People v. Reyna CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D077918 · 2021-07-19 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE333769
Trial judge: John Thompson
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: O'Rourke (author), Patricia D. Benke, Patricia Guerrero

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:05Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Reyna's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, ruling that he was ineligible because he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that the statute does not apply to defendants convicted of manslaughter and that this exclusion does not violate equal protection.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 “The court denied the petition, finding Reyna was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder, which is a necessary prerequisite for relief under the statute.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of Penal Code section 1170.95, which limits eligibility to persons convicted of murder. Since Reyna pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, he does not meet the statutory prerequisite for relief. The court's reliance on prior published decisions from multiple districts confirms that this interpretation is consistent with existing California appellate law.

Authorities

relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95.
relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — Denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.
relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — Section 1170.95 permits defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for resentencing.
relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the plain language of Penal Code section 1170.95, which explicitly limits eligibility to those convicted of murder. It is supported by a consistent line of published appellate decisions from multiple districts that have rejected the argument that manslaughter convictions qualify for relief under this specific statute.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence medium

The trial court denied John Reyna's Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing on the ground that he had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was never convicted of murder, a statutory prerequisite for relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed, adhering to its own decision in People v. Turner and agreeing with the uniform line of appellate authority holding that manslaughter convictions are outside section 1170.95 and that this limitation does not violate equal protection.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of section 1170.95 resentencing petition on the ground that a defendant convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, is ineligible for relief “The court denied the petition, finding Reyna was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder, which is a necessary prerequisite for relief under the statute.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The opinion does not state a standard of review, but the question is one of statutory eligibility reviewed independently. As the statute read in 2021, section 1170.95, subdivision (a) extended relief only to persons 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.' Reyna pleaded to voluntary manslaughter, an offense without malice as an element, so he was not aggrieved by the theories of malice imputation the Legislature abolished. The court's reliance on Turner, Flores, Sanchez, Paige, Cervantes and Martinez is consistent with the plain text and the uniform Court of Appeal authority at the time; Reyna conceded no case supported him.
Rejection of claim that excluding voluntary manslaughter convictions from section 1170.95 violates equal protection “We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The court disposed of the equal protection argument by adopting the reasoning of Turner and Harris. Those cases hold that persons convicted of murder and manslaughter are not similarly situated because the offenses differ in elements and punishment, and that the Legislature has a rational basis for extending ameliorative relief to the more serious offense first. The opinion's treatment is cursory and incorporates reasoning by reference rather than restating it, but the conclusion is well supported. The court properly noted Harris had been granted review, which under rule 8.1115(e)(1) permits citation for persuasive value only.

Authorities

relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A defendant who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, and the statute's limitation to murder convictions does not violate equal protection.
relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted to limit murder liability under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine, and section 1170.95 relief requires a murder conviction obtained on one of those theories.
relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — Section 1170.95 does not extend to voluntary manslaughter convictions, and excluding manslaughter from relief does not violate equal protection (review granted; cited for persuasive value).
relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — A defendant who pleaded to voluntary manslaughter after being charged with murder is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief.
relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — Section 1170.95 by its plain terms applies only to murder convictions and not to voluntary manslaughter pleas.
relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — Voluntary manslaughter convictions by plea fall outside section 1170.95, and the exclusion survives equal protection scrutiny.
relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — Section 1170.95 provides no relief for persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion answers the two arguments presented with the correct statutory text and a consistent body of published appellate authority, including the panel's own binding-in-practice precedent in Turner, and appellant conceded no contrary authority existed. It is brief and incorporates the equal protection analysis by reference rather than restating it, but given the uniform case law and the plain language of section 1170.95 as it stood in July 2021, the result and reasoning are correct.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 7/19/21 P. v. Reyna CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D077918

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE333769)

JOHN REYNA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John Thompson, Judge. Affirmed. Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2013, John Reyna was charged with first degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and conspiracy to commit a crime (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. In 2014, Reyna pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a).) The factual basis of the plea was that Reyna took the life of a human being “without malice aforethought.” The court sentenced Reyna to a determinate term of 11 years. In 2020, Reyna filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, claiming he pleaded guilty to manslaughter to avoid trial for felony murder under an aider and abettor theory. Accordingly, Reyna contends he is entitled to resentencing under section 1170.95, even though he was not convicted of murder. The court denied the petition, finding Reyna was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder, which is a necessary prerequisite for relief under the statute. Reyna on appeal acknowledges all Court of Appeal decisions regarding eligibility for relief by persons convicted of manslaughter have rejected his contentions. He notes the California Supreme Court has not granted review in any of the cases, and argues that all of the appellate decisions rejecting his arguments are wrong. We reject Reyna’s arguments and adhere to the views we expressed in People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-439. DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 “was enacted ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a 2 petition for resentencing to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) Under Senate Bill No. 1437, the defendant must have been convicted of murder following trial or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory. (People v. Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) Reyna was not convicted of murder, and his conviction did not arise from an offense where malice is an element of the crime. Thus, Reyna is not a person aggrieved by the former methods of proving malice that the Legislature has now rejected. Reyna’s arguments that the statute applies to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder or that failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions would violate equal protection have been rejected by the Courts of Appeal, including the following cases: (1) People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557, 565-571, review granted April 21, 2021, S267529 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (2) People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 916, 918-921 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (3) People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 197-198 [First Appellate District, Division Two]; (4) People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435-439 [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; (5) People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992-997 [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; and (6) People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887-888 [Second Appellate District, Division Six]. We have reviewed the cases listed above, all of which have rejected all of Reyna’s arguments. We agree with the analysis in each of the cases. In People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435 through 439, this court analyzed the arguments that are now presented in this appeal and rejected them. For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a 3 person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection. (People v. Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 570, rev. gr.) DISPOSITION The order denying Reyna’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.