was final before Proposition 47 took effect.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Proposition 47 petition to reduce prior grand theft person conviction to misdemeanor“Because a section 1170.18 proceeding is not the proper procedural vehicle for a defendant to collaterally attack his or her sentence, Quillar’s contentions do not warrant reversal of the trial court’s denial order.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Implicit denial of argument to dismiss prior felony enhancements based on redesignation of prior conviction“Because the judgment containing the prior felony enhancements became final long before Proposition 47 took effect, Quillar may not invoke Proposition 47 to obtain dismissal of the prior felony enhancements.” | de novo | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — Proposition 47 requires felony-based enhancements to be retroactively stricken only if the judgment containing the enhancement was not final when Proposition 47 took effect.
- relied: People v. Clark (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 863 — Resentencing provisions do not authorize collateral attacks on prior convictions.
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appellate counsel must review the record for error when presenting no argument for reversal.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appellate counsel must identify issues that might arguably support the appeal when presenting no argument for reversal.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the holding in People v. Buycks to determine that Quillar cannot challenge his prior felony enhancements because the judgment was final before Proposition 47 took effect. It also correctly cites People v. Clark to establish that Proposition 47 proceedings are not the proper vehicle for collateral attacks on prior convictions.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Lee Vert Quillar's Penal Code section 1170.18 (Proposition 47) petition, which sought to reduce a grand theft person felony that was not a conviction in the present case but only underlay a stayed prison-prior enhancement, ruling that any petition had to be filed in the prior case (CR75335). On a Wende/Anders appeal with a supplemental pro. per. brief, the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 1170.18 does not authorize collateral attacks on the prior conviction and that, under Buycks, redesignation of the prior as a misdemeanor cannot strike enhancements in a judgment that was final long before Proposition 47 took effect.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Proposition 47 petition because the grand theft person conviction was not charged in this case and relief had to be sought in case CR75335“On October 25, 2021, the trial court denied Quillar’s Proposition 47 petition, reasoning that grand theft person was not charged in the present case.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (f), allow a petitioner to seek reduction of a qualifying conviction in the case where that conviction was entered. The grand theft person conviction was from CR75335, not SCE171374, and the record showed it had in fact already been redesignated a misdemeanor in CR75335 in 2018, so there was nothing for the trial court to reduce in this case. The court did not state a standard of review; counsel framed the issue as abuse of discretion, but the question is legal and the result is correct under any standard. |
Rejection of Quillar's collateral attacks on the CR75335 judgment (claims he was never charged with the pleaded offenses and never possessed a deadly weapon) as outside the scope of section 1170.18“Because a section 1170.18 proceeding is not the proper procedural vehicle for a defendant to collaterally attack his or her sentence, Quillar’s contentions do not warrant reversal of the trial court’s denial order.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 1170.18 creates a limited resentencing/redesignation mechanism, and subdivision (n) expressly preserves the finality of judgments outside its purview. The analogy to People v. Clark (Proposition 36 resentencing does not permit collateral attack on a strike prior) is apt. Challenges to the validity of the CR75335 plea or conviction would have to be raised by habeas corpus or other proper vehicle, not a Proposition 47 petition in a different case. |
Rejection of the argument that redesignation of the grand theft person felony as a misdemeanor 'for all purposes' under section 1170.18, subdivision (k) requires dismissal of the prior-felony enhancements in this case“Because the judgment containing the prior felony enhancements became final long before Proposition 47 took effect, Quillar may not invoke Proposition 47 to obtain dismissal of the prior felony enhancements.” | unclear | correct | agree with court People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 holds that the 'misdemeanor for all purposes' language retroactively strikes felony-based enhancements only in judgments not yet final when Proposition 47 took effect (Nov. 2014). This judgment became final in 2000. The court applied Buycks' holding faithfully. The grand theft person prior also underlay only a stayed section 667.5(b) prison prior, so even apart from finality the practical effect on the sentence would have been nil. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — Proposition 47's 'misdemeanor for all purposes' provision requires felony-based enhancements to be stricken retroactively only in judgments that were not final when the initiative took effect; a judgment is final when the time for appeal and certiorari has expired.
- relied: People v. Clark (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 863 — The resentencing provision of Proposition 36 does not authorize a collateral attack on a prior strike conviction; applied by analogy to section 1170.18.
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, the appellate court independently reviews the record for error.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds no meritorious issues may file a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies that section 1170.18 reaches only the case in which the qualifying conviction was entered, that it does not permit collateral attacks on a prior conviction, and that Buycks bars using a later redesignation to strike enhancements in a judgment final since 2000. It does not state a standard of review and conducts a full Wende review in a postconviction appeal where such review is arguably not required, but neither point affects the plainly correct result.
Opinion
Filed 6/17/22 P. v. Quillar CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D079875
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE171374)
LEE VERT QUILLAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roderick W. Shelton, Judge. Affirmed. Lee Vert Quillar, in pro. per.; and Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. I BACKGROUND In 1997, a jury convicted Lee Vert Quillar of causing a fire in an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (b); count 1),1 arson of the property of another (§ 451, subd. (d); count 2), assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and false imprisonment by violence involving the personal use of a deadly weapon (§§ 236, 237; count 4). The jury found true an allegation that Quillar committed count 4 using a knife as a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) Thereafter, the trial court found true allegations underpinning two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), two serious felony prior convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and two felony strike prior convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)). In particular, it found Quillar was previously convicted of: (1) grand theft of property taken from the person of another (§ 487; hereafter, grand theft person) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) in case number CR75335; and (2) voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and residential burglary (§§ 459, 460) in case number CR107662. The trial court sentenced Quillar to an aggregate term of 36 years to life in state prison, consisting of a base term of 25 years to life for count 4, plus a one-year consecutive term for the use of a deadly weapon enhancement and two five-year consecutive terms for the serious felony priors. It imposed a concurrent sentence of 25 years to life for count 1 and imposed, but stayed, sentences of 25 years to life on counts 2 and 3. The court stayed sentences for Quillar’s prison prior convictions.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 On November 9, 1999, this court affirmed Quillar’s convictions. (People v. Quillar (Nov. 9, 1999, D029778) [nonpub. opn.].) The Supreme Court denied review and the judgment became final in 2000.2 On September 15, 2021, Quillar, proceeding in propria persona, filed a petition to have one of his felony convictions resentenced as a misdemeanor conviction under section 1170.18, which voters enacted as part of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. He requested resentencing for his grand theft person felony conviction. As noted, Quillar was not convicted of grand theft person in this case. Instead, the court imposed one of the stayed prison prior enhancements after finding that Quillar was convicted of grand theft person in case number CR75335. On October 25, 2021, the trial court denied Quillar’s Proposition 47 petition, reasoning that grand theft person was not charged in the present case. The court found Quillar must file his petition in case number CR75335. On December 16, 2021, Quillar appealed the order denying his Proposition 47 petition. In his notice of appeal, he indicated for the first time that he had already filed a successful Proposition 47 petition, which resulted in the redesignation of his grand theft person felony conviction as a misdemeanor conviction in case number CR75335. Quillar’s petition was granted in case number CR75335 on January 2, 2018. II DISCUSSION Appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief summarizing the facts and proceedings in the trial court. Counsel presented no argument for 2 “A judgment becomes final when the availability of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5 (Buycks).) 3 reversal, but invited this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and identified the following issue that “might arguably support the appeal” (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744 (Anders)): “Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Quillar’s Motion for Resentencing Pursuant to Proposition 47?” Additionally, we granted Quillar the opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf and he has done so. Quillar’s brief is difficult to comprehend. However, as best we can discern, Quillar appears to raise collateral attacks on the judgment rendered in case number CR75335. He claims the sentence imposed in case number CR75335 was “unauthorized” because: (1) he was never charged with the crimes to which he pleaded guilty in that case; and (2) he “never actually possessed” a dangerous or deadly weapon and, therefore, he never committed assault with a deadly weapon. Quillar’s arguments do not warrant reversal of the denial order. Section 1170.18 creates a mechanism for the reduction of certain qualifying prior felony convictions to misdemeanors. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f).) It does not authorize any other collateral attack on a prior conviction, such as the attacks Quillar raises here. (See People v. Clark (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 863, 875 [resentencing provision of Proposition 36 does not authorize collateral attack on prior strike conviction]; accord § 1170.18, subd. (n) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section does not diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in any case that does not come within the purview of this section.”].) Because a section 1170.18 proceeding is not the proper procedural vehicle for a defendant to collaterally attack his or her sentence, Quillar’s contentions do not warrant reversal of the trial court’s denial order.
4 In addition to raising collateral attacks on the judgment from case number CR75335, Quillar notes in passing that his grand theft person felony conviction was redesignated as a misdemeanor conviction. He further notes that a felony conviction that has been redesignated as a misdemeanor conviction “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes” under section 1170.18, subdivision (k). We construe these statements as an argument that one or more of Quillar’s prior felony enhancements must be dismissed due to the redesignation of his grand theft person felony conviction as a misdemeanor conviction. So construed, Quillar’s argument is meritless. In Buycks, the Supreme Court determined that a Proposition 47 petitioner who obtains a reduction to a felony conviction may subsequently challenge a sentencing enhancement based on the previously-designated felony, but only if the “judgment containing the enhancement was not final when Proposition 47 took effect.” (Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 879; see id. at p. 876 [“[B]ecause Proposition 47 is a measure designed to ameliorate punishment, the ‘misdemeanor for all purposes’ language … requires felony- based section 667.5 and 12022.1 enhancements to be retroactively stricken, but only with regard to judgments that were not final at the time the initiative took effect.”].) Here, the judgment containing the prior felony enhancements (the judgment in case number SCE171374) became final in 2000. Because the judgment containing the prior felony enhancements became final long before Proposition 47 took effect, Quillar may not invoke Proposition 47 to obtain dismissal of the prior felony enhancements. Our review of the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the issue identified by counsel, has disclosed no other reasonably arguable appellate issue. Quillar has been adequately represented by counsel on this appeal.
5 III DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
DATO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Buycks S231765; S232900; S238888 · 2018-07-30
- People v. Clark A143378 · 2017-02-15
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12