People v. Downey CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD255514
- Trial judge
- Peter C. Deddeh
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Joan K. Irion, Patricia Guerrero
Analysis
The trial court denied Downey's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, determining he was ineligible because he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that the statute does not apply to manslaughter convictions and that excluding such defendants does not violate equal protection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95“We continue to hold to the views we expressed in Turner. For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95.” | de novo | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1170.95 apply to defendants convicted of murder or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory.
- relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, and this exclusion does not violate equal protection.
- relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — Section 1170.95 does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter.
- relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — Section 1170.95 does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter.
- relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — Section 1170.95 does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter.
- relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — Section 1170.95 does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter.
- relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — Section 1170.95 does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the statutory limitation of Section 1170.95 to murder convictions and relies on multiple published Court of Appeal decisions that have squarely rejected the argument that manslaughter convictions are eligible for relief. The court's reliance on People v. Turner, a decision from the same division, provides a consistent and binding precedent for the specific legal question presented.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Neil Downey's Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing because he had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter rather than murder and so was not eligible for relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that persons convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter are not eligible under section 1170.95 and that excluding them does not violate equal protection, following its own decision in People v. Turner and a line of consistent Court of Appeal authority.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1170.95 resentencing petition on the ground that a defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter (not murder) is ineligible for relief“For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court did not articulate a standard of review, but the question is one of statutory interpretation. As enacted in 2019, section 1170.95, subdivision (a) by its terms permitted only persons convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition, and every published appellate decision as of May 2021 (Turner, Flores, Cervantes, Sanchez, Paige, Harris) had held manslaughter convictions outside the statute. Appellate counsel conceded the issue was raised only for preservation. The court's reading of the statute as it then existed was correct; the Legislature's later expansion by Senate Bill No. 775 (effective 2022) postdates this opinion and does not bear on its correctness. |
Rejection of the equal protection challenge to excluding voluntary manslaughter convictions from section 1170.95 relief“We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court adopted the equal protection analysis in Turner and the other cited cases, which held that persons convicted of manslaughter are not similarly situated to those convicted of murder and that, under rational basis review, the Legislature could reasonably limit relief to those convicted of murder under the now-rejected theories. The opinion does not independently restate the analysis but incorporates it by reference, which is a defensible approach given the uniform authority and counsel's concession. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine as they relate to murder; section 1170.95 relief begins with a conviction for murder.
- relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A defendant who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for section 1170.95 relief, and that exclusion does not violate equal protection.
- relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — Section 1170.95 does not extend to persons convicted of manslaughter; no equal protection violation.
- relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — Voluntary manslaughter convictions by plea are outside section 1170.95; no equal protection violation.
- relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — Section 1170.95 applies only to murder convictions, not manslaughter.
- relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — A defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief.
- relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — Section 1170.95 by its plain language applies to murder convictions and does not reach voluntary manslaughter.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applied the plain language of section 1170.95 as it existed in 2021 and followed uniform, consistent published authority, including the same division's own decision in Turner, which addressed the identical statutory and equal protection arguments. Although it incorporates the equal protection analysis by reference rather than restating it, appellate counsel conceded the arguments were raised only for preservation, so the brief treatment is adequate.
Opinion
Filed 5/27/21 P. v. Downey CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D078197
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD255514)
NEIL EDWARD DOWNEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed. John Derrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2017, Neil Downey pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted a gang allegation (Pen. Code,1 § 192) as part of a plea agreement. A murder charge was dismissed, and the parties stipulated to a 21-year sentence for Downey. In 2019, Downey filed a pro. per. petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel and received briefing from the parties. Ultimately, the court denied the petition because Downey was not eligible for relief since he was convicted of manslaughter and not murder. Downey filed a timely notice of appeal. Downey contends he is entitled to relief under section 1170.95, even though the statute expressly applies to persons convicted of first- or second- degree murder. Appellate counsel candidly concedes all of the opinions of the courts of appeal, including this court, have squarely rejected all of his arguments and the Supreme Court has declined to grant review in any of those cases. Counsel admits the arguments that are repeated in this case are being made to preserve the issues for review or possibly federal habeas corpus proceedings. We will reject Downey’s arguments for including persons convicted of manslaughter within the ambit of section 1170.95 relief.2 DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 “was enacted ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to the analysis of the issues raised by this appeal. Accordingly, we will omit the traditional statement of facts.
2 to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez).) Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for resentencing to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) The beginning point of the analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 is that the defendant must have been convicted of murder or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory. (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) In this case Downey was not convicted of murder, and his conviction did not arise from an offense where malice is an element of the crime. Thus, Downey is not a person aggrieved by the former methods of proving malice that the Legislature has now rejected. The arguments that the statute applies to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder or that failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions would violate equal protection have been soundly rejected by the courts of appeal, including the following cases: (1) People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557, 565-571 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (2) People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 916, 918-921 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (3) People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 197-198 [First Appellate District, Division Two]; (4) People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-439 (Turner) [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; (5) People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992-997 [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; and (6) People v. 3 Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887-888 [Second Appellate District, Division Six]. We have reviewed the cases listed above, all of which have rejected all of Downey’s arguments. We agree with the analysis in each of the cases. In Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435 through 439, this court analyzed the arguments that are now presented in this appeal. We carefully considered the same arguments and found them to not be persuasive. We continue to hold to the views we expressed in Turner. For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection. DISPOSITION The order denying Downey’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
GUERRERO, J.