gno.law

People v. Alcantara CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D077148 · 2020-11-24 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN315462
Trial judge
Aaron H. Katz
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Patricia D. Benke, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:18Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Alcantara's motion to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) to strike a serious felony prior conviction, determining that modifying the stipulated sentence was inappropriate. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, finding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion and declining to reach the People's argument regarding the retroactivity of Senate Bill No. 1393.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to recall sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) to strike serious felony prior conviction
“Ultimately, the court, aware of its discretion concluded it was “inappropriate” to modify the sentence in this case.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
The appellate court found that the trial court understood its discretion and made a reasoned decision based on the stipulated nature of the plea agreement. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's decision to maintain the sentence was a valid exercise of discretion and did not constitute a demonstrable error of law.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533 — A sentencing court's misunderstanding of the law can constitute a demonstrable error of law amounting to an abuse of discretion, warranting remand.
  • relied: People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — A judgment becomes final when the time for filing a notice of appeal expires without an appeal being taken.
  • relied: People v. Federico (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 318 — The California Supreme Court has granted review on the issue of whether Senate Bill No. 1393 applies to final judgments via sentence recall under section 1170, subdivision (d).

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's exercise of sentencing discretion, finding no error in the trial court's reasoning. It prudently avoids deciding the unresolved retroactivity issue pending Supreme Court guidance in People v. Federico.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

After receiving a CDCR recommendation to recall the sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), the trial court denied Alcantara's motion to recall his stipulated 18-year sentence and strike the five-year serious felony prior under Senate Bill No. 1393, finding modification inappropriate given the negotiated plea. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the record showed the trial court understood its discretion and made a reasoned choice not to strike the prior, and declined to reach the People's argument that SB 1393 could not apply to a long-final judgment because that issue was pending before the Supreme Court in People v. Federico.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to recall sentence under section 1170, subdivision (d) and strike the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) serious felony prior
“it is plain the court thought it had the discretion and undertook to exercise it.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
Alcantara's only claim was that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, which under Duong would be an abuse of discretion. The opinion quotes the trial court stating on the record that the five-year term is now within the sentencing judge's discretion, and describes the court weighing the stipulated-plea context before concluding modification was inappropriate. That record defeats the claimed misunderstanding, and a decision to leave a negotiated sentence intact is a permissible exercise of discretion. Assuming discretion existed arguendo and declining to reach the People's finality argument was a sensible way to resolve the appeal without deciding an issue pending before the Supreme Court, since either path affirmed the denial.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533 — A trial court's demonstrable error of law in understanding the scope of its sentencing discretion is an abuse of discretion warranting remand.
  • relied: People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — A judgment becomes final for retroactivity purposes when the time to appeal and to seek certiorari has expired.
  • relied: People v. Federico (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 318 — Addresses whether a section 1170, subdivision (d) recall permits application of Senate Bill No. 1393 to an otherwise final judgment; cited as pending before the Supreme Court as the reason the court declined to reach the People's finality argument.
  • missed: People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 — Senate Bill No. 1393 does not authorize a trial court to strike a serious felony prior while otherwise preserving a negotiated stipulated-sentence plea agreement; the remedy is to allow the parties to withdraw from the bargain. Relevant because the trial court's stated reason for declining to strike was the integral role of the five-year prior in the stipulated plea.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly answers the only argument Alcantara raised by pointing to record statements showing the trial court knew it had discretion and exercised it, and it reasonably avoided the unsettled finality question pending in Federico because the outcome was the same either way. It does not, however, cite People v. Stamps, a binding decision issued months earlier that directly bears on a court's authority to strike a serious felony prior embedded in a stipulated plea and would have reinforced the trial court's reasoning.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 11/24/20 P. v. Alcantara CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D077148

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN315462)

JORGE COLIN ALCANTARA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Affirmed. Charles R. Khoury, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. This is an appeal from the trial court’s decision not to recall the sentence under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d) for the purpose of striking a serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). In July 2013, Jorge Colin Alcantara pleaded guilty to attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664) as part of a plea agreement with a stipulated sentence. Alcantara admitted a serious felony prior conviction, a strike prior, and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. The parties stipulated to an 18-year prison term, which was structured as the low term for attempted murder, doubled because of the prior strike for 10 years, plus five years for the serious felony prior, and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. Alcantara did not appeal his sentence or seek a certificate of probable cause. Alcantara contends the trial court did not understand the scope of its discretion and the case should be remanded to permit the court to exercise informed discretion. The People’s response does not address Alcantara’s contention. Rather, it argues the conviction was final years before Senate Bill No. 1393 (2018- 2018 Reg. Sess.) was enacted, effective January 1, 2019. The argument continues that Senate Bill No. 1393 does not apply to Alcantara’s case because the judgment was final and that a recall of the sentence under section 1170, subdivision (d) does not reopen the judgment for purposes of retroactive changes in law. We will disagree with Alcantara’s claim the court was unaware of its discretion. The court understood its discretion and made a reasoned decision not to strike the prior conviction. We will decline to reach the People’s argument in this case. The issue raised is before the Supreme Court 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 (People v. Federico (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 318, review granted Aug. 26, 2020, S263082), and the trial court refused to dismiss the prior. We will leave the question of the intersection of finality of judgments and recalling sentences under section 1170, subdivision (d) to another day.2 DISCUSSION I Procedural Background Alcantara pleaded guilty to attempted murder in 2013 and admitted a strike prior, a serious felony prior, and a great bodily injury enhancement. He was sentenced on December 10, 2013. He did not appeal; thus, his judgment became final no later than February 8, 2014. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5.) In August 2019, the trial court received a letter from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommending recall of Alcantara’s sentence. Thereafter, Alcantara filed a motion to recall his sentence for the purposes of striking the serious felony prior. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court denied Alcantara’s motion. II Alcantara’s Contention Alcantara argues that the court did not understand that it had discretion to strike the prior conviction even though it was part of a stipulated sentence. Thus, Alcantara contends he is entitled to remand because the judge’s misunderstanding is a “demonstrable error of law” that amounts to an abuse of discretion. (People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1537.) The difficulty with Alcantara’s position is the court did believe it 2 The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to the analysis of the issues on this appeal. We will omit the traditional statement of facts. 3 had discretion to strike the prior. The parties all asserted the court had discretion and the court said earlier in the hearing, “The law has changed in that where that five-year sentence was mandatory, it is now within the discretion of the sentencing judge as to whether or not the five years needs to be imposed.” During the arguments that followed, the court noted this case involved a stipulated sentence where the five year prior was an integral part of the plea agreement. The court reviewed the plea and noted the sentence was what Alcantara’s attorney felt comfortable with and the prosecution believed was appropriate. Ultimately, the court, aware of its discretion concluded it was “inappropriate” to modify the sentence in this case. III Analysis We recognize the People contend the court did not have discretion because Senate Bill No. 1393 could not be applied to the long-final judgment in this case. Assuming, for sake of argument, the court did have such discretion, on the record before us, it is plain the court thought it had the discretion and undertook to exercise it. After much discussion and deliberation, the court concluded the sentence arrived at by the parties in this case was appropriate and should not be disturbed notwithstanding the letter from CDCR. Certainly, that decision is an exercise of discretion and well within the sentencing choices available to the court. As we have previously noted, the People contend the law prevents such decision; however, here, the outcome is effectively the same in that the court declined to strike the prior. The Supreme Court has taken up the People’s issue and will ultimately provide guidance. Therefore, we will affirm the 4 decision on the basis Alcantara has not demonstrated error and decline to discuss the People’s contention. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus