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United States v. Christian Venegas

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 10-56401 · 2012-02-24 · Unpublished

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christian VENEGAS, Claimant-Appellant, and $33,020.00 in U.S. Currency; $3,520.00 in U.S., Defendants

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Analysis

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Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 24 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-56401 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01706-BEN- BGS v. CHRISTIAN VENEGAS, MEMORANDUM * Claimant - Appellant, and $33,020.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY; $3,520.00 IN U.S., Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 17, 2012 Pasadena, California Before: PREGERSON, HAWKINS, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Christian Venegas (“Venegas”) appeals on Fourth Amendment grounds the denial of his Amended Motion to Suppress and resulting Consent Judgment of Forfeiture of all of the defendant currency, seized by the San Diego County Sheriff’s office during a traffic stop. Reviewing the district court’s denial of the Amended Motion to Suppress de novo, we affirm. See United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2008).

In the context of investigative traffic stops, the Fourth Amendment requires only that an officer have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, formed upon “‘specific, articulable facts . . . together with objective and reasonable inferences.’” United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir.

2000) (internal citations omitted). The arresting officer predicated the traffic stop on suspicion that while proceeding through an intersection, Venegas had violated California Vehicle Code § 22107 requiring a motorist to signal before turning.

Objective facts, known to the officer at the time of Venegas’s stop were sufficient to constitute an objective basis for reasonable suspicion that Venegas had failed to signal before turning. As such, the stop did not violate Venegas’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and resulting Consent Judgment are AFFIRMED.

Cites, in this corpus