People v. Macedon CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Riverside County · No. SWF1102631
- Trial judge
- John D. Molloy
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author), Judith D. McConnell, Patricia Guerrero
Analysis
The trial court summarily denied defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, finding him statutorily ineligible because his guilty plea admitted he was a direct participant in the murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, concluding that as a direct participant, the defendant was ineligible for relief under the statute.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Summary denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95“The trial court stated it had read defendant’s plea form and concluded the plea admitted the special circumstances alleged were true. The court on January 8, 2021, summarily denied the petition on the ground defendant pleaded guilty to murder with special circumstance allegations” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that the trial court's determination of statutory ineligibility based on the factual admissions in the plea is a question of law or mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. The court correctly applied the statute to the facts admitted by the defendant. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1 — A direct participant in a murder is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appellate counsel must conduct an independent review of the record when unable to identify arguable issues.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appellate counsel must conduct an independent review of the record when unable to identify arguable issues.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound as it follows the Wende/Anders protocol for independent review. However, it is substantively thin, relying on a single sentence to dismiss the defendant's potential argument that his 'direct participant' status might be re-evaluated under the new statutory definitions, without addressing the specific nuance of the codefendant's relief.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe Riverside Superior Court summarily denied Corey Macedon's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that his 2014 guilty plea to first degree murder and admission of robbery/burglary felony-murder special circumstances necessarily established intent to kill or major-participant/reckless-indifference status, making him statutorily ineligible. On appeal, counsel filed a Wende/Anders brief; the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, cited People v. Gomez for the proposition that a direct participant in a murder is ineligible, found no arguable issues, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Summary denial of section 1170.95 petition for failure to state a prima facie case because defendant's guilty plea to first degree murder and admission of section 190.2(a)(17) special circumstances rendered him statutorily ineligible“Under section 1170.95, a direct participant in a murder is ineligible for relief under the statute.” | unclear | correct (law misapplied) | unsure The appellate court affirmed in two sentences, relying on Gomez and characterizing defendant as a 'direct participant' without explaining whether that rests on the special circumstance admission, the premeditation allegation in the plea, or the prosecutor's description of the codefendant's appellate opinion. The trial court's stated ground, that the special circumstance admission necessarily established intent to kill or major participation with reckless indifference, was contested at the time: the plea predated Banks (2015) and Clark (2016), and published decisions (Torres, Smith, York) held that pre-Banks/Clark special circumstance findings do not establish ineligibility as a matter of law, a view the Supreme Court later adopted in People v. Strong (2022). The court cited only the Gomez line and did not acknowledge the split or Banks/Clark. The plea to murder 'with deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought' might independently preclude relief if it was a genuine factual admission rather than a generic recital of the charge, but the opinion does not quote the plea form or analyze that question (cf. Rivera), and the fourth issue counsel flagged, whether the plea-form boxes support the court's conclusions, goes unaddressed. Because the result may be defensible on the premeditation admission but the stated reasoning is incomplete and rests on a then-disputed and since-rejected rule, I cannot confidently agree or disagree. |
Trial court and parties' reliance on the appellate opinion in codefendant Walker's separate case, which described Walker as 'duped' and defendant as the actual killer“whether the parties and court were correct in referring to the opinion in codefendant Walker’s separate trial and appeal” | unclear | not reached (procedure) | unsure Appellate counsel specifically asked the court to consider whether referring to Walker's appellate opinion was proper, but the opinion never discusses it. Whether a court at the prima facie stage may rely on factual characterizations from a codefendant's separate appellate opinion, as opposed to the petitioner's own record of conviction, is a genuine question; the court's silence leaves it unresolved. Because the opinion does not say whether the denial rested in any part on that material, I cannot assess prejudice. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appellate court must independently review the record when appointed counsel files a no-issue brief in a criminal appeal
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Procedure for appointed counsel who finds no arguable appellate issues
- relied: People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1 — Describes Senate Bill 1437 and section 1170.95; holds a petitioner with a felony-murder special circumstance finding is ineligible for relief and must challenge the finding under Banks/Clark by habeas (later disapproved in People v. Strong (2022))
- missed: People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 — Clarified the 'major participant' element of the felony-murder special circumstance for non-killers; relevant because defendant's 2014 admission predated this clarification
- missed: People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 — Clarified the 'reckless indifference to human life' element of the felony-murder special circumstance; relevant to whether a pre-2016 admission establishes current-law ineligibility
- missed: People v. Torres (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1168 — Published decision holding a pre-Banks/Clark felony-murder special circumstance finding does not render a section 1170.95 petitioner ineligible as a matter of law; contrary to Gomez and part of a then-existing split the court did not acknowledge
- missed: People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 — A plea to murder charged generically with malice aforethought does not by itself establish ineligibility for section 1170.95 relief; relevant to whether the plea-form admissions here were factual admissions or generic recitals
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court conducted the independent review it chose to undertake and reached a result consistent with the Gomez line of cases, and the plea to premeditated murder may independently support ineligibility. But the opinion ignores the published contrary authority on pre-Banks/Clark special circumstance findings, does not quote or analyze the plea form, and never addresses the reliance on the codefendant's appellate opinion that counsel expressly flagged.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 4/22/21 P. v. Macedon CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D078513
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF1102631)
COREY LAMONT MACEDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2014, defendant Corey Lamont Macedon pleaded guilty to first degree special circumstance murder. In December 2020, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170.95. In January 2021, the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. trial court summarily denied the petition on the ground defendant was statutorily ineligible. Defendant appealed. Unable to identify any arguable issues, appellate counsel has sought independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Affirmed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND An amended information filed in Riverside County on April 19, 2012, charged defendant and a codefendant Davel D. Walker2 with the premeditated murder of Theron B. on October 13, 2011 (§ 187, subd. (a)). The information alleged that the murder was committed by defendants while they were engaged in the commission and attempted commission of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)); and that defendant in 1996 had committed a serious violent felony (attempted murder) (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1) & 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). On December 5, 2014, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty to murder of Theron B. with deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought. He also admitted the special circumstances allegation pursuant to sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A) and (G); specifically, that the murder occurred while he was engaged in the attempted commission or commission of robbery (§ 211), and was actually engaged in second degree burglary. On December 8, 2014, defendant was sentenced to an agreed upon sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The allegations of prior offenses were stricken.
2 Walker is not a party in this appeal. 2 DISCUSSION A. Additional Background As noted, defendant in December 2020 filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. During the proceedings that followed, the prosecutor represented to the court and to defense counsel, through an appellate opinion in Walker’s case, that Walker had been granted relief under section 1170.95 on the ground he had been “duped” into participation in the crimes and it was defendant who was the actual killer. The trial court stated it had read defendant’s plea form and concluded the plea admitted the special circumstances alleged were true. The court on January 8, 2021, summarily denied the petition on the ground defendant pleaded guilty to murder with special circumstance allegations, which required he admit he had the specific intent to kill or was a substantial participant acting with reckless disregard at the time. Therefore, the court concluded defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. As noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Wende and Anders indicating she has been unable to identify any arguable issues for reversal or modification on appeal. Counsel asks that we review the record for error as mandated by Wende. To assist the court in its review, counsel asks we focus on the following areas of the record: 1) whether the parties and court were correct in referring to the opinion in codefendant Walker’s separate trial and appeal; 2) whether defendant was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 due to his guilty plea; 3) whether defendant’s admission of special circumstances was an appropriate consideration by the court; and 4) whether the boxes check-marked on the plea form were appropriately checked off, and support the court’s conclusions.
3 B. Guiding Principles and Analysis “In 2018, ‘the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . in order to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also added . . . section 1170.95, which created a [petition] procedure whereby a person whose felony murder conviction was final, but who could not have been convicted under the amended statutes, could petition to have the conviction vacated.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1, 11–12 (Gomez).) Under section 1170.95, subdivision (c) a trial court presented with a facially valid petition must determine if the petition sets forth a prima facie case for relief. If it does, the court must then hold a hearing at which the prosecutor bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecutor fails to meet this burden, the court must vacate the murder conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c) & (d).) Here, the record shows defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder as a result of being a direct participant in the murder. Under section 1170.95, a direct participant in a murder is ineligible for relief under the statute. (See Gomez, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 14–15.) We have fully and independently examined the record and conclude that there are no other issues which, if resolved favorably to defendant, would result in reversal or modification of his judgment; and that defendant has been represented by competent counsel in this appeal.
4 DISPOSITION The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.
BENKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
GUERRERO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12