gno.law

Wheeler v. Sahni CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D076967 · 2021-02-26 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2019-00012041-CU-NP-CTL
Trial judge
Randa Trapp
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
civil
Panel
O'Rourke (author), Cynthia Aaron, William S. Dato

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:13Z · confidence high

The trial court sustained a demurrer to Wheeler's second amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the defendants immune under various statutes and the claims barred by the favorable termination doctrine. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the defendants were protected by absolute privileges and immunities under Civil Code section 47 and Government Code sections 820.2, 845.8, and 855.8.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend based on statutory immunity and privilege
“We conclude that respondent psychologists, employees of a state agency, did not incur liability in preparing or reviewing the CRA because Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides an absolute privilege for any publication made in the proper discharge of an official duty in any legislative proceeding, judicial proceeding, or “in any other official proceeding authorized by law.””
de novocorrectagree with court
agree with court
Sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend based on the favorable termination doctrine (Heck/Yount)
“Further, plaintiff’s collateral attack on his parole denial and continued confinement is barred because he has not, and cannot, allege that his prison sentence has been properly overturned or invalidated.”
de novocorrectagree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885 — Establishes the favorable termination doctrine in California, barring civil claims that would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence unless that conviction has been overturned.
  • relied: Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 — Establishes the federal favorable termination doctrine, preventing § 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence.
  • relied: Sacramento Brewing Co. v. Desmond, Miller & Desmond (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1082 — Interprets Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) to provide an absolute privilege for publications made in the proper discharge of an official duty in any official proceeding authorized by law.
  • relied: Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 — Confirms that the absolute privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) immunizes defendants from liability for defamation and related claims arising from official proceedings.
  • relied: Lebbos v. State Bar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656 — Holds that the absolute privilege under Civil Code section 47 applies to claims based on an alleged breach of a mandatory duty.
  • relied: Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623 — Establishes that a specific immunity statute cannot be abrogated by a statute that simply imposes a general legal duty or liability.
  • relied: State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1023 — Interprets Government Code section 845.8 to provide absolute immunity for all acts within the ambit of release procedures, including parole decisions.
  • relied: Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844 — Holds that statutory liabilities, such as those under the Information Practices Act, must be subordinated to statutory immunities like Government Code section 845.8 in the context of parole decisions.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the absolute privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) to the preparation of a risk assessment for a parole hearing, an official proceeding. It also correctly applies the specific statutory immunities of Government Code sections 820.2, 845.8, and 855.8, which broadly protect public employees acting within their discretionary duties and in the context of parole decisions and mental health diagnoses.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The San Diego Superior Court sustained, without leave to amend, a demurrer to incarcerated plaintiff Eric Wheeler's second amended complaint (negligence, defamation, Information Practices Act, and Fourteenth Amendment due process) against three CDCR psychologists who prepared, reviewed, and approved a comprehensive risk assessment used at his parole hearing, holding they were immune under Civil Code section 47(b) and Government Code sections 820.2, 845.8, and 855.8 and that the claims were barred under Heck and Yount. The Court of Appeal affirmed solely on the privilege and immunity grounds and declined to reach the Heck/Yount favorable-termination issue.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Demurrer sustained because Civil Code section 47(b) absolutely privileges the psychologists' preparation and approval of the comprehensive risk assessment as a publication in an official proceeding authorized by law (the parole hearing under Penal Code section 3041).
“Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) therefore immunizes respondents from all liability for the causes of action and claims alleged here, including defamation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
de novocorrect (law misapplied)unsure
The opinion never states a standard of review but conducts its own legal analysis, which is the correct de novo approach for a demurrer. As to the state tort and statutory claims, applying section 47(b) to a legally mandated risk assessment prepared for a parole hearing is consistent with Silberg and Sacramento Brewing. However, the court's statement that section 47(b) bars 'all' claims sweeps in Wheeler's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; under Martinez v. California, a state privilege or immunity statute cannot defeat a federal section 1983 claim. The court also lists intentional infliction of emotional distress, which the complaint as described did not plead. The overbreadth is likely harmless because the Heck/Yount bar the trial court applied would independently dispose of the federal claim, but the appellate court chose not to reach that ground.
Rejection of Wheeler's argument that the Information Practices Act and Government Code section 815.6 (mandatory duty) override the section 47(b) privilege and statutory immunities.
“Accordingly, the general duty set forth in the IPA and Government Code section 815.6 cannot abrogate the immunity set forth in the specific immunity statutes.”
de novocorrectagree with court
Creason holds that a specific immunity statute prevails over a general statutory duty, and Lebbos applied section 47 to a mandatory-duty claim; those authorities support the result. The court did not directly address Wheeler's reliance on Civil Code section 1798.70, but that provision concerns an agency withholding records from the individual, not damages liability, so it does not help him. The court also did not note that the IPA's civil remedy in section 1798.45 runs against an 'agency,' whereas Wheeler sued individual employees, which would have been an additional ground supporting the result.
Government Code section 820.2 discretionary-act immunity bars the claims because the psychologists exercised discretion in formulating the CRA and making parole recommendations.
“were required to exercise their discretion in formulating the CRA and making recommendations regarding parole; therefore, their actions are immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2.”
de novocorrect (law misapplied)unsure
The court applies section 820.2 in a single conclusory sentence without the analysis required by Johnson v. State of California, which limits the immunity to basic policy decisions and excludes operational or ministerial implementation. Preparing a clinical risk assessment is arguably an operational task even though it involves professional judgment, so the immunity is not self-evident. Because section 47(b) and section 845.8 independently support the judgment on the state claims, this thin analysis does not affect the outcome.
Government Code section 845.8(a) immunity for injuries resulting from determining whether to parole a prisoner bars the state claims, including the IPA claim.
“Because the psychologists’ actions involved a parole decision, they are immune from liability.”
de novocorrectagree with court
State of California v. Superior Court construes section 845.8 broadly to cover all acts within the ambit of release procedures, and Torres holds that statutory liabilities are subordinated to this immunity. A psychological risk assessment prepared by regulation for the parole board is squarely within the release process. This is the strongest ground for the state-law dismissal; the only caveat, again, is that the immunity cannot reach the federal due process claim (Martinez v. California addressed section 845.8 itself).
Government Code section 855.8(a) immunity for diagnosing or failing to diagnose mental illness bars the claims to the extent Wheeler alleges the CRA misdiagnosed him.
“Here, as Wheeler complains that the CRA includes a misdiagnosis of him, this statute applies and immunizes respondents from liability.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The statute's text plainly covers public employees acting within the scope of employment who diagnose or fail to diagnose mental illness, and Wheeler's complaint, as described, attacks the diagnostic content of the CRA. The application is straightforward for the state-law claims. The court cites no case law for this point but the statutory text is sufficient.
Trial court's alternative ground that the action is barred by the favorable-termination doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey and Yount v. City of Sacramento because Wheeler cannot allege his parole denial or confinement has been invalidated.
“In light of the above analysis of privilege and immunity, and our conclusion the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, we need not discuss the additional issues Wheeler raises.”
de novonot reachedunsure
The appellate court expressly declined to reach the Heck/Yount ground. That choice is permissible, but it left the federal due process claim resting only on state immunities, which is the weak point of the opinion; the Heck/Yount ground (with Butterfield v. Bail, which the trial court cited) would have been the proper basis for dismissing the federal claim. The court also did not separately analyze whether Wheeler could amend, though under settled law the burden is on the plaintiff to show how amendment would cure the defect, and nothing in the opinion suggests he did.
Trial court's discretionary refusal to consider Wheeler's second, 70-page opposition beyond its first 15 pages because the Rules of Court permit only one opposition of no more than 15 pages.
“The court, in its discretion, has considered only the first 15 pages of the amended opposition filed September 9, 2019.”
abuse of discretionnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review this ruling; it simply followed the trial court's limitation and confined its own review to the same portion of the record. Enforcing the page limits on opposition papers is within a trial court's discretion, and the opinion does not indicate Wheeler challenged the ruling on appeal. The appellate court's decision to self-limit its record review is unusual phrasing but has no apparent effect on the legal analysis, which turned on the face of the complaint.

Authorities

  • relied: Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 — The Civil Code section 47(b) privilege is absolute and applies to all torts other than malicious prosecution arising from publications in official proceedings.
  • relied: Sacramento Brewing Co. v. Desmond, Miller & Desmond (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1082 — Section 47(b) provides an absolute privilege for publications made in the proper discharge of an official duty in legislative, judicial, or other official proceedings authorized by law.
  • relied: Lebbos v. State Bar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656 — A demurrer to a claim for breach of a mandatory duty is properly sustained where the conduct is privileged under Civil Code section 47.
  • relied: Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623 — A specific statutory immunity cannot be abrogated by a statute that merely imposes a general legal duty or liability, including under Government Code section 815.6.
  • relied: State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1023 — Government Code section 845.8 immunity is absolute and broad, covering all acts within the ambit of parole and release procedures.
  • relied: Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844 — Statutory liabilities must be subordinated to the statutory immunity of Government Code section 845.8 for parole decisions.
  • relied: Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885 — Adopts the Heck favorable-termination rule in California: a civil claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or confinement is barred absent prior invalidation (cited by the trial court; not reached on appeal).
  • missed: Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277 — A state immunity statute such as Government Code section 845.8 cannot immunize state employees from liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violations of federal constitutional rights; the court should have addressed this before holding state immunities bar Wheeler's Fourteenth Amendment claim.
  • missed: Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 — Government Code section 820.2 discretionary immunity is limited to basic policy decisions and does not extend to operational or ministerial acts implementing policy; the court applied section 820.2 without this analysis.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The result is defensible: the state-law claims against individual CDCR psychologists for a parole risk assessment are plainly barred by Civil Code section 47(b) and Government Code section 845.8, and the court cites the right California authorities for those points. But the opinion overreaches in declaring state immunities bar 'all' claims including the federal due process claim, which Martinez v. California forbids, applies section 820.2 without the Johnson policy/operational analysis, and sidesteps the Heck/Yount ground that would properly have disposed of the federal claim.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 2/26/21 Wheeler v. Sahni CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC WHEELER, D076967

Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-00012041-CU-NP-CTL) NAMEETA SAHNI et al., Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Randa Trapp, Judge. Affirmed. Eric Wheeler, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Monica N. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh and Andrew M. Gibson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents. Eric Wheeler is a self-represented litigant incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility. He appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the court sustained a demurrer to all causes of action in his operative second amended complaint without leave to amend. Respondents are three psychologists employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Wheeler contends: (1) respondents are not entitled to immunity under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) and Government Code sections 820.2, 845.8, and 855.8, as the Information Practices Act of 1977 (IPA; Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.)1 applies and is mandatory; and (2) his claims are not barred by the favorable termination doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 (Heck) and Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885 (Yount). We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Wheeler sued Dr. Nameeta Sahni, who prepared a comprehensive risk assessment report (CRA) about Wheeler for use at his parole hearing, at which he was denied parole. Wheeler also sued Dr. Sahni’s supervisor, Dr. Jasmine Tehrani, who reviewed the CRA, and Chief Psychologist Dr. Cliff Kusaj, who approved it. Wheeler alleged state law causes of action for negligence, defamation, and violation of the IPA, as well as one federal cause of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Wheeler sought $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.

1 Civil Code section 1798.18 states: “Each agency shall maintain all records, to the maximum extent possible, with accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness. [¶] Such standard need not be met except when such records are used to make any determination about the individual. When an agency transfers a record outside of state government, it shall correct, update, withhold, or delete any portion of the record that it knows or has reason to believe is inaccurate or untimely.” Civil Code section 1798.45, subdivision (b) provides that an individual may bring a civil action against an agency whenever such agency “[f]ails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be made on the basis of such record, if, as a proximate result of such failure, a determination is made which is adverse to the individual.”

2 Respondents demurred to the complaint on grounds that the claims were barred by statutory privilege or immunities set forth in Civil Code section 47 and Government Code sections 820.2, 845.8, and 855.8. Respondents also argued that all claims failed because they were barred by the favorable-termination doctrine set forth in Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th 885 and Heck, supra, 512 U.S. 477 and Wheeler could not prove proximate causation. In opposition Wheeler argued respondents were not entitled to absolute immunity for their roles in preparing and approving the CRA “per the ‘IPA’ . . . a supreme state law;[2] and Government Code section 815.6;[3]

2 Civil Code section 1798.70 of the IPA states: “This chapter shall be construed to supersede any other provision of state law, . . . which authorizes any agency to withhold from an individual any record containing personal information which is otherwise accessible under the provisions of this chapter.”

3 Government Code section 815.6 provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”

3 . . . and Penal Code section 115.[4]” He later filed an “amendment” to his opposition to the demurrer, but the trial court reviewed only a portion of that document.5 Citing Heck, supra, 512 U.S. 477, Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th 885 and Butterfield v. Bail (9th Cir. 1997) 120 F.3d 1023, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend: “Defendants are immune from liability under Civil Code [section 47, subdivision] (b) and Government Code [sections] 820.2, 845.8 and 855.8 for preparing and approving the Comprehensive Risk Assessment in connection with plaintiff's parole proceedings. Further, plaintiff’s collateral attack on his parole denial and continued confinement is barred because he has not, and cannot, allege that his prison sentence has been properly overturned or invalidated.” DISCUSSION We conclude that respondent psychologists, employees of a state agency, did not incur liability in preparing or reviewing the CRA because Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides an absolute privilege for any publication made in the proper discharge of an official duty in any legislative 4 Penal Code section 115, subdivision (a) states: “Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.”

5 The trial court ruled that under the California Rules of Court, “Plaintiff filed two oppositions when only one is permitted. Further, the first opposition is 19 pages and the second is 70 pages when only 15 pages are allowed for an opposition. . . . The court, in its discretion, has considered only the first 15 pages of the amended opposition filed September 9, 2019.” This court similarly limits its review to the portion of the record that the court considered.

4 proceeding, judicial proceeding, or “in any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Sacramento Brewing Co. v. Desmond, Miller & Desmond (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1086.) Here, the CRA that respondents authored or approved was mandated by law to be used at Wheeler’s parole hearing (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2240), which is an official proceeding under Penal Code section 3041. Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) therefore immunizes respondents from all liability for the causes of action and claims alleged here, including defamation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 215.) In his opening brief, Wheeler argues that Civil Code section 47 does not apply to his claims because respondents were mandated to maintain accurate records; therefore, a failure to comply is actionable under both the IPA and Government Code section 815.6. However, the Civil Code section 47 privilege also applies to claims based on an alleged breach of a mandatory duty. (See Lebbos v. State Bar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656, 669 [finding that trial court properly sustained demurrer to violation of a mandatory duty claim based on immunity of Civil Code section 47].) Moreover, “[i]f a specific immunity statute applies, ‘it cannot be abrogated by a statute which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability.’ ” (Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 635.) Accordingly, the general duty set forth in the IPA and Government Code section 815.6 cannot abrogate the immunity set forth in the specific immunity statutes. Government Code section 820.2 also provides immunity to a public employee from liability for “an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Here, the psychologists, in performance of their official duties as public employees, 5 were required to exercise their discretion in formulating the CRA and making recommendations regarding parole; therefore, their actions are immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2. Under Government Code section 845.8, subdivision (a), “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release.” Because the psychologists’ actions involved a parole decision, they are immune from liability. This immunity is absolute and broad, immunizing “all acts within the ambit of release procedures . . . from tort liability” (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1027-1028), including alleged IPA violations. (See Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 849 [in applying the immunity of Government Code section 845.8 to defendants’ parole decision, court found that “statutory liabilities [must] be subordinated to statutory immunities”].) Government Code section 855.8, subdivision (a) states: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for injury resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that a person is afflicted with mental illness or addiction or from failing to prescribe for mental illness or addiction.” Here, as Wheeler complains that the CRA includes a misdiagnosis of him, this statute applies and immunizes respondents from liability. In light of the above analysis of privilege and immunity, and our conclusion the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, we need not discuss the additional issues Wheeler raises.

6 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, J.

DATO, J.

Cites, in this corpus