People v. Crenshaw CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD132521
- Trial judge
- John M. Thompson
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Patricia Guerrero
Analysis
The trial court denied Crenshaw's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, concluding the record established he was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial after conducting an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende and Anders v. California, finding no arguable issues for reversal.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95“The court denied the petition by written order, concluding the record demonstrated Crenshaw was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court independently reviewed the record as required by Wende and Anders. It found that the record demonstrated Crenshaw was the actual killer, which renders him ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court affirmed the trial court's order because no arguable issues for reversal were identified. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires appointed appellate counsel to review the record for error when no arguable issues are identified, and the court to conduct an independent review.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to withdraw from representation after identifying no arguable issues, requiring a brief and court review.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound as it follows the mandatory Wende/Anders review process. However, it is extremely brief and provides no substantive legal analysis of why the record establishes Crenshaw was the 'actual killer' beyond stating the conclusion, which is a gap in reasoning for a published opinion, though acceptable for an unpublished Wende case where the record is presumed clear.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Douglas Crenshaw's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition after appointing counsel, receiving briefing, and reviewing the record of conviction, concluding he was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for relief. On appeal, counsel filed a Wende brief; the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issues, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1170.95 petition on the ground that the record of conviction showed Crenshaw was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief, without an evidentiary hearing“The court denied the petition by written order, concluding the record demonstrated Crenshaw was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.” | unclear | correct | unsure The jury convicted Crenshaw of first degree murder with a true finding that he personally used a hammer and a burglary-murder special circumstance; the trial court appointed counsel, took briefing, and reviewed the record before ruling. An actual killer is categorically ineligible under section 1170.95, so if the record of conviction establishes that status, denial at the prima facie stage is proper. The opinion, however, does not describe the facts or explain how the record established actual-killer status (a personal-use finding alone does not always foreclose aider liability), so I cannot fully verify the conclusion from the opinion itself. |
Appellate court's Wende/Anders independent review of the record on appeal from a postconviction section 1170.95 denial, finding no arguable issues“We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Whether Wende review is constitutionally required in appeals from postconviction orders was unsettled among the Courts of Appeal at the time, but conducting such review is within the court's discretion and only benefits the defendant. Counsel identified the prima facie issue, Crenshaw was invited to file a supplemental brief and did not, and the court reviewed the whole record. Nothing in the opinion suggests the review was deficient. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record for error.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal frivolous should file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, and the court then reviews the record.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court followed the Wende/Anders procedure, invited a supplemental brief, and reviewed the record, reaching a defensible affirmance where the jury's personal-use and special-circumstance findings point toward actual-killer status. It did not, however, address the then-live question whether Wende review applies to postconviction section 1170.95 appeals, and it gave no explanation of why the record conclusively established that Crenshaw was the actual killer.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 4/14/21 P. v. Crenshaw CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D077929
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD132521)
DOUGLAS L. CRENSHAW, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed. Lynelle K. Hee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2000, a jury convicted Douglas L. Crenshaw of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and found Crenshaw had personally used a deadly weapon (a hammer) in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The jury also found true a special circumstance the murder was 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. committed during a burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Crenshaw was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Crenshaw appealed and this court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion filed in November 2001. (People v. Crenshaw (Nov. 30, 2001, D035848) [nonpub. opn.].) In March 2019, Crenshaw filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel, received written briefs from the parties, and reviewed the record of the conviction. The court denied the petition by written order, concluding the record demonstrated Crenshaw was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. Crenshaw filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating she has not been able to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Crenshaw the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but he has not responded.
DISCUSSION2 As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified the following possible issue which was considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Whether Crenshaw’s petition for resentencing established prima facie showing of merit which would require a hearing.
2 The facts of the offense are fully set forth in our opinion on direct appeal. (People v. Crenshaw, supra, D035848.) We will not repeat them here. 2 We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has represented Crenshaw on this appeal. DISPOSITION The order denying Crenshaw’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
GUERRERO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12