People v. Fryklind CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD220343
- Trial judge
- Howard H. Shore
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court denied Fryklind's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, concluding he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief based on his conviction as an aider and abettor. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred by relying on the prior appellate opinion's substantial evidence finding rather than limiting its review to readily ascertainable facts, and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 at the prima facie stage“In short, the record before the trial court does not, as a matter of law render Fryklind ineligible for relief under the statute.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard from People v. Drayton, which limits the trial court's review at the prima facie stage to 'readily ascertainable facts' and prohibits factfinding or weighing of evidence. The trial court improperly relied on the prior unpublished opinion's conclusion that there was 'substantial evidence' to support the verdict, which is a legal sufficiency determination, not a readily ascertainable fact. Therefore, the trial court's denial was premature and legally erroneous. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 — Establishes that at the prima facie stage of a section 1170.95 petition, the trial court's review is limited to readily ascertainable facts and cannot involve factfinding or weighing of evidence.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the legal standard for the prima facie stage of a section 1170.95 petition and applies it to the specific error committed by the trial court. It accurately distinguishes between a 'substantial evidence' finding (which involves weighing evidence) and 'readily ascertainable facts' (which are limited to the record of conviction), thereby justifying the reversal.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Paul Fryklind's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, relying on the jury's aiding-and-abetting verdicts and the Court of Appeal's earlier substantial-evidence affirmance to conclude he had not made a prima facie showing. The Court of Appeal, with the Attorney General conceding error, reversed and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings under the statute.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1170.95 petition at the prima facie stage without issuing an order to show cause, based on the jury verdicts and the prior appellate opinion finding substantial evidence of aiding and abetting.“Our finding of substantial evidence is not in itself a factfinding by this court. Rather, it is a statement that there was enough evidence, if believed by the jury, to support the verdicts.” | unclear | error (procedure) | agree with court Under Drayton, the trial court at the prima facie stage may consult the record of conviction only for readily ascertainable facts and may not weigh evidence; a prior appellate substantial-evidence holding is not a factual finding that the petitioner acted with the requisite mental state, and aiding-and-abetting verdicts on second degree murder do not by themselves establish ineligibility as a matter of law where a natural-and-probable-consequences theory may have been available. The court's reasoning tracks Drayton and the Attorney General conceded the point, so the reversal is supported, though the opinion's reference to 'indifference for human life' (a felony-murder concept) is somewhat imprecise for a case apparently tried on aiding-and-abetting/natural-and-probable-consequences grounds and the opinion does not discuss the jury instructions actually given. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1170.95 petition the trial court must issue an order to show cause if the petitioner's allegations, taken as true, would entitle him to relief; review of the record of conviction is limited to readily ascertainable facts and may not involve weighing evidence or factfinding.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies Drayton's limit on prima facie review and properly distinguishes a substantial-evidence affirmance from a factual finding that would render the petitioner ineligible as a matter of law, and the Attorney General's concession supports the result. It is thin, however: it does not identify the theory on which the jury was instructed (natural and probable consequences versus direct aiding and abetting), which is the dispositive question for eligibility, and it borrows the felony-murder 'reckless indifference' vocabulary in a second degree murder case.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 2/25/21 P. v. Fryklind CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D077856
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD220343)
PAUL J. FRYKLIND, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Howard H. Shore, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In October 2010, a jury convicted Paul J. Fryklind of second degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1). The jury also found true a 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. firearm enhancement alleging a principal in the offense used a firearm and proximately caused death or great bodily harm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The jury also convicted Fryklind of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 3 and 4). The court sentenced Fryklind to an indeterminate term of 40 years to life plus 14 years eight months. Fryklind appealed and this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Fryklind (Nov. 21, 2012, D058714) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2019, Fryklind filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court appointed counsel and received briefing from both parties. The court reviewed the record on appeal and concluded that Fryklind had not established a prima facie case for relief under section 1170.95. Fryklind appeals contending the trial court erred in determining no prima facie case was shown by the petition. The court relied in part on this court’s opinion, which concluded there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict on a theory of aiding and abetting the actual killer. 2 The Attorney General concedes error, arguing the trial court could not deny relief at that early stage of the petition review and should have issued an order to show cause and proceed to hearing. We will agree with the parties and find the court was premature in its resolution of the petition. We will reverse the court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings. STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts of the offenses are fully set forth in our prior opinion. We will not repeat them here. We will adopt the brief summary in the respondent’s brief for background purposes.
2 It is undisputed that Fryklind was not the actual killer. 2 Fryklind and his fellow gang-members attacked a rival gang member at a liquor store. One of Fryklind’s confederates shot and killed the rival gang member and wounded other victims. Fryklind confessed his involvement in the murder to a cooperating witness who recorded the conversation. During that conversation, Fryklind acknowledged hiding the murder weapon at his girlfriend’s house. DISCUSSION When a trial court receives a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, the court must first review the petition to determine if the petition presents a prima facie case for relief. If it does, the court must issue an order to show cause and conduct the appropriate proceedings as required by the statute. (People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 975-976 (Drayton).) In order to determine whether a prima facie case for relief has been shown, the court should ordinarily appoint counsel, and receive briefing from the People and from the petitioner. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1) & (3).) The trial court may review the record of conviction to determine if the form allegations in the petition are correct. The authority to review the record “is limited to readily ascertainable facts from the record (such as the crime of conviction), rather than factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion (such as determining whether the petitioner showed reckless indifference to human life in the commission of the crime).” (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) If the record, without weighing evidence, shows the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, the court can deny the petition without an order to show cause.
3 In this case, the trial court relied on the jury verdicts finding Fryklind to be an aider and abettor. The court also considered our prior opinion in which we found there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. The verdicts do not establish the requisite indifference for human life. Our opinion notes there was substantial dispute as to the exact role of the various parties to the crimes. Our finding of substantial evidence is not in itself a factfinding by this court. Rather, it is a statement that there was enough evidence, if believed by the jury, to support the verdicts. In short, the record before the trial court does not, as a matter of law render Fryklind ineligible for relief under the statute. We agree with the parties the trial court’s order must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and undertake further proceedings. DISPOSITION The order denying Fryklind’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is reversed. The case is remanded to the Superior Court with 4 directions to issue an order to show cause and to conduct such further proceedings as required by the statute.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
IRION, J.