People v. Ashton CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D077343 · 2021-02-08 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD284179
Trial judge: Polly H. Shamoon
Outcome: reversed in part — Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Area: criminal
Panel: Patricia D. Benke (author), William S. Dato, Truc T. Do

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:14Z · confidence high

The trial court imposed a probation condition requiring the defendant to waive Fourth Amendment rights to searches of all his electronic devices, rejecting defense counsel's objection that the condition was too broad. The Court of Appeal reversed in part, striking the electronic device search condition as overly broad and unrelated to the offenses, while affirming the remainder of the judgment.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Probation condition No. 6n requiring waiver of Fourth Amendment rights to searches of all electronic devices “We conclude that the portion of probation condition No. 6n relating to electronic devices must be stricken.”	unclear	error	agree with court The appellate court found the condition too broad because it was based on mere speculation that the defendant would use devices to document alcohol or drug abuse, rather than a specific connection to the charged offenses. This aligns with the precedent set in In re Ricardo P., which requires a nexus between the search condition and the criminal conduct or personal history.

Authorities

relied: In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 — A probation condition authorizing searches of electronic devices is invalid if it is not related to the offense or the defendant's personal history, but is instead based on speculation about monitoring compliance with other conditions.
relied: In re Alonzo M. (2020) 40 Cal.App.5th 156 — There must be a connection between a probation search condition and the defendant's criminal conduct or personal history for the condition to be valid.
relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — Probation conditions must be reasonably related to the offense and the defendant's criminal history; overly broad conditions are improper.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the controlling precedent from In re Ricardo P. to strike a probation condition that lacked a specific nexus to the defendant's crimes. The reasoning clearly distinguishes the speculative basis for the search condition from the required specific connection to criminal conduct.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The San Diego Superior Court granted Mark Ashton probation after he pled guilty to vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851) and driving under the influence, and over a Lent objection imposed condition No. 6n authorizing warrantless searches of all his electronic devices and passcodes. The Court of Appeal held the electronic-search condition was unreasonable under In re Ricardo P., struck the electronic-device portion of the condition, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Imposition of probation condition No. 6n authorizing search of all of defendant's electronic devices and passcodes, over a People v. Lent objection “the condition here is based on mere speculation defendant will use his electronic devices to document or discuss alcohol or drug abuse.”	unclear	error (discretion)	agree with court The opinion does not state a standard of review, but Lent challenges are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ricardo P. held that an electronics search condition imposed solely to monitor compliance with drug prohibitions, without any record showing the probationer used electronic devices in connection with the offense or drug use, imposes a burden substantially disproportionate to the supervisory interest and fails Lent's third prong. Here the offenses (vehicle taking and DUI) had no electronic component, the trial court articulated no connection, and the People conceded the condition was overbroad, seeking only a narrowing to phone, text and email. Because the People's proffered justification (monitoring alcohol and drug use) was the same rationale rejected in Ricardo P., and nothing in the record tied electronic devices to defendant's conduct or history, striking rather than narrowing the condition is a defensible application of controlling Supreme Court authority.

Authorities

relied: In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 — An electronics search condition imposed only to monitor compliance with drug prohibitions, where nothing in the record connects the probationer's use of electronic devices to the offense or to drug use, imposes a burden substantially disproportionate to the legitimate interests in supervision and is invalid under the third Lent prong.
relied: People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 — A probation condition is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of conviction, (2) relates to conduct that is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct not reasonably related to future criminality.
relied: In re Alonzo M. (2020) 40 Cal.App.5th 156 — Applying Ricardo P., an electronics search condition must be supported by a record connection between the condition and the probationer's criminal conduct or personal history; absent such a connection it must be stricken or narrowed.
missed: People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 — Trial courts have broad discretion in setting probation conditions and their rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; a condition is upheld unless it fails all three Lent prongs.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified Ricardo P. as controlling and reasonably rejected the People's request to narrow the condition because the only justification offered was the same speculative drug-monitoring rationale Ricardo P. rejected. The opinion is thin, however: it never states the standard of review (Olguin), does not expressly address whether a narrowed condition could survive on a fuller record, and its disposition directing an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation appears to be boilerplate ill-suited to a probationary sentence with local custody.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion

Filed 2/8/21 P. v. Ashton CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D077343

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD284179)

MARK ASHTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Lise Jacobson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. FACTUAL BACKGROUND According to the probation report filed in this case, a law enforcement officer responded to a call of an intoxicated motorist at a Poway carwash after an employee of the carwash reported the motorist had driven his car into a trash can. The responding officer found defendant, Mark Ashton, who appeared to be intoxicated, inside an automobile that had been reported stolen. Defendant stated that he and a friend had been drinking when they found the car at a trolley station with the keys inside; and that they drove the car to the carwash and his friend left. A field sobriety test was administered to defendant, which he failed. Two hours later, defendant’s blood reflected an alcohol level of .047 percent as well as the presence of benzodiazepines. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defendant was charged by the San Diego County District Attorney with felony taking or driving a vehicle without consent in violation of Vehicle Code1 section 10851, subdivision (a), count 1; with receiving a stolen vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 496d, count 2; and with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 23152, subdivision (a), count 3, with a prior conviction within the meaning of section 23540; and with driving with his license suspended for driving under the influence, in violation of section 14601.2, subdivision (a), count 4. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 3, which were amended to allege driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, in violation of section 23152, subdivision (g), and he admitted the prior conviction for driving under the influence. Probation was granted and the remaining charges were dismissed. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court granted defendant probation with terms that included 365 days in custody against which he was awarded a combined total of 100 actual and 100 conduct presentence custody credits.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Vehicle Code. 2 Probation No. 6n included a waiver of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, allowing searches of his person and property, including computers and recordable media. Defense counsel objected that the condition was too broad under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481. The court denied the request to strike the electronic searches but amended condition No. 6n to apply to all electronic devices and passcodes to those devices. DISCUSSION Relying principally on In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), defendant contends probation condition No. 6n is too broad in extending to all his electronic devices. We agree. In setting the conditions of probation, the trial court noted defendant was receiving substance abuse treatment and thus his future criminality needed to benefit from the conditions set for probation. As noted by defendant, the trial court did not expressly state how condition No. 6n is related to the offenses with which he was charged or convicted. He therefore contends the entire electronic-device condition should be stricken. The People generally agree that search of all his electronic devices is too broad, but argue the condition should be narrowed to the electronics search of his phone and text and e-mail messages. The basis on which they rely is that such a narrow condition would respond to his general success on parole, in particular, as it would address supervising his alcoholism and addiction. The People do not argue that defendant used any electronic device to steal the vehicle in which defendant was found here. The basis on which the People find condition No. 6n applicable and helpful is nearly identical to the failed basis in Ricardo P. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1115 [search of electronics not related to offense but added to monitor compliance with drug prohibition].) Like the situation in Ricardo P., 3 the condition here is based on mere speculation defendant will use his electronic devices to document or discuss alcohol or drug abuse. (See id. at pp. 1123–1124.) As such, there is nothing in this record that establishes a connection between the search condition and defendant’s criminal conduct or personal history. (In re Alonzo M. (2020) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166.) We conclude that the portion of probation condition No. 6n relating to electronic devices must be stricken. DISPOSITION The portion of probation condition No. 6n relating to electronic devices is stricken. The trial court should prepare an amended abstract of judgment with this change and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Ricardo P. (In Re Ricardo P.) S230923 · 2019-08-15
People v. Lent Crim. 17984 · 1975-10-30