People v. Thomas CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD284533
- Trial judge
- Polly H. Shamoon
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author), O'Rourke, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court imposed a probation condition requiring the defendant to submit his electronic devices to warrantless searches, citing his history of using multiple identities to evade monitoring and violate stay-away orders. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding the condition reasonable and not unconstitutionally overbroad given the specific tailoring of the waiver.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of probation condition No. 6n requiring submission of electronic devices to search without a warrant or reasonable cause.“We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the electronic search condition. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1120.)” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Determination that the electronic search condition is not unconstitutionally overbroad.“The condition is not overbroad as tailored. (See People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)” | de novo | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — Establishes the three-prong test for determining the reasonableness of probation conditions, including the requirement that conditions be reasonably related to the crime and necessary for rehabilitation or protection of the public.
- relied: In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 — Clarifies the standard for reviewing probation conditions and the necessity of a factual basis for imposing specific restrictions, particularly regarding electronic monitoring and searches.
- relied: People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934 — Supports the conclusion that tailored electronic search conditions, which exclude specific categories of data like medical and legal records, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
- relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Provides guidance on the scope of probation conditions and the requirement that they be narrowly tailored to serve legitimate penological interests.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's factual findings regarding the defendant's history of evading monitoring, and it properly cites controlling authority (Carbajal, Ricardo P.) to support the reasonableness and tailoring of the electronic search condition.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court accepted a West plea to grand theft from the person, dismissed the robbery count, imposed one year in jail with release to a behavioral health program and three years of formal probation, and over defendant's objection imposed a search condition extending to computers and electronic devices (excluding medical, legal, and financial records and pre-probation data), citing defendant's use of multiple names and birthdates, a record of over a dozen convictions since 2004, repeated probation violations, and the need to monitor stay-away and no-contact orders. The Court of Appeal held the electronic search condition was reasonable under Lent and Ricardo P., rejected the overbreadth challenge because the condition was tailored, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of probation condition No. 6n (electronic device search waiver) over defendant's Lent/Ricardo P. objection“We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the electronic search condition.” | abuse of discretion | correct | unsure The trial court gave record-based reasons (multiple identities, a long history of probation violations, three stay-away orders and a no-contact order) that supply a plausible nexus between device searches and monitoring compliance, which Ricardo P. recognizes can justify an electronics condition. But the appellate opinion never performs the proportionality analysis Ricardo P. requires under Lent's third prong—it does not weigh the privacy burden against the monitoring interest or explain why a search of all devices is needed when nothing in the recited record shows defendant used electronics in any offense or to contact victims. The result is defensible but the reasoning is conclusory, and the opinion cites 'Carbajal, supra' without ever having given a full citation. |
Rejection of the constitutional overbreadth challenge to the electronic search condition“The condition is not overbroad as tailored.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The condition excluded medical, legal, and financial information and all data predating the grant of probation, which is the kind of tailoring courts have accepted. The court did not state the standard of review (constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed de novo under Sheena K.) and its analysis is a single sentence, but the carve-outs do narrow the condition to the monitoring interest the trial court identified, so the conclusion is supported. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — A probation condition is invalid if it has no relationship to the crime, relates to conduct not itself criminal, and requires or forbids conduct not reasonably related to future criminality.
- relied: In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 — Under Lent's third prong the burden an electronics search condition places on privacy must be proportionate to the legitimate interests served; a condition may be justified where the record supports a need to monitor compliance with other conditions.
- relied: People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 — Trial courts have broad discretion in setting probation conditions, reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — A probation condition that impinges on constitutional rights must be closely tailored to the purpose of the condition to survive an overbreadth challenge.
- relied: People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934 — An electronics search condition limited in scope is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches a defensible result because the trial court articulated record-based reasons—multiple identities, chronic probation violations, and several stay-away and no-contact orders—that fit Ricardo P.'s recognition that electronics conditions may be proper to monitor compliance. It nonetheless skips the proportionality analysis that is the core of Ricardo P., cites Carbajal by 'supra' without a full citation, disposes of overbreadth in one sentence without stating the standard, and does not address whether the three-year probation term survives Assembly Bill 1950 in a case pending on appeal after January 1, 2021.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 4/28/21 P. v. Thomas CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D077371
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD284533)
COOPER THOMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.
Karissa Adame, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. BACKGROUND On December 14, 2019, defendant entered a clothing store on Fifth Avenue in downtown San Diego. He took multiple pairs of socks worth over $40. The store supervisor observed defendant and tried to stop him. However, defendant swung his arm, struck and injured the supervisor’s nose and face. Defendant then fled from the store. This conduct was captured on surveillance cameras and the supervisor provided the footage to the police. The supervisor also provided the police with a photograph showing defendant loitering outside the store. In a photo lineup provided by the police, the supervisor identified defendant as the person who took the socks and injured her on December 14. The police used defendant’s photograph to create and then send out a bulletin to law enforcement. An officer recognized defendant’s photo as someone he had arrested for public intoxication on December 13. On December 19, another officer spotted defendant walking down Fourth Avenue in San Diego and, recognizing him from the bulletin, arrested him. The store manager provided a record of the store’s economic loss and indicated defendant had stolen from the store multiple times. Defendant was charged in an information filed by the San Diego District Attorney with robbery in violation of Penal Code1 section 211 (count 1) and grand theft from the person of another in violation of section 487, subdivision (c) (count 2). By way of a negotiated plea bargain, and pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 (West), defendant pleaded guilty to grand theft from the person of another. The plea pursuant to West did not admit a factual basis for the plea. The People in return, dismissed the robbery count. They stipulated to having no opposition to local time, with release to a behavioral health program, and termination of probation in six misdemeanor cases.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Defendant was sentenced to one year in jail, thereafter being set for release to an authorized behavioral health program, and placed on formal probation for three years with certain terms and conditions, including an electronic device search waiver condition. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION As he did at the time of sentencing, defendant challenges on appeal probation condition No. 6n, which requires he submit his “person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices to search at any time with or without a warrant, and without reasonable cause, when required by (probation officer) or law enforcement officer.” The waiver embodied in condition No. 6 did not apply to medical, legal, financial records, and any data before defendant’s acceptance of probation. Defendant contends that even so limited, the condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.) The court noted defendant was the subject of six prior misdemeanor convictions and throughout the processing of those cases, defendant failed to give any consistent name, birthdate or place of birth to the probation department. Therefore, the court system could not connect the names to prior or existing cases.2 The trial courts and probation were finding it very difficult to monitor him. With respect to these cases, not including the stay-away order in this case, there were at least two other stay-away orders issued. With respect to the search waiver condition (condition No. 6n) the court stated:
2 The court ordered defendant to provide a copy of his birth certificate to the probation department within 60 days. 3 “The reason I’m imposing the Fourth (Amendment) Waiver is so that Probation has all the tools it needs to make sure you are compliant with probation. That is to make sure you are at the treatment facility, that you are complying with [the] absolute no contact order of these people. You don’t reach out either directly or indirectly to contact them. “In terms of future criminality and the third prong of Lent, I’m looking at a criminal record that dates back to 2004 with over a dozen convictions. Almost each and every time you’re on probation for one case when another is committed. And there have been a variety of drug and theft offenses and violations of not cooperating with law enforcement.” Commenting further on defendant’s criminal history, the court noted defendant had shown a very distinct pattern comprising nearly eight pages in the probation report showing his violations of the terms and conditions of probation. The court stated that placing a Fourth Amendment waiver on defendant was a way probation could ensure he was not directly or indirectly contacting or trying to locate victims in his cases, or violating any of three stay-away locations—the downtown clothing store in the instant case, as well as a Vons market and Goodwill location on Park Boulevard. The court said, “Based on your past record, I want Probation to have all the tools so that it can help you be compliant . . . .” Given his use of multiple names and birth dates, his history of willingness to violate probation orders, as well as the resulting difficulty tracking defendant to assure he was not continuing to violate court orders, we conclude that requiring his communication systems and technology used to contact others to be open for examination is not unreasonable. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the electronic search condition. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1120.)
4 Defendant also contends that the electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. The court tailored the condition to exclude searches of medical and legal information, financial accounts or transactions, and any data created before defendant accepted the grant of probation. The condition is not overbroad as tailored. (See People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Ricardo P. (In Re Ricardo P.) S230923 · 2019-08-15
- People v. Lent Crim. 17984 · 1975-10-30
- People v. West Crim. 14453 · 1970-12-03