gno.law

People v. Washington CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D078636 · 2021-05-10 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD227126
Trial judge
Eugenia A. Eyherabide
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:09Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Washington's petition to modify his sentence under Penal Code section 1016.8, finding that his Illinois guilty pleas did not involve a waiver of future benefits as required by the statute. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, concluding that Washington failed to identify any specific future benefit he was required to forgo and that the legal consequences of his pleas (qualifying as strikes) did not constitute a waiver of future benefits.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for modification of sentence under Penal Code section 1016.8
“The legal consequences of his guilty pleas were not a waiver of future benefits as contemplated in the statute.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court correctly applied the statutory text of section 1016.8, which requires a plea bargain provision that 'requires a defendant to generally waive future benefits.' Washington's argument that his Illinois pleas were void because they resulted in 'strikes' in California does not fit the statutory definition of waiving 'future benefits of legislative enactments... that may retroactively apply.' The court properly identified that the petition failed to specify any such benefit, rendering the petition legally insufficient under the statute's plain language.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Establishes the procedure for appointed appellate counsel to file a brief identifying no arguable issues and requesting the court to review the record for error.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires appointed counsel to file a brief identifying any arguable issues and to request the court to independently review the record for error.
  • relied: Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 — Holds that plea agreements generally incorporate the state's reserve power to amend the law and do not insulate parties from changes in the law intended to apply to them.
  • relied: Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 — Holds that due process requires a defendant's guilty plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
  • relied: Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454 — Defines waiver as the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.
  • relied: Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 — Supports the definition of waiver as the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.
  • relied: Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17 — Holds that waiver requires knowledge that the right exists.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the specific statutory requirements of Penal Code section 1016.8 to the facts presented, noting that Washington failed to identify any 'future benefit' he was required to waive. The court properly distinguishes between the legal consequences of a plea (such as qualifying as a strike) and a statutory waiver of future legislative benefits, thereby justifying the denial of the petition.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The trial court denied Cortez Washington's pro. per. petition to modify his 41-years-to-life sentence under Penal Code section 1016.8, which argued that his Illinois guilty pleas (used as strikes and serious felony priors) were void because he was not warned the pleas would deny him future benefits. On appeal, counsel filed a Wende brief, Washington filed a supplemental brief, and the Court of Appeal, after reviewing the record under Wende and Anders, found no arguable issue and affirmed, declining to appoint new counsel.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for modification of sentence under Penal Code section 1016.8 based on the claim that Illinois guilty pleas were void
“The legal consequences of his guilty pleas were not a waiver of future benefits as contemplated in the statute.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
Section 1016.8 voids plea-bargain provisions that require a defendant to generally waive future changes in the law; it does not void a plea simply because the resulting conviction later qualifies as a strike under California law, and Washington identified no such waiver provision in his Illinois pleas. The court's reading of the statute's text is correct and the result follows, although the opinion does not state a standard of review and does not address whether the post-judgment order was appealable or whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify a long-final sentence.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the appellate court must independently review the entire record for arguable issues.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal frivolous should file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
  • relied: People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042 — Prior published opinion affirming Washington's convictions and sentence, including the use of the Illinois convictions as strikes; its facts are incorporated by reference.
  • missed: People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200 — A trial court generally lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once execution has begun absent a statutory exception, and an order denying such an unauthorized motion is nonappealable; the court did not address appealability or jurisdiction before reaching the merits.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly read section 1016.8 as addressing plea provisions that waive future changes in the law, not the collateral consequence that an out-of-state conviction later counts as a strike, so the affirmance is defensible on the merits. The opinion is very brief, states no standard of review, and does not address whether the order denying a freestanding post-judgment motion to modify a final sentence was appealable or within the trial court's jurisdiction.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 5/10/21 P. v. Washington CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D078636

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD227126)

CORTEZ L. WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed. James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2011, a jury convicted Cortez L. Washington of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). Washington admitted five prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and two serious felony prior convictions 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. (§ 667, sub.(a)(1)), which were also admitted as “strikes” (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The serious felonies were from two convictions in Illinois to which Washington previously pleaded guilty. Washington was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 41 years to life in prison. Washington appealed and this court affirmed his convictions and sentence in a published opinion filed October 31, 2012. (People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042.) In December 2020, Washington filed a pro. per. petition for modification of his sentence relying on section 1016.8.2 He contended the 2 Section 1016.8 states: (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following: “(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them. “(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. “(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19). “(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent. “(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy. 2 Illinois convictions were rendered void because he was not warned the plea would deny him future benefits. Washington did not specify what future benefits were denied or how the Illinois pleas violated the statute. Apparently, he is complaining because they were found to qualify as strikes. The trial court denied the petition by written order. Washington again appeals challenging the trial court’s denial of his petition. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating counsel has not been able to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Washington the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. He has responded with a supplemental brief which we will discuss below. STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts of the underlying offense and the circumstances of the Illinois guilty pleas are fully set forth in our prior opinion. We will not repeat them here. DISCUSSION As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified the following possible issue which was considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for modification of sentence under section 1016.8.

“(c) For purposes of this section, ‘plea bargain’ has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.” 3 In his supplemental brief, Washington baldly asserts he is entitled to void his Illinois guilty pleas in light of section 1016.8. He does not identify any future benefit he was required to forgo in the Illinois guilty pleas. As best we can discern, his complaint is that they qualified as strikes in California. The legal consequences of his guilty pleas were not a waiver of future benefits as contemplated in the statute. Washington asserts we should reject the Wende brief and appoint new counsel. We decline his request. He has not raised any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has represented Washington on this appeal. DISPOSITION The order denying Washington’s motion to modify his sentence under section 1016.8 is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HALLER, J.

Cites, in this corpus