gno.law

People v. Hamilton CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D077879 · 2021-04-23 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN292715
Trial judge
Carlos O. Armour
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), O'Rourke, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:10Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Hamilton's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, finding him statutorily ineligible because he had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter rather than being convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that the statute does not apply to defendants convicted of manslaughter and that this exclusion does not violate equal protection.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95
“We continue to hold to the views we expressed in Turner. For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of Penal Code section 1170.95, which limits eligibility to persons convicted of murder. Since Hamilton pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, he does not meet the statutory threshold for relief. The court's reliance on established precedent from multiple appellate districts confirms that the statute does not extend to manslaughter convictions, making the trial court's denial of the petition legally sound.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — A person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, and denial of such relief does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — The beginning point of the analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 is that the defendant must have been convicted of murder or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory.
  • relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder, and failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder, and failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder, and failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder, and failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — The statute does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder, and failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions does not violate equal protection.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the plain language of Penal Code section 1170.95, which explicitly limits eligibility to those convicted of murder. It relies on a consistent line of published appellate precedent to reject the appellant's arguments regarding original charges and equal protection.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence medium

The trial court denied Kenneth Hamilton's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition, finding him statutorily ineligible because he had pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed, following its own decision in People v. Turner and unanimous published authority holding that manslaughter convictions fall outside section 1170.95 and that excluding them does not violate equal protection.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of section 1170.95 petition on the ground that a defendant convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter, though originally charged with murder, is statutorily ineligible for resentencing
“After reviewing the briefing and the record of conviction, the court found Hamilton was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 and denied the petition.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The question is one of statutory interpretation, and the court did not articulate a standard of review, but the result follows from the text of section 1170.95 as it stood in April 2021, which by its terms applied to persons convicted of murder. Every published decision at the time, including this division's own decision in Turner and Flores, had reached the same conclusion, and nothing in the opinion suggests the court misread those authorities. (The Legislature later extended relief to manslaughter pleas through Senate Bill No. 775, but that amendment postdates this opinion and does not make the ruling erroneous when made.)
Rejection of the claim that excluding voluntary manslaughter convictions from section 1170.95 relief violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The court incorporated the reasoning of Turner, Sanchez, Harris, Cervantes and the other cited cases, which held that persons convicted of murder and persons convicted of manslaughter are not similarly situated and that the Legislature had a rational basis for limiting relief to the murder convictions targeted by Senate Bill No. 1437. The opinion does not independently restate the analysis, but adopting consistent published precedent on an identical legal issue is a proper basis for the ruling.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 — Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine as they relate to murder, and section 1170.95 relief begins with a conviction for murder.
  • relied: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557 — Defendants convicted of manslaughter are not eligible for section 1170.95 relief and the exclusion does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 — Section 1170.95 does not extend to voluntary manslaughter convictions obtained by plea, and the limitation survives equal protection scrutiny.
  • relied: People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 — A defendant who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter after being charged with murder is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief.
  • relied: People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 — Section 1170.95 by its terms applies only to murder convictions; a defendant convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is ineligible and the exclusion does not violate equal protection.
  • relied: People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 — Voluntary manslaughter convictions fall outside section 1170.95 and the statutory limitation is constitutional.
  • relied: People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 — Section 1170.95 does not apply to defendants convicted of manslaughter, and there is a rational basis for distinguishing manslaughter from murder convictions.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies the controlling statutory text and follows a uniform body of published authority, including this division's own prior decision in Turner, that squarely rejected both of Hamilton's arguments. It is brief and incorporates Turner's reasoning by reference rather than restating the equal protection analysis, but on a settled question with no contrary authority that approach is adequate.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/23/21 P. v. Hamilton CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D077879

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN292715)

KENNETH HAMILTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carlos O. Armour, Judge. Affirmed. Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respond. In 2011, Kenneth Hamilton was charged, along with other gang members, with two counts of murder. Hamilton entered into a negotiated plea agreement. Hamilton pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (a)) and admitted a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) as well as a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The parties stipulated to a determinate term of 20 years in prison. Hamilton was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. In 2019, Hamilton filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court appointed counsel and solicited briefing. After reviewing the briefing and the record of conviction, the court found Hamilton was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 and denied the petition. Hamilton filed a timely notice of appeal. Although Hamilton was not convicted of murder as required by section 1170.95, he argues he must be eligible because he was originally charged with murder on an aiding and abetting theory. He also contends that if he is not given the benefit of the relief enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hamilton candidly admits multiple courts of appeal have rejected his arguments, but he contends that all the courts, including this court, simply got it wrong, and the opinions should not be followed. We respectfully disagree and will follow the unanimous precedent from several appellate districts and reject Hamilton’s arguments. STATEMENT OF FACTS This appeal follows an earlier plea of guilty. The only factual statements are taken from the probation officer’s report. The facts are well summarized in the respondent’s brief. We include them here simply for background information.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 On the night of May 3, 2011, Hamilton and two of his co-defendants were at Libby Park in Oceanside. One of the co-defendants, who was armed with a firearm, walked over to where an Hispanic 16-year-old male and an Hispanic 14-year-old female were sitting on a park bench. The co-defendant asked the teens where they were from, and the male indicated he was not from anywhere, just from Oceanside. The co-defendant then shot and killed both teens. Hamilton and his co-defendants fled the park. Hamilton’s cohorts were documented Deep Valley Crips gang members, and Hamilton (aka “Little 187”) was also associated with the Deep Valley Crips. The co-defendant who shot the teens had recently been “jumped” by Hispanic gang members in the area, and Hamilton had also recently been assaulted in Libby Park. DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 “was enacted ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez)) Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for resentencing to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)) The beginning point of the analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 is that the defendant must have been convicted of murder or by plea in a case prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory. (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) In this case Hamilton was not convicted of 3 murder, and his conviction did not arise from an offense where malice is an element of the crime. Thus, Hamilton is not a person aggrieved by the former methods of proving malice that the Legislature has now rejected. The arguments that the statute applies to persons convicted of manslaughter after being charged with murder or that failure to apply the statute to manslaughter convictions would violate equal protection have been soundly rejected by the courts of appeal, including the following cases: (1) People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557, 565-571 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (2) People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 916, 918-921 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; (3) People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 197-198 [First Appellate District, Division Two]; (4) People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-439 (Turner) [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; (5) People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992-997 [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; and (6) People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887-888 [Second Appellate District, Division Six]. We have reviewed the cases listed above, all of which have rejected all of Hamilton’s arguments. We agree with the analysis in each of the cases. In Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435 through 439, this court analyzed the arguments that are now presented in this appeal. We carefully considered the same arguments and found them to not be persuasive. We continue to hold to the views we expressed in Turner. For the reasons set forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.

4 DISPOSITION The order denying Hamilton’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

IRION, J.