gno.law

People v. Bruestle CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D076937 · 2021-02-04 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN389602
Trial judge
William Wood
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:15Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted Mark Bruestle of resisting an executive officer by force and violence (Pen. Code § 69) and refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without force or violence (Pen. Code § 148). The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that there was no substantial evidence to support the lesser offense and that any error was harmless under the Watson standard.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Refusal to instruct jury on lesser included offense of resisting arrest without force or violence (Pen. Code § 148).
“Given the amount of force required to qualify for violation of section 69, there is simply no substantial evidence in this record that would support a finding Bruestle resisted police but did not use force.”
de novonot reachedagree with court
The appellate court determined that the trial court did not err because the evidence of physical force was overwhelming, rendering the instruction unnecessary. The court further held that even if an error occurred, it was harmless under the Watson standard because the jury found the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Application of the Chapman harmless error test for instructional error.
“That is not the proper test for any instructional error in this case. In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165, the court determined the proper test was that set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that the Chapman standard applied, correctly identifying that the Watson standard governs harmless error analysis for instructional errors in California state court proceedings.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232 — Under the accusatory pleading test, section 148 is a lesser included offense of section 69.
  • relied: People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636 — The court has a duty to instruct on a lesser offense if there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the lesser, but not the greater, offense was committed.
  • relied: People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 — The court has a duty to instruct on a lesser offense if there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the lesser, but not the greater, offense was committed.
  • relied: People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 — It is not necessary to give an instruction on a lesser offense where the evidence is minimal and insubstantial.
  • relied: People v. Bernal (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 512 — The force required for a section 69 conviction does not have to amount to an assault; struggling with police or physically resisting is sufficient.
  • relied: People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978 — The force required for a section 69 conviction does not have to amount to an assault; struggling with police or physically resisting is sufficient.
  • relied: People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140 — A defendant's struggle due to fear of police force does not justify an instruction on the lesser offense of resisting with force, but rather relates to whether police acted unlawfully.
  • relied: Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 — The standard for harmless error in federal constitutional cases, which the court rejected as inapplicable here.
  • relied: People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 — The proper test for harmless error in instructional errors in California state court is the Watson standard, not Chapman.
  • relied: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — The standard for harmless error in California state court: whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different result absent the error.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence test for lesser included offenses and the Watson standard for harmless error, supported by appropriate California authorities. The reasoning directly addresses the defendant's arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for the lesser offense and the applicable harmless error standard.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence medium

A San Diego County jury convicted Mark Bruestle of forcibly resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code § 69) with a great-bodily-injury enhancement and of felony vandalism, and the trial court refused his request to instruct on the lesser included offense of resisting without force (§ 148), sentencing him to five years eight months. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding there was no substantial evidence that Bruestle resisted without force and, alternatively, that any instructional error was harmless under Watson.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Refusal to instruct the jury on Penal Code section 148 (resisting without force or violence) as a lesser included offense of section 69.
“Given the amount of force required to qualify for violation of section 69, there is simply no substantial evidence in this record that would support a finding Bruestle resisted police but did not use force.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The opinion does not expressly name a standard of review, though it independently examines the record for substantial evidence of the lesser offense, which is the de novo approach California courts take to lesser-included-offense claims. The parties agreed under People v. Smith that § 148 was a lesser included offense under the accusatory pleading test, so the only question was whether substantial evidence showed resistance without force. Under Bernal and Carrasco, gripping a push bar, tensing to defeat handcuffing, dropping body weight, thrashing, and kicking at an officer constitute force; Bruestle's own testimony admitted holding the bar and tensing, and his claimed motive (fear of being slammed) goes to lawfulness of the officers' conduct, which he did not challenge. The conclusion that no reasonable jury could find resistance without force is supported by the record as described.
Prejudice analysis for the asserted failure to instruct on the lesser offense (Watson rather than Chapman standard).
“Applying Watson, we find there is no reasonable likelihood a different result would have occurred had the lesser offense instruction been given.”
de novoharmless erroragree with court
Breverman squarely holds that in noncapital cases the failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense is state-law error reviewed under Watson, so the court correctly rejected Chapman. The court's phrasing ('reasonable likelihood') is slightly looser than Watson's 'reasonable probability' formulation, but the substance is the same. The jury's true finding that Bruestle personally inflicted great bodily injury on an officer during the struggle, together with uncontroverted bodycam evidence of continuous physical resistance, strongly supports the no-prejudice conclusion.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232 — Section 148 is not a lesser included offense of section 69 under the elements test but may be under the accusatory pleading test when the pleading alleges forcible resistance.
  • relied: People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636 — A court must instruct on a lesser included offense when substantial evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find the lesser but not the greater offense was committed.
  • relied: People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 — Duty to instruct on lesser included offenses arises only when there is substantial evidence supporting the lesser offense.
  • relied: People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 — No lesser-included-offense instruction is required where the supporting evidence is minimal and insubstantial.
  • relied: People v. Bernal (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 512 — Force sufficient for section 69 need not amount to an assault; struggling with or physically resisting officers suffices.
  • relied: People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978 — Physical resistance such as struggling and refusing to release hands for handcuffing constitutes force under section 69.
  • relied: People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140 — Evidence that officers used excessive force bears on whether they were lawfully performing their duties, an element of section 69, and may require a section 148 instruction.
  • relied: People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 — In noncapital cases, failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is state-law error reviewed for prejudice under Watson, not Chapman.
  • relied: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — State-law error is reversible only if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error.
  • relied: Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 — Federal constitutional error requires reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; held inapplicable here.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly frames the lesser-included-offense duty, applies controlling authority (Smith, Bernal, Carrasco, Breverman) to undisputed bodycam evidence of physical resistance, and properly selects the Watson prejudice standard. It does not expressly state the standard of review and disposes of Bruestle's contrary testimony somewhat summarily, but the result is well supported by the record and authorities cited.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 2/4/21 P. v. Bruestle CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D076937

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN389602)

MARK BRUESTLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William Wood, Judge. Affirmed. Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Mark Bruestle of resisting an executive officer by force and violence (Pen. Code,1 § 69; count 1) and vandalism causing damage in excess of $400 (§ 594, subd. (a)(b)(1); count 2). The jury found true an allegation that Bruestle personally inflicted great bodily injury on a police officer (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a) and 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) in connection with count 1. The court sentenced Bruestle to a term of five years eight months in custody. Bruestle appeals challenging only the conviction for count 1. He contends the court prejudicially erred in declining to instruct the jury on resisting arrest without force or violence pursuant to section 148. The parties agree that under the accusatory pleadings test, section 148 would be a lesser included offense of section 69 in this case. We will conclude there is no substantial evidence in this record to justify an instruction on the lesser offense. In any event, we will agree with the People that any error would be harmless on this record. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.2 STATEMENT OF FACTS The summary of facts set forth in the respondent’s brief is accurate and objective. We will include it here. On August 7, 2018, around 1:50 a.m., Bruestle was standing in the middle of the street in downtown Oceanside screaming at the top of his lungs. People who lived in the neighborhood looked out their windows and saw Bruestle kicking and pounding on a silver Dodge SUV owned by Scott C., who 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Bruestle does not challenge his conviction in count 2 for vandalism, nor does he challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the true finding on the enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a). 2 had parked it on the street the previous evening. Bruestle tore the windshield wiper off the back window, and tried to pry the license plate off.

The SUV had dents and the gas cap and rear taillight were broken.3 Bruestle was also seen pounding on the windows of a nearby Jersey Mike’s restaurant. At some point, a pedestrian came walking down the street. Bruestle chased the individual a short distance. Bruestle moved into the middle of the street and harassed drivers as they drove by. A car then stopped at the intersection. Bruestle got in front of the car and hit the driver’s side windows before the car drove off. Around 2:00 a.m., Oceanside Police Officers Kelly Thompson and Aaron Weirich arrived on the scene after receiving two calls that a male wearing dark shorts and no shoes was causing a disturbance and hitting and kicking a parked vehicle. Their bodycam videos of their encounter with Bruestle were played for the jury. Officer Thompson approached Bruestle, who matched the description provided, while Officer Weirich exited his vehicle and came around the sidewalk on Bruestle’s other side. Officer Thompson asked Bruestle what was going on, and Bruestle did not respond. Officer Thompson calmly told Bruestle to have a seat and stop moving for officer safety reasons; Bruestle did not comply. Bruestle had his right hand “kind of behind his back,” which made Officer Thompson believe he might be holding or concealing a weapon. Bruestle told Officer Thompson, “They are harassing me.” Officer Thompson asked who was harassing him, but Bruestle did not respond. Officer Thompson then told Bruestle that they had received a call about him.

3 Scott C. testified that it cost him $5,500 to repair the damage Bruestle did to his Dodge SUV. 3 Bruestle got agitated and asked, “Who called?” Officer Thompson told Bruestle that he did not know who called. When Officer Thompson asked for Bruestle’s name, he responded, “Sir Knight” and then “Mark Joseph Don Bruestle,” as he approached Officer Thompson. Officer Thompson repeatedly told Bruestle to relax. Bruestle continued to refuse to sit down, ignored Officer Thompson’s commands, and at one point, started to advance towards Officer Thompson. Bruestle raised his right hand towards the side of his head, making Officer Thompson fear Bruestle might try to strike or attack him. Officer Thompson, who was holding his taser in the “low ready position” can be seen in the bodycam video backing up to create more space between himself and Bruestle. Officer Thompson told Bruestle to stop moving and get back. While Bruestle was still facing Officer Thompson, Officer Weirich took hold of Bruestle’s left arm and the back of his neck and calmly walked him towards the hood of Officer Thompson’s patrol vehicle so that the officers could place Bruestle in handcuffs. At that point, Bruestle took hold of the push bumper on the front of the vehicle and gripped it with both hands. The officers then attempted to bend Bruestle at the waist and place his upper body against the hood of the car. While gripping the push bumper, Bruestle resisted Officer Thompson’s and Weirich’s efforts to place Bruestle’s hands behind his back to secure handcuffs. The officers told Bruestle to let go of the bumper and stop resisting, but he continued to resist. Bruestle was fully tensing up his back and arm muscles and making himself as stiff as possible to not allow the officers to put his hands behind his back. With the force of both Officer Weirich and Officer Thompson pulling Bruestle’s forearms and wrists, Officer Thompson got a handcuff on his right wrist, and Officer Weirich was able to pull his left arm from the 4 push bumper to secure the left handcuff. At some point during this struggle, Officer Weirich’s finger got hung up on either Bruestle’s neck or some other part of his body or clothing, and Officer Weirich broke a bone in his hand. An X-ray revealed a fracture in the middle of the metacarpal (hand) bone just below the ring finger. When the officers got Bruestle in handcuffs, Bruestle dropped his body weight and threw himself on the ground in a seated position. At this point, Bruestle was still actively thrashing, twisting, and turning his body. Officer Weirich held Bruestle on the ground, while Officer Thompson walked around and unlocked the patrol car. The officers stood Bruestle up and escorted him to the back of the vehicle. At this point, Bruestle was still resisting and continuing to thrash and twist his body, so the officers had to physically push him inside the door. Once inside the vehicle, Bruestle was lying on his back with his feet up towards the windows. From this position, Bruestle started kicking at Officer Weirich’s crotch. As Bruestle reared up to kick Officer Weirich again, Officer Weirich blocked his leg and pushed his upper body further back into the vehicle to close the door. Officer Weirich finally closed the door, and Bruestle was secured in the patrol vehicle. Officer Thompson called for a supervisor to deliver a wrap restraint device. During the 15 minutes it took for another officer to arrive with a wrap device, Bruestle was kicking and banging on the windows inside the patrol vehicle. While inside the vehicle, Bruestle somehow moved his handcuffs and his hands from the back of his body to the front. Once additional officers arrived on the scene, they took Bruestle out of the car to reposition the handcuffs. The officers were trying to double lock the handcuffs to ensure they did not tighten or loosen. Bruestle was twisting 5 and turning his body, making it difficult for the officers. The officers had difficulty getting the wrap restraint device on Bruestle. During the procedure, Bruestle started to lift his head and rock his shoulders while screaming. Bruestle was also placed in a spit sock because he had spit to the side of his mouth a few times. Once the wrap restraint device was secured, the officers placed Bruestle back into the patrol vehicle. Bruestle then said, “I may kill one or more of your officers.” Bruestle sustained a small cut on his right ear. Officer Thompson believed Bruestle’s injury took place when he slipped his handcuffs over his head from around his back to his lap. Bruestle testified on his own behalf claiming he had consumed four shots of fireball whiskey over a span of four hours and was intoxicated when the officers approached him. However, he knew that he had not committed vandalism that night. He was just walking to the beach after leaving a bar. Bruestle claimed he did not comply with the officers’ demands to sit down on the curb because they were flanking him and he did not understand why they were contacting him. Bruestle claimed that Officer Weirich pushed Bruestle’s “body forward to slam [him] onto the hood of the car.” Then, according to Bruestle, Officer Weirich “placed his thumb on [Bruestle’s] carotid artery to restrict [his] breathing.” Bruestle claimed he had tensed up and held onto the push bar to prevent from being slammed against the hood because the officers were pushing his private parts into the push bar. The bodycam video shows that the officers did not attempt to slam Bruestle against the hood. Bruestle also claimed that after Officer Weirich unsuccessfully tried getting Bruestle’s feet into the back of the patrol car, Officer Weirich struck him on the side of the head with a closed fist. Bruestle also denied kicking 6 Officer Weirich. Bruestle claimed the injury to his ear was sustained when Officer Weirich struck Bruestle in the head as he was pushing Bruestle into the patrol car. DISCUSSION Bruestle contends that resisting arrest without force under section 148 is a lesser included offense of resisting an executive officer by force under section 69. He argues there was sufficient evidence to support a finding he did not use force and thus the court should have instructed on the lesser offense. Finally, Bruestle argues any error was prejudicial. After reviewing the record, we are satisfied there is no substantial evidence to support the lesser offense and that any error is harmless under the appropriate standard. A. Legal Principles Section 69 provides: “(a) Every person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law, or who knowingly resists, by the use of force or violence, the officer, in the performance of his or her duty, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

“(b) The fact that a person takes a photograph or makes an audio or video recording of an executive officer, while the officer is in a public place or the person taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place he or she has the right to be, does not constitute, in and of itself, a violation of subdivision (a).”

Relying on People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239-240, the parties agree that under the accusatory pleading test, section 148 is a lesser included 7 offense of section 69 as pled in this case. Therefore, we will address the rules for instructing on lesser offenses. Where there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the lesser, but not the greater offense was committed, the court has a duty to instruct the jury on the lesser offense. (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684.) It is not necessary to give an instruction on a lesser offense where the evidence is “minimal” and “insubstantial.” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145.) The force required to support a conviction under section 69 does not have to amount to an assault of the police officers. It is sufficient to show the defendant struggled with police, had to be taken down, or physically resisted the officers. (People v. Bernal (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 512, 519; People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 985-986.) The fact the defendant struggled because the person feared the police might use force does not justify an instruction on the lesser offense of resisting with force. Rather, such concerns, at best, would relate to whether the police acted unlawfully in the illegal use of force. (Cf. People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 151, 154.) Bruestle does not argue that the force used by police to subdue him in this case was unreasonable. Analysis Bruestle resisted police right from the beginning of the encounter. He not only refused to comply with directions but used varying forms of physical force to avoid compliance. He grabbed the push bar of the police car and held tightly, requiring police to use force to remove his grip on the bar. Once cuffed, Bruestle dropped to the ground requiring the officers to literally shove him into the car. Once in the car, he attempted to kick the officers.

8 Ultimately, it took three officers, a body wrap, and spit sock before they could finally subdue Bruestle and take him into custody. Given the amount of force required to qualify for violation of section 69, there is simply no substantial evidence in this record that would support a finding Bruestle resisted police but did not use force. The trial court did not err in refusing the requested lesser offense instruction. Out of an abundance of caution we will briefly comment on prejudice. First, Bruestle argues we should apply the Chapman test for harmless error (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S 18, 24). That is not the proper test for any instructional error in this case. In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165, the court determined the proper test was that set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. Applying Watson, we find there is no reasonable likelihood a different result would have occurred had the lesser offense instruction been given. The evidence of Bruestle’s continuous use of force against the police efforts to subdue Bruestle is overwhelming. We also note the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bruestle personally inflicted great bodily injury on one of the officers (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Bruestle suffered no prejudice from the court’s refusal to instruct on the lesser offense.

9 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HALLER, J.

Cites, in this corpus