People v. Greer CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN290070
- Trial judge
- Robert J. Kearney
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Cynthia Aaron, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court denied Greer's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, ruling that he was ineligible because he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that a person convicted of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for relief under the statute and that this exclusion does not violate equal protection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95“The court denied the petition finding Greer was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder, which is a necessary prerequisite for relief under the statute.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of the statute, which requires a prior conviction of murder to be eligible for resentencing. Greer's conviction for voluntary manslaughter does not meet this statutory prerequisite, making the trial court's denial of the petition legally sound. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, and this denial does not violate equal protection.
- relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — The beginning point of the analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 is that the defendant must have been convicted of murder or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory.
- relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
- relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
- relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
- relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
- relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the plain language of the statute, which explicitly requires a prior conviction of murder for eligibility. The court adequately addresses the appellant's arguments by citing a consistent line of published appellate authority that rejects the extension of the statute to manslaughter convictions.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court denied Jason Joe Greer's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition because he had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and attempted robbery, not murder, and the statute requires a murder conviction. The Court of Appeal affirmed, adhering to its prior decision in People v. Turner and agreeing with the uniform line of appellate authority holding that persons convicted of manslaughter are ineligible for relief and that excluding them does not violate equal protection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1170.95 petition on the ground that a defendant who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter was not convicted of murder and is therefore statutorily ineligible for resentencing“The court denied the petition finding Greer was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder, which is a necessary prerequisite for relief under the statute.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The opinion does not state a standard of review, but the question is one of statutory construction that the court effectively decided de novo. As section 1170.95 read in 2021, subdivision (a) permitted only a person 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' to petition, and every published Court of Appeal decision (Turner, Flores, Cervantes, Sanchez, Paige, Harris) had held manslaughter convictions fall outside the statute. The court's reliance on Martinez for the starting premise and on Turner for the full analysis is consistent with the statutory text and the then-existing authority; no contrary published California authority existed at the time. |
Rejection of the claim that excluding defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter from section 1170.95 relief violates equal protection“We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court disposed of the equal protection argument by incorporating the reasoning of Turner and the other cited appellate decisions rather than analyzing it afresh. Those cases held that persons convicted of murder and of manslaughter are not similarly situated for purposes of the statute, and that the Legislature's decision to address only murder liability has a rational basis. The opinion's result is consistent with the unanimous appellate authority, though its own analysis is conclusory and rests entirely on incorporation by reference. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A defendant who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, and that exclusion does not violate equal protection.
- relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted to limit murder liability for non-killers, and section 1170.95 relief begins with a conviction for murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory.
- relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — Section 1170.95 does not extend to persons convicted of manslaughter, and the exclusion does not violate equal protection.
- relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — Defendants who pleaded guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder are ineligible for section 1170.95 relief.
- relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — Section 1170.95 by its terms applies only to murder convictions, not manslaughter.
- relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — Persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea are not entitled to petition under section 1170.95, and the statute's limitation to murder survives equal protection scrutiny.
- relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — The plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief to murder convictions and does not reach voluntary manslaughter.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies the controlling statutory text and the unanimous body of published appellate authority, including its own prior decision in Turner, and reaches a result that was unassailable under the law in effect in May 2021. It is thin, however: it incorporates Turner's reasoning by reference rather than engaging Greer's specific contention that those cases were wrongly decided, and it never states a standard of review or independently analyzes the equal protection claim.
Opinion
Filed 5/6/21 P. v. Greer CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D077939
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN290070)
JASON JOE GREER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J. Kearney, Judge. Affirmed. Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2012, Jason Joe Greer was charged with first degree murder (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), as well as burglary (§ 459), and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211). In 2013, Greer pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211). The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed. Greer was sentenced to a determinate term of 19 years four months in prison. In 2019, Greer filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, claiming he pleaded guilty to manslaughter to avoid trial for felony murder under an aider and abettor theory. Accordingly, Greer contends he is entitled to resentencing under section 1170.95, even though he was not convicted of murder. The trial court appointed counsel, received briefing, and reviewed the record of conviction. The court denied the petition finding Greer was not eligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder, which is a necessary prerequisite for relief under the statute. Greer filed a timely notice of appeal. In his appeal, Greer acknowledges all court of appeal decisions regarding eligibility for relief by persons convicted of manslaughter have rejected his contentions. He notes the Supreme Court has not granted review in any of the cases, and we do not have that court’s final word on the issue. He argues all of the appellate decisions rejecting his arguments are simply wrong, including decisions of this court. We will reject Greer’s arguments and adhere to the views we have previously expressed. (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-439 (Turner).)
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 “was enacted ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez)) Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for resentencing to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) The beginning point of the analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 is that the defendant must have been convicted of murder or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory. (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) In this case Greer was not convicted of murder, and his conviction did not arise from an offense where malice is an element of the crime. Thus, Greer is not a person aggrieved by the former methods of proving malice that the Legislature has now rejected. The arguments that the statute applies to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder or that failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions would violate equal protection have been soundly rejected by the courts of appeal, including the following cases: (1) People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557, 565-571 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (2) People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 916, 918-921 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (3) People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 197-198 [First Appellate District, Division Two]; (4) Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435-439 [Fourth Appellate 3 District, Division One]; (5) People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992- 997 [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; and (6) People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887-888 [Second Appellate District, Division Six]. We have reviewed the cases listed above, all of which have rejected all of Greer’s arguments. We agree with the analysis in each of the cases. In Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435 through 439, this court analyzed the arguments that are now presented in this appeal. We carefully considered the same arguments and found them to not be persuasive. We continue to hold to the views we expressed in Turner. For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection. DISPOSITION The order denying Greer’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
IRION, J.