People v. Crane
THE PEOPLE, and v. RONALD DALE CRANE, and
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Don R. Work (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike a prior second-degree burglary conviction as a serious felony, finding that court records established the prior offense was a residential burglary. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the prior conviction's records expressly adjudicated the residential character required for serious felony enhancement, distinguishing the rule in People v. Crowson.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to strike prior serious felony conviction“Because court records establish the prior conviction specifically included the adjudication the burglary was residential in character within the meaning of section 667, we affirm the judgment.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the rule that a prior conviction is limited to the facts actually adjudicated. Here, the records (complaint, plea form, abstract, and transcript) explicitly included the section 667 allegation and the defendant's admission to it, meaning the residential nature was a necessary part of the conviction, unlike the scenario in People v. Crowson where the record was silent on the specific enhancement element. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623 — A court cannot go behind the judgment of a prior conviction to find facts not adjudicated in that proceeding to support a serious felony enhancement.
- relied: In re Finley (1968) 68 Cal.2d 389 — The least adjudicated elements of a prior conviction remain the same and parties cannot go behind those elements to show a different offense.
- relied: People v. Lee (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 455 — Entry of a residence is not an element of second-degree burglary, so a guilty plea to the offense alone does not establish the residential character.
- relied: People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8 — An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction by its nature, definition, and terms.
- relied: In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264 — Supports the principle that prior convictions are limited to the facts actually adjudicated.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly distinguishes People v. Crowson by identifying that the prior conviction's records explicitly contained the section 667 allegation and the defendant's admission to it, making the residential nature an adjudicated fact rather than an unadjudicated element. The court properly utilized judicial notice of the certified court records to establish this fact without violating the rule against going behind the judgment.
The trial court denied Crane's motion to strike a prior second degree burglary conviction alleged as a serious felony under Penal Code sections 667 and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18), finding on certified court records that the prior burglary was of a residence. The Court of Appeal, taking judicial notice of the prior case's complaint, change of plea form, abstract of judgment, minute entries, and plea transcript, held the residential character was expressly admitted and adjudicated in the prior proceeding, found no Crowson error, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to strike the prior serious felony conviction; finding that the prior second degree burglary was residential within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18)“Because court records establish the prior conviction specifically included the adjudication the burglary was residential in character within the meaning of section 667, we affirm the judgment.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Crowson and Finley bar going behind the adjudicated elements of a prior conviction to prove a greater or different offense. Here the court did not go behind the judgment: the prior complaint expressly alleged a residence within the meaning of section 667, Crane's signed plea form admitted entering a residence, the plea transcript showed he expressly admitted the section 667 allegation, and the minutes and abstract recorded a '459/667' conviction. The residential character was therefore actually and necessarily adjudicated, satisfying even the strict Crowson/Finley test the court assumed applied. |
Admission and reliance on certified copies of the prior amended complaint, change of plea form, and abstract of judgment to prove the residential character of the prior burglary“Essentially, Crane contends the trial court erred in proving the residential character of the prior burglary by certified copies of the prior’s amended criminal complaint, the change of plea form, and the abstract of judgment.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court properly recognized that an abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment (Hartsell; § 1213.5) and so took judicial notice of the reporter's transcript of the prior plea and the minute entries under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). Those records of conviction showed the residential allegation was pleaded, admitted, and incorporated into the judgment, so the documents were competent proof of what was adjudicated rather than extrinsic evidence of underlying conduct. The court did not state whether the transcript and minutes were before the trial court, which is a gap, but Evidence Code provisions permit a reviewing court to notice such records. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623 — In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies for an enhancement, the court may not go behind the elements adjudicated in the prior proceeding; a guilty plea admits only the elements of the formal charge.
- relied: In re Finley (1968) 68 Cal.2d 389 — Neither the People nor the defendant may go behind the least adjudicated elements of a prior conviction to show a greater, lesser, or different offense was committed.
- relied: In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264 — Source of the least adjudicated elements principle applied in Finley and Crowson to prior-conviction enhancements.
- relied: People v. Lee (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 455 — Entry of a residence is not an element of second degree burglary, so a bare plea to second degree burglary does not establish a residential burglary.
- relied: People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8 — An abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction.
- relied: McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 — A guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly distinguished Crowson by showing the residential character of the prior burglary was pleaded as a section 667 allegation, expressly admitted at the plea, and reflected in the minutes and abstract, so the enhancement rested on adjudicated facts rather than on going behind the judgment. It assumed rather than decided whether the Finley/Crowson rule governs section 667 residential-burglary priors and did not explain whether the judicially noticed plea transcript and minutes were before the trial court, leaving minor gaps in an otherwise defensible analysis.
Opinion — Work
Opinion
WORK, J.Ronald Dale Crane appeals a negotiated judgment convicting him of a first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code,1 § 459). He admitted a prior felony conviction for second degree burglary and the trial court found the prior burglary was of a dwelling house, a serious prior felony under sections 667, subdivisions (a) and (d), and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18). Crane contends the trial court erred in finding the prior conviction *669of second degree burglary was of a residence. Because court records establish the prior conviction specifically included the adjudication the burglary was residential in character within the meaning of section 667, we affirm the judgment.
Pursuant to the parties’ plea bargain reserving the right to litigate the validity of the serious felony at the time of sentencing, Crane moved to strike the prior serious felony conviction, contending, as he does here, the court is precluded by the holding in People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623 [190 Cal.Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389], from going behind the prior second degree burglary judgment to determine whether it was in fact a residential burglary, a serious felony prior pursuant to sections 667, subdivisions (a) and (d), and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18). His motion was denied. At the hearing, the prosecution relied on the prior felony criminal complaint which charged: “Count III: On or about October 12, 1982, Ronald Dale Crane did unlawfully enter a building with intent to commit theft, in violation of Penal Code section 459.
“And, it is further alleged that the above burglary was committed upon an inhabited building, and a residence within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.” The People also relied on the change of plea form where Crane declared his plea of guilty to “count III 459 2nd degree with allegation” and admitted he violated “P.C. 459 2nd degree by entering a residence during the daytime with the intent to commit a theft.” (Italics added.) Finally, the People relied on the abstract of judgment which reflected Crane’s conviction of the second degree burglary, but also included under “other orders”: “This burglary convicted within the meaning of P.C. 667. ” (Italics added.)
Essentially, Crane contends the trial court erred in proving the residential character of the prior burglary by certified copies of the prior’s amended criminal complaint, the change of plea form, and the abstract of judgment. He argues that because a plea of guilty to an offense is no more than an admission of all the elements of the formal criminal charge and entry of a residence is not an element of second degree burglary (People v. Lee (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 455, 457 [197 Cal.Rptr. 766]), his plea to second degree burglary does not establish he burglarized a residence. Quoting In re Finley (1968) 68 Cal.2d 389, 393 [66 Cal.Rptr. 733, 438 P.2d 381], relied on in People v. Crowson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 623, 634, he stresses: “The least adjudicated elements of the prior conviction remain the same whether it is questioned in the trial court at the time of determination of habitual criminality or on habeas corpus after such determination becomes final. Neither the People nor the defendant can go behind those adjudicated *670elements in an attempt to show that he committed a greater, lesser, or different offense. [Citations.]”
“In general, the doctrine of collateral estoppel regards as conclusively determined only those issues actually and necessarily litigated in the prior proceeding [citations] and the United States Supreme Court has noted that a guilty plea is simply an admission of ‘all the elements of a formal criminal charge. ’ (McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459, 466 [22 L.Ed.2d 418, 425, 89 S.Ct. 1166].)” (People v. Crowson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 623, 634.)
Here, taking judicial notice of the court records (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), we first review the People’s proof of the residential character of the burglary consisting of certified copies of the amended criminal complaint, the change of plea form, and the abstract of judgment. The abstract of judgment states the second degree burglary conviction was found to be within the meaning of section 667, consistent with the complaint alleging his burglary was committed upon an inhabited building and a residence within the meaning of section 667. His change of plea form pleading guilty to that count and allegation declares he committed second degree burglary by entering a residence during the daytime with the intent to commit a theft.
Because the abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction by its very nature, definition and terms {People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 14 [109 Cal.Rptr. 627]; § 1213.5), we take further judicial notice of the reporter’s transcript for October 22, 1982 (when Crane pleaded guilty to the second degree burglary), showing he expressly admitted the section 667 allegation that the burglary was committed upon an inhabited building and a residence within the meaning of that section. Also, the minute entries memoralizing his guilty plea and conviction state they were for violating section “459/667 P.C. second degree” and the pronouncement of judgment upon that conviction of “459/667 P.C.”
Accordingly, assuming the principle derived from In re Finley, supra, 68 Cal.2d 389, and In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 276 [176 P.2d 40], approvingly set forth in People v. Crowson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 623, is applicable within this context, Crane’s prior conviction was expressly for second degree burglary within the meaning of the serious felony section 667, requiring the actual and necessary adjudication a residential burglary was indeed involved. Here, the residential character of this burglary conviction was expressly set forth in the entry of the plea of guilty and thus the conviction, memoralized by the minute entries, the abstract of judgment, the signed change of plea form, and the express allegations of count III in the *671criminal complaint. Thus, the record of Crane’s earlier conviction shows on its face it was for a serious felony pursuant to sections 667 and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18). There is no Crowson error.
Judgment affirmed.
Staniforth, Acting P. J., and Lewis, J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Lee AO21087 · 1984-01-04
- People v. Crowson Crim. 22415 · 1983-03-24
- People v. Hartsell Crim. 5285 · 1973-08-23
- In Re Finley Crim. 11721 · 1968-03-18
- In Re McVickers Crim. 4680 · 1946-12-03
Cited by
- People v. Alfaro Crim. 25042 · 1986-10-02