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Cui v. Secured Capital Limited Partnership CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D078538 · 2021-12-02 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2019-00041913-CU-FR-CTL
Trial judge
Ronald L. Styn
Outcome
reversed — Reversed.
Area
civil
Panel
Judith L. Haller (author), Cynthia Aaron, William S. Dato

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:57Z · confidence high

The trial court granted a postjudgment motion for attorney fees and costs to the defendants based on their status as prevailing parties following a summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed the fee order, holding that the award necessarily falls with the reversal of the underlying judgment in a prior appeal.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs
“An order awarding costs falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the well-established principle that an award of costs or fees incident to a judgment is vacated when that judgment is reversed. The court properly distinguished the cited authorities as inapposite because they did not involve the reversal of the underlying judgment, and it correctly noted that partial reversal of the judgment still necessitates the reversal of the fee award.

Authorities

  • relied: Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270 — An order awarding costs falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.
  • relied: Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018 — An award of costs necessarily falls with the judgment, even when the judgment is reversed as to fewer than all causes of action.
  • relied: Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033 — Reversal of the judgment necessarily compels the reversal of the award of fees as costs to the prevailing party.
  • relied: Evans v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1378 — Because the award of costs to defendant was incident to the judgment, reversal of the judgment operates to vacate the award.
  • relied: Ventas Finance I, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1207 — A fee award must be reversed following a partial reversal of the judgment.
  • relied: Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101 — Distinguished as inapposite because it did not involve the reversal of an underlying judgment.
  • relied: Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1073 — Distinguished as inapposite because it did not involve the reversal of an underlying judgment.
  • relied: Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215 — Distinguished as inapposite because it did not involve the reversal of an underlying judgment.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established rule that fee awards incident to a judgment are vacated upon reversal of that judgment. The court adequately addresses the respondents' arguments by distinguishing the cited cases as factually inapposite.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

After granting summary judgment to Secured Capital and El Dorado on the ground that a prior unlawful detainer stipulated judgment barred Cui's fraud and contract claims, the trial court awarded the defendants $96,964.69 in prevailing party attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeal reversed the fee and cost order because it had already reversed the underlying judgment in a separate appeal (Cui I) as to all claims except premises liability, and an award of fees and costs falls with reversal of the judgment on which it rests.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Postjudgment order awarding Secured Capital and El Dorado $96,964.69 in prevailing party attorney fees and costs
““ ‘An order awarding costs falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.’ ” (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284”
unclearerror (other)agree with court
The court did not articulate a standard of review, but the question is purely legal and the rule it applied is settled: a fee and cost award that is incident to a judgment is vacated when that judgment is reversed, even where the reversal is partial (Harris; Ventas Finance). Because Cui I reversed the judgment on all claims but premises liability, the prevailing party determination that supported the award no longer exists and must be redetermined on remand. The court also correctly distinguished the defendants' authorities (Abdallah, Erickson, Fed-Mart) as not involving reversal of the underlying judgment. The trial court's order was not wrong when made, but reversal is the proper consequence of the reversal of the judgment.

Authorities

  • relied: Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270 — An order awarding costs falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.
  • relied: Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018 — An award of costs necessarily falls with the judgment, and a postjudgment fee and cost order must be reversed even where the judgment is reversed as to only some causes of action.
  • relied: Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033 — Reversal of the judgment necessarily compels reversal of the award of fees as costs to the prevailing party based on that judgment.
  • relied: Evans v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1378 — Because an award of costs is incident to the judgment, reversal of the judgment operates to vacate the award.
  • relied: Ventas Finance I, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1207 — A fee award is reversed following a partial reversal of the underlying judgment.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion applies a well-established and consistently followed rule that fee and cost awards incident to a judgment fall when the judgment is reversed, and it cites multiple published authorities directly on point, including ones addressing partial reversals. It briefly but adequately distinguishes the respondents' cases on the ground that none involved reversal of the underlying judgment; the only blemish is a minor chronological misstatement (describing roughly six months as 'about 18 months'), which does not affect the result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 12/2/21 Cui v. Secured Capital Limited Partnership CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL CUI, D078538

Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019- SECURED CAPITAL LIMITED 00041913-CU-FR-CTL) PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L. Styn, Judge. Reversed. Liu & Wakabay and Youjun Liu for Plaintiff and Appellant. Mulvaney Barry Beatty Linn & Mayers, Patrick L. Prindle and George A. Rios III for Defendants and Respondents. Paul Cui appeals a postjudgment order awarding defendants Secured Capital Limited Partnership (Secured Capital) and El Dorado Properties, Inc. (El Dorado) approximately $97,000 in prevailing party attorney fees and costs. Cui contends that because our court has since reversed the underlying judgment in a separate appeal (Cui v. Secured Capital Limited Partnership (June 28, 2021, D078110) [nonpub. opn.] (Cui I)), we must now also reverse the postjudgment order awarding fees and costs. We agree, and will do so. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In October 2018, Secured Capital filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Cui alleging he breached a commercial lease. The parties resolved the suit in December 2018 with a stipulated judgment under which Cui agreed to forfeit the lease, surrender possession of the leased premises, and pay specified rent for the interim period. About seven months later, in August 2019, Cui filed an unlimited civil suit against Secured Capital and its real estate broker, El Dorado. As later amended, the complaint asserted causes of action against Secured Capital for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, concealment, premises liability, and breach of contract; and against El Dorado for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and concealment (but not for premises liability or breach of contract). The gist of Cui’s claims was that the defendants had misrepresented the suitability of the leased premises for Cui’s intended use. Secured Capital and El Dorado moved for summary judgment (or, in the alternative, summary adjudication) on the basis that the stipulated judgment in the unlawful detainer case barred Cui’s current claims. The trial court granted the motion. About two weeks later, on October 2, 2020, Secured Capital and El Dorado filed a motion seeking prevailing party attorney fees and costs. About two weeks after that, on October 14, the trial court entered judgment for Secured Capital and El Dorado. Cui appealed the judgment the following day.

2 About two months later, on December 11, 2020, over Cui’s opposition, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion and awarded them prevailing party attorney fees and costs totaling $96,964.69. Cui appealed this order about one week later. About 18 months later, on June 28, 2021, our court filed Cui I, in which we reversed the underlying judgment in this case on all claims except for Cui’s premises liability claim, which he did not challenge on appeal. (Cui I, supra, D078110.) DISCUSSION Cui contends that because we reversed the underlying judgment in Cui I, we must likewise reverse the postjudgment order awarding fees and costs. We agree. “ ‘An order awarding costs falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.’ ” (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284; see Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1027 (Harris) [an “award of costs necessarily falls with the judgment”]; Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1053 [“Our reversal of the judgment necessarily compels the reversal of the award of fees as costs to the prevailing party based on the judgment.”]; Evans v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1388 [“Because the award of costs to defendant was incident to the judgment, reversal of the judgment operates to vacate the award.”].) This holds true even when, as here, the judgment was reversed as to fewer than all causes of action. (See Harris, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at 1021 [reversal of postjudgment fee and cost order required where judgment was reversed as to only one of three causes of action]; Ventas Finance I, LLC 3 v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1212 [reversing fee award following partial reversal of judgment].) The cases Secured Capital and El Dorado cite to support a contrary conclusion are inapposite because none involved reversal of an underlying judgment. (See Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1104, 1105-1106, 1111; Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1077; Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 229.) Accordingly, we will reverse the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs. DISPOSITION The postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs to Secured Capital and El Dorado is reversed. Cui is entitled to his costs on appeal.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, J.

DATO, J.

Cites, in this corpus