San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Ruben S.
In re NINFA S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, and v. RUBEN S., and
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- Alex C. McDonald (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied Ruben S.'s request for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing to complete paternity testing and terminated his parental rights. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because genetic linkage was irrelevant to the issues at the termination hearing, and Ruben's due process claim failed because he had not established presumed father status.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of continuance for section 366.26 hearing“Because further delay of the hearing would have interfered with Ninfa’s need for prompt resolution of her custody status and her right to a permanent placement, and the sole reason asserted for continuing the hearing was to adduce information irrelevant to the pending proceeding, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the continuance.” | abuse of discretion | not reached | agree with court The appellate court found no abuse of discretion because the requested continuance was solely to establish genetic linkage, which is irrelevant to the specific statutory factors (likelihood of adoption and four enumerated exceptions) decided at a section 366.26 hearing. The court prioritized the minor's need for prompt resolution and stability over the father's desire for genetic information that would not alter the legal outcome. |
Termination of parental rights“The court first decides whether it is likely the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated. If so, the court examines whether termination of parental rights will be detrimental to the minor based on four enumerated circumstances.” | abuse of discretion | not reached | agree with court The appellate court affirmed the termination order by rejecting the underlying argument that the denial of the continuance violated due process or standing. The court reasoned that Ruben, having failed to establish presumed father status, had no standing to contest the termination based on the child's best interests or his own biological connection. |
Authorities
- relied: Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238 — Continuances in dependency cases are discouraged.
- relied: In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180 — An order denying a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080 — There is no evidentiary opportunity for a parent to show general interests of the child are fostered by considerations not set forth in section 366.26.
- relied: In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647 — A biological father's rights are limited to establishing presumed father status; the court does not err in terminating rights if the father had the opportunity to show presumed status but did not.
- relied: In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802 — A biological father who has not attained presumed father status lacks standing to assert that the minor's best interests would be better served by placement with relatives.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the abuse of discretion standard to the continuance request and accurately identifies that genetic testing is legally irrelevant to the specific statutory factors required for termination under section 366.26. It also correctly relies on established precedent to deny the due process claim based on the appellant's failure to establish presumed father status, which is a prerequisite for standing in such proceedings.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court denied the alleged father's request for a 25-day continuance of the section 366.26 hearing to complete paternity testing, found the child adoptable with no statutory exception applying, and terminated parental rights. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion because biological paternity was irrelevant to the issues at the .26 hearing, and that no due process right was violated because a mere biological father who never sought presumed father status has no standing to contest termination.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of the alleged father's request for a 25-day continuance of the section 366.26 hearing to complete paternity testing“Here, genetics is irrelevant to either the likelihood of Ninfa’s adoption or any of the four enumerated exceptions which might make termination of parental rights detrimental to Ninfa.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Section 352 requires good cause and bars continuances contrary to the child's interests, with substantial weight given to the child's need for prompt resolution. The .26 hearing addresses only adoptability and the enumerated exceptions to termination; genetic linkage bears on neither, and Ruben had nine months of inaction before seeking testing on the eve of the hearing. The court correctly applied Jeff M., Gerald J. and Jennifer J. |
Rejection of the claim that preventing completion of paternity testing denied the alleged father standing and violated due process“Ruben makes no claim that he was denied the opportunity to show his entitlement to presumed father status.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Under Spencer W. a biological father's rights are limited to the opportunity to establish presumed father status, which Ruben was given 60 days to do and never pursued; under Jasmine J. a non-presumed biological father lacks standing to assert the child's interest in placement with or ties to relatives. Biological confirmation would have conferred no additional notice or hearing rights. The result is correct, though the court did not discuss Adoption of Kelsey S., the Supreme Court's leading authority on a biological father's constitutional interest, which on these facts (no contact, no effort for nine months) would not have helped Ruben. |
Authorities
- relied: Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238 — Continuances in dependency proceedings are discouraged.
- relied: In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180 — An order denying a continuance in dependency proceedings is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080 — At a section 366.26 hearing there is no evidentiary window for a parent to show the child's general interests would be served by considerations outside the statute's enumerated exceptions.
- relied: In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647 — A biological father's rights are limited to the opportunity to establish presumed father status; the court may terminate his rights when he has had that opportunity and failed to use it.
- relied: In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802 — A biological father without presumed father status lacks standing to contest termination of parental rights at a .26 hearing on the ground that the child's interests would be served by relative placement.
- missed: Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 — An unwed biological father who promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to parental responsibilities has a constitutionally protected interest that cannot be defeated solely because the mother thwarted presumed father status; the court did not address this authority when rejecting the due process claim, though Ruben's nine months of inaction would have foreclosed relief under it.
- missed: In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435 — Only presumed fathers are entitled to reunification services and custody in dependency proceedings; a biological father who fails to achieve presumed status within the statutory timeframe has no right to such services, which frames the limits of an alleged father's standing.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identifies the abuse of discretion standard, ties the irrelevance of paternity to the narrow statutory issues at a .26 hearing, and uses Spencer W. and Jasmine J. to dispose of the standing-based due process claim. It does not address Adoption of Kelsey S. or Zacharia D., the Supreme Court's controlling statements on biological fathers' rights, which would have strengthened and completed the due process analysis even though the result would be the same.
Opinion — McDonald
Opinion
McDONALD, J.Ruben S. (Ruben) appeals the order terminating his parental rights entered after a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing (the .26 hearing). Ruben argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance of the .26 hearing to permit the completion of paternity testing, and that by preventing him from establishing his paternity he was deprived of his due process right to participate in the .26 hearing.
*810I. Factual and Procedural Background
In June 1996 Ninfa S. was declared a dependent after the court entered true findings on a petition alleging jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). At the dispositional hearing the court found Ruben was the “natural alleged father” and gave Ruben 60 days within which to show he was a “presumed father.”
From July 1996 through April 1997, Ruben had no contact with Ninfa, made no effort to prove presumed father status, and did not complete paternity testing. After two continuances, the six-month review hearing was held in April 1997. The court terminated reunification services and referred the case to the .26 hearing. This court affirmed that order. (Ruben S. v. Superior Court (July 29, 1997) D028510 [nonpub. opn.].)
The department of social services’ assessment report filed at the .26 hearing stated Ruben had not seen Ninfa since she was placed in foster care and had made no efforts to develop a relationship with her. The report also stated Ninfa was adoptable, 40 to 50 homes were available for a child like her, and her foster parents wished to adopt her.
At the .26 hearing Ruben’s counsel stated Ruben had finally completed the blood draw necessary for paternity testing. He requested a 25-day continuance of the .26 hearing to allow Ninfa’s blood draw and to complete the paternity test. The court denied the continuance. It found that Ninfa would likely be adopted if parental rights were terminated, that none of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights applied, and that adoption was in Ninfa’s best interests. The court terminated parental rights. Ruben appeals.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the Continuance, Because Establishment of Genetic Linkage Would Have Provided No Information Relevant to the Issues Adjudicated at the .26 Hearing
Ruben argues it was error for the court to deny his request for a continuance of the .26 hearing. Section 352 provides that a continuance shall be granted only on a showing of good cause and shall not be granted if it is contrary to the minor’s best interests. “[T]he court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).) Continuances are discouraged (Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242 *811[66 Cal.Rptr.2d 343]) and we reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 569]).
The only basis of the requested continuance was Ruben’s wish to establish his genetic link to Ninfa. However, Ruben does not explain how this information would have been relevant to any issue decided at the .26 hearing. A .26 hearing is concerned only with a long-term placement plan for the child, the preferred alternative being adoption and termination of parental rights. The court first decides whether it is likely the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated. If so, the court examines whether termination of parental rights will be detrimental to the minor based on four enumerated circumstances. “[T]here is no window of evidentiary opportunity for a parent to show that in some general way the ‘interests’ of the child will be fostered by an order based on some consideration not set forth in section 366.26.” (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 813].)
Here, genetics is irrelevant to either the likelihood of Ninfa’s adoption or any of the four enumerated exceptions which might make termination of parental rights detrimental to Ninfa. Because further delay of the hearing would have interfered with Ninfa’s need for prompt resolution of her custody status and her right to a permanent placement, and the sole reason asserted for continuing the hearing was to adduce information irrelevant to the pending proceeding, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the continuance.
III. Ruben’s Due Process Claim Is Without Merit
Ruben argues that because he was prevented from establishing his biological paternity he was denied standing in these proceedings; denial of standing to contest termination of parental rights, he argues, is a violation of his due process rights. However, a biological father’s rights are limited to establishing his right to “presumed” father status, and the court does not err by terminating a biological father’s parental rights when he has had the opportunity to show presumed father status and has not done so. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1652-1655 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 524].)
Ruben makes no claim that he was denied the opportunity to show his entitlement to presumed father status. He instead argues that by precluding the completion of paternity testing the court deprived him of his right to know if he was Ninfa’s father, and also deprived Ninfa of her right to know, and perhaps develop ties to, her paternal heritage and relatives. *812In In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 560], a biological father who had not attained presumed father status was denied a contested .26 hearing at which his parental rights were terminated. (Id. at pp. 1805-1806.) He argued his rights were violated because he could have shown at the .26 hearing that the minor’s best interests would have been served by placement with a biological relative. The court rejected his claim because he had no standing to assert that the minor’s best interests would be better served by placement with relatives. (Id. at pp. 1806-1808.) Similarly, Ruben has no standing to assert that Ninfa’s rights were violated by the court’s order terminating Ruben’s parental rights.
Ruben’s argument is at bottom a claim that he had the right to know whether he and Ninfa were biologically related. However, because this information was not germane to any issue decided at the .26 hearing and would not have conferred on Ruben any additional rights to notice of or opportunity for a hearing, the denial of the continuance did not deprive him of any due process right. '
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
Kremer, P. J., and Huffman, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 13, 1998.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
Cites, in this corpus
- JEFF M. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County B114191 · 1997-08-01
- In Re Spencer W. D025123 · 1996-07-30
- In Re Jasmine J. B097244 · 1996-06-05
- In Re Jennifer J. D015384 · 1992-08-13
- San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Gerald J. D013266 · 1991-11-21
Cited by
- In Re Ninfa S. D029325 · 1998-03-04