In re Adrian H. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a dispositional order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J238031
- Trial judge
- Kathleen M. Lewis
- Outcome
- modified — Affirmed as modified.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell, William S. Dato
Analysis
The juvenile court committed the minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a maximum term of eight years. The Court of Appeal modified the disposition to a maximum term of six years, applying a subsequent legislative amendment retroactively because the case was not final on appeal.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Dispositional order committing the minor to DJJ for a maximum term of eight years“At the dispositional hearing, the court committed the Minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of up to eight years.” | unclear | error | agree with court The appellate court determined that the trial court's imposition of an eight-year term was incorrect in light of the subsequent legislative amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (c), which limited DJJ commitments to the middle term of imprisonment for the same offense. The court applied the retroactivity principles from In re Estrada and People v. Superior Court (Lara) to conclude that the minor was entitled to the benefit of the new statutory limitation because the case was not final on appeal when the amendment was enacted. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Legislative amendments that ameliorate punishment must be applied retroactively to cases not final on appeal unless the Legislature specifically rejects retroactive application.
- relied: People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 — The benefits of a legislative change that reduces punishment must be made available to cases that were not final at the time of enactment if the Legislature has not specifically rejected retroactive application.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established retroactivity framework from In re Estrada and People v. Superior Court (Lara) to a straightforward statutory amendment that reduced the maximum term of commitment. The reasoning directly addresses the appellant's argument and the Attorney General's concession, relying on the correct binding authorities to justify the modification of the disposition.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court committed the Minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a maximum term of up to eight years after he admitted one count of lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). On appeal, with the Attorney General conceding, the Court of Appeal held that the intervening amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (c), capping DJJ terms at the adult middle term, applied retroactively under Estrada to this nonfinal case, and modified the maximum commitment to six years, otherwise affirming.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Dispositional order committing the Minor to DJJ for a maximum term of up to eight years“We agree with the parties that Estrada compels the conclusion that the amendment to section 731, subdivision (c) must be retroactively applied to this case.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The opinion does not state a standard of review, but the question is a pure question of law (retroactivity of an ameliorative amendment). The court did not find the juvenile court erred when it imposed the eight-year maximum; rather, the Legislature later amended section 731 to cap DJJ terms at the adult middle term, and under Estrada and Lara an ameliorative change applies to all cases not yet final absent a contrary legislative indication. The parties agreed the case was not final, and six years is the middle term for Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), so the modification is correct. The reasoning is brief but applies the controlling authorities properly. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — An amendment that lessens punishment applies retroactively to all cases not yet final on appeal unless the Legislature indicates otherwise.
- relied: People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 — Estrada's inference of retroactivity extends to ameliorative legislation affecting juveniles, including changes that reduce possible punishment, for cases not final when the legislation took effect.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied Estrada and Lara to an undisputed, conceded retroactivity question and modified the disposition to the adult middle term as required by amended section 731, subdivision (c). The opinion is short and does not expressly address the legislative history or the absence of a savings clause, but given the Attorney General's concession and the settled rule, nothing material was skipped.
Opinion
Filed 4/16/21 In re Adrian H. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ADRIAN H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D077906 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J238031)
v. ADRIAN H., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a dispositional order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging Adrian H. (the Minor) committed lewd acts on a child. The Minor admitted one count of committing lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). At the dispositional hearing, the court committed the Minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of up to eight years. After the disposition in this case, the Legislature modified Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 731. Under the statute, as amended, the court could no longer impose a term in DJJ longer than the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense. (§ 731, subd. (c).) The Minor appeals contending the amendment to section 731 must be retroactively available to cases not final on appeal. The Minor asks that we either vacate the disposition or modify it to conform with the new limitations. The Attorney General has filed a brief conceding the amendment should apply to this case. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada); People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 306-308 (Lara).) We agree with the parties that Estrada compels the conclusion that the amendment to section 731, subdivision (c) must be retroactively applied to this case. We will order the dispositional order modified to reflect six years (the middle term for violating Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). We will affirm the disposition as modified.2 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Since there are no factual issues presented by this appeal, we will omit the traditional statement of facts. 2 DISCUSSION Where legislation is passed that ameliorates the punishment for an offense, and the Legislature has not specifically rejected retroactive application, the benefits of the change must be made available to those cases that were not final at the time of the enactment of the new legislation. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 307-308.) It is not disputed that the Minor’s case was not final when the amendment was enacted. Thus, the parties have correctly agreed that the Minor must receive the benefit of the statutory change. DISPOSITION The dispositional order is modified to reflect a maximum commitment to DJJ not to exceed six years. The court shall modify the abstract of judgment accordingly. In all other respects, the dispositional order is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty. S241231 · 2018-02-01
- In Re Estrada Crim. 8524 · 1965-12-23