gno.law

People v. Brown CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D078975 · 2021-11-08 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD207315
Trial judge
Robert F. O'Neill
Outcome
reversed — Reversed and remanded with directions.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Cynthia Aaron, Patricia Guerrero

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:59Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Brown's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, finding him ineligible as a matter of law based on his 2008 plea admission that he acted with malice. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the bare admission did not rebut Brown's prima facie showing that his liability was based on theories eliminated by Senate Bill 1437, and remanded for an order to show cause and evidentiary hearing.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing.
“In its order denying the petition for resentencing, the trial court found that the admission that Brown acted with malice in the 2008 plea rendered him ineligible for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437) and section 1170.95.”
de novoerroragree with court
The trial court erred by treating a bare admission of 'malice' in a 2008 plea form as conclusive evidence of eligibility under current law. Because the definition of malice changed significantly with Senate Bill 1437, and the record lacked a transcript to clarify the basis of liability (e.g., natural and probable consequences), the trial court could not deny the petition at the prima facie stage without an evidentiary hearing.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830 — Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure murder liability is not imposed on persons who are not actual killers, did not act with intent to kill, or were not major participants acting with reckless indifference.
  • relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1170.95 petition review, the court must assume the petitioner's allegations are true and may only deny the petition if the record of conviction rebuts those allegations without requiring factfinding.
  • relied: People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 — A trial court may deny a section 1170.95 petition if the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law, but may not engage in factfinding or weigh credibility at the prima facie stage.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the framework established in People v. Lewis, recognizing that a bare admission of 'malice' in a pre-2019 plea does not automatically establish eligibility under the amended statute. It properly identifies that the record was insufficient to rebut the petitioner's prima facie showing without an evidentiary hearing, as the specific theory of liability (e.g., natural and probable consequences) was not established in the written record.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The trial court denied Andre Brown's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage without issuing an order to show cause, reasoning that his 2008 change-of-plea admission that he killed "with malice" made him ineligible as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with directions to issue an OSC and hold an evidentiary hearing, holding that a generic 2008 malice admission does not conclusively rebut the petition's allegations because malice then could rest on natural-and-probable-consequences or felony-murder theories that Senate Bill 1437 eliminated.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of section 1170.95 petition at the prima facie stage, without an OSC or evidentiary hearing, on the ground that the 2008 plea-form admission of malice rendered Brown ineligible as a matter of law
“There is no transcript of the 2008 plea. All we have is the bare statement in the change of plea form. We do not know, based upon this record, whether Brown’s participation in the events surrounding this killing would warrant a finding of malice under current law.”
unclearerror (law misapplied)agree with court
Under Lewis the trial court must accept the petition's allegations as true at the prima facie stage unless the record of conviction conclusively rebuts them, and may not engage in factfinding. In 2008 an admission of 'malice' for second degree murder could rest on imputed malice under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which Senate Bill 1437 abolished, so the bare plea-form statement, with no plea transcript or factual basis in the record, does not establish ineligibility as a matter of law. The court's reliance on Gentile and Lewis supports reversal, though the opinion does not expressly address the People's possible argument that 'committed this unlawful killing' amounts to an admission of being an actual killer.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the section 1170.95 prima facie stage the court must accept the petition's allegations as true, may consult the record of conviction, but may deny without an OSC only if the record conclusively establishes ineligibility without factfinding or credibility weighing.
  • relied: People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830 — Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine so that murder liability is not imposed on one who was not the actual killer, did not intend to kill, and was not a major participant acting with reckless indifference.
  • relied: People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 — A trial court may deny a section 1170.95 petition at the prima facie stage only where the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law and may not engage in factfinding or credibility determinations at that stage.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies Lewis, Gentile, and Drayton: a 2008 plea-form admission of 'malice' is ambiguous because malice could then be imputed under theories Senate Bill 1437 eliminated, so the record does not conclusively rebut the petition. It is thin, however, in not engaging with the plea form's language that Brown 'committed this unlawful killing' with a codefendant, which the People might argue is an admission of direct perpetration, and it does not address prejudice or the parallel published decisions on generic malice pleas.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 11/8/21 P. v. Brown CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D078975

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD207315)

ANDRE WILLIAM BROWN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert F. O’Neill, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2008, Andre William Brown pleaded guilty to second degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and admitted the killing was for the benefit of a 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Brown also admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Brown was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life plus five years for the prior conviction. In 2019, Brown filed a pro. per. petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel, received briefing, reviewed the record of conviction, and denied the petition by written order. The record does not contain any evidentiary hearings but does contain the change of plea form filed in 2008. In that form, Brown stated that he “along with [codefendant] Williams committed this unlawful killing of Gregory Harper with malice, and further did so in association with a criminal street gang.” In its order denying the petition for resentencing, the trial court found that the admission that Brown acted with malice in the 2008 plea rendered him ineligible for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437) and section 1170.95. Accordingly, the court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause (OSC) or holding an evidentiary hearing. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal. Brown contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for resentencing without issuing an OSC and conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argues the 2008 admission that he acted with malice does not mean he is ineligible for relief. Brown notes that malice liability for murder in 2008, could be based on aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony murder rule, which would not be a valid basis for imputing malice under Senate Bill 1437’s amendments. We agree 2 with Brown and will reverse and remand for an appropriate evidentiary hearing.2 DISCUSSION Senate Bill 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) was enacted to “ ‘amend[ ] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).) Section 1170.95, subdivision (c) provides: “The court shall review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The prosecutor shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor’s response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.” When a trial court reviews a petition for resentencing, the court first determines if the petitioner has shown a prima facie case for relief under the statute. If so, the court must issue an OSC and hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 962 (Lewis).) However, the court may deny the petition if the person is ineligible as a matter of law. (People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980-981.) The 2 The record does not include any evidentiary hearings; therefore, we will omit a statement of facts. 3 court may review the record of conviction, including any prior appellate opinion, to determine if the petitioner’s allegations are rebutted by the record. (Lewis, at p. 972.) However, the court may not engage in factfinding and weighing credibility at the prima facie stage of petition review. (Drayton, at p. 979.) In Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pages 971-972, the court directed trial courts, in reviewing petitions at the prima facie stage, to assume the allegations are true. However, the court agreed trial courts could and should review the records of conviction. If the record demonstrates ineligibility without any factfinding, the court could deny a petition without first issuing an OSC. Here, the denial of the petition is based solely on Brown’s 2008 change of plea admission he acted with malice. However, as the court in Gentile pointed out, the purpose of Senate Bill 1437 was to modify the definition of malice so as to avoid imputing murder liability to persons who were not the actual killers, or direct aiders and abettors who acted with the intention to kill, or were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless disregard for human life. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.) Thus, the definitions of malice in 2008 are significantly different from the current definitions. Brown alleges that he could not be convicted today in light of the changes in the definitions of malice. Under Lewis, the court was obligated to accept the allegation as true at the prima facie stage of review, unless rebutted by the record of conviction. There is no transcript of the 2008 plea. All we have is the bare statement in the change of plea form. We do not know, based upon this record, whether Brown’s participation in the events surrounding this killing would warrant a finding of malice under current law. Accordingly, we must 4 reverse the trial court’s denial of Brown’s petition and remand for further proceedings. DISPOSITION The order denying Brown’s petition for resentencing is reversed. The case is remanded to the superior court with directions to issue an OSC and conduct an evidentiary hearing as required by section 1170.95.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, J.

GUERRERO, J.

Cites, in this corpus