gno.law

People v. Bhakta CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D075566 · 2020-11-19 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD255550
Trial judge
Joseph P. Brannigan
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Area
criminal
Panel
O'Rourke (author), Judith D. McConnell, Patricia Guerrero

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:19Z · confidence high

The trial court sentenced the defendant to seven years and eight months in state prison following a guilty plea to 113 counts and imposed a court security assessment of $4,620. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding the defendant's Section 654 double-punishment claim was forfeited under Rule 4.412(b), but remanded for the trial court to recalculate the assessment to the correct amount of $4,520.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Forfeiture of the defendant's claim that the sentence on count 2 violated Penal Code section 654 (double punishment).
“By agreeing to the plea, he avoided a potentially harsher sentence of over 82 years. Therefore, this claim is forfeited under rule 4.412(b) and the holding in Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th 290.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
agree with court
Miscalculation of the court security assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8.
“As Bhakta was convicted of 113 counts, the correct assessment amount should be $4,520. The court is directed to correct this error on remand.”
de novoerroragree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 — Acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of section 654 rights, and defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed.
  • relied: People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735 — Rule 4.412(b) applies to plea agreements involving a maximum term, not just an exact specified term.
  • relied: People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053 — A defendant who avoids a potentially harsher sentence by entering a plea bargain may be implied to have waived rights under sentencing rules.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies Rule 4.412(b) and People v. Hester to determine that the defendant's failure to raise the Section 654 issue at the time of the plea resulted in forfeiture, supported by People v. Jones regarding the definition of 'specified' terms. It also correctly identifies the arithmetic error in the court security assessment based on the number of convictions.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

After Prakashkumar Bhakta pleaded guilty 'to the sheet' to 113 counts of fraud-related offenses and admitted loss enhancements, the trial court sentenced him to seven years eight months, declining to stay the count 2 term under Penal Code section 654, and imposed a $4,620 court security assessment. The Court of Appeal held the section 654 claim forfeited under rule 4.412(b) and People v. Hester because the plea form listed a maximum exposure of 82 years 8 months, accepted the People's concession that the assessment was miscalculated ($4,520 for 113 counts), affirmed the judgment, and remanded for recalculation.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Imposition of an unstayed term on count 2 rather than staying it under Penal Code section 654
“Therefore, this claim is forfeited under rule 4.412(b) and the holding in Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th 290.”
unclearnot reached (law misapplied)disagree with court
The court did not reach the merits; it held the claim forfeited under rule 4.412(b), which by its terms applies to a defendant 'agreeing to a specified term.' Here there was no negotiated term or lid: defense counsel said Bhakta was pleading to the sheet, the 82-year-8-month figure was simply his statutory maximum exposure, and counsel expressly stated there was 'no guarantee as to any one specific sentence.' Hester rests on estoppel from accepting a bargained benefit, and the court's assertion that Bhakta 'avoided a potentially harsher sentence of over 82 years' by pleading is unsupported, since the maximum exposure was identical with or without the plea. People v. Jones involved a plea agreement with a maximum term, not a bare advisement of exposure; extending it here would make every guilty plea an implied section 654 waiver, contrary to People v. Scott's rule that section 654 errors are reviewable without objection absent a plea bargain. The court also did not address People v. Shelton, which frames the implied waiver as tied to a negotiated lid.
Imposition of a $4,620 court security assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8
“We accept the People’s concession that the court erred by imposing the court security assessment in the amount of $4,620.”
de novoerror (other)agree with court
Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) mandates a $40 assessment per conviction; 113 convictions yields $4,520, not $4,620. The People conceded and the arithmetic is straightforward, so remand for correction is proper.

Authorities

  • misapplied: People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 — A defendant who accepts a plea bargain for a specified term and receives the benefit of that bargain is estopped from later claiming a component of the sentence violates section 654; the rationale depends on a negotiated agreement conferring a benefit, not on a bare advisement of maximum exposure in an open plea.
  • relied: People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735 — Rule 4.412(b)'s reference to a 'specified term' includes a maximum term stated in a plea agreement, so a defendant sentenced to or below an agreed maximum abandons unasserted section 654 claims.
  • relied: People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053 — When a defendant avoids a potentially harsher sentence by entering a plea bargain, waiver of rules that would have required a more lenient sentence may be implied.
  • missed: People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 — Claims that a sentence is unauthorized, including section 654 double-punishment claims, may be raised on appeal despite the absence of an objection in the trial court, unlike discretionary sentencing choices.
  • missed: People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759 — A plea agreement specifying a maximum sentence (a lid) implies the defendant's acknowledgment that the court has authority to impose that lid, and the defendant thereby waives a section 654 challenge to it; the implied waiver is tied to the negotiated lid.

The appellate opinion: questionable — The court's forfeiture holding stretches rule 4.412(b) and Hester, which address agreed-upon terms in plea bargains, to an open plea to the sheet where the only 'specified' figure was the mandatory advisement of statutory maximum exposure and counsel disclaimed any guaranteed sentence; its statement that the plea avoided a harsher sentence is not supported by the record it quotes. It did not address Scott's no-forfeiture rule for section 654 claims or Shelton's framing of the implied waiver, and never reached whether count 2 in fact shared an objective with other punished counts, though the assessment correction is plainly right.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

inconsistent with cited authority

Opinion

Filed 11/19/20 P. v. Bhakta CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D075566

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD255550)

PRAKASHKUMAR BHAKTA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joseph P. Brannigan, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions. Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, A. Natasha Cortina and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. After a grand jury indicted Prakashkumar Bhakta, he pleaded guilty to 113 counts as follows: three counts of conspiracy to commit procuring or offering a false or forged instrument (Penal Code,1 §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 115, subd. (a)), two counts of conspiracy to commit grand theft (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1); 487, subd. (a)); 82 counts of procuring or offering a false or forged instrument (§ 115, subd. (a)), four counts of grand theft by false pretenses (§ 487, subd. (a)), and 22 counts of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). He admitted enhancements that certain offenses involved losses of over $100,000 (§ 1203.045), over $500,000 (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(2)), and over $1,300,000 (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(3)).2 The court sentenced Bhakta to seven years eight months in state prison, consisting of the midterm of 24 months each on count 2, the base count, and count 20; eight months on count 21, and three years for the section 186.11, subdivision (a)(2) enhancement. It imposed all other sentences concurrently or stayed them under section 654. Bhakta contends: (1) his count 2 sentence should be stayed under section 654 because insufficient evidence showed his involvement in the circumstances of that count; and (2) the court miscalculated the amount of the court security assessment it imposed under section 1465.8. The People argue that Bhakta did not raise his section 654 claim when he pleaded guilty to the charges; therefore, that claim is forfeited under 1 Undesignated statutory references are to Penal Code.

2 The indictment also named Jacob Daniel Orona, Aide Orona, Marcus Newell Robinson, John Madrid Contreras, and David Thompson Boyd as co- defendants, but they are not parties to this appeal.

2 California Rules of Court,3 rule 4.412(b). The People concede the court security assessment miscalculation. We affirm the judgment and remand for the court to recalculate the section 1465.8 assessment. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Because we dispose of Bhakta’s appellate issues without relying on the facts of the underlying crimes, we need not detail the probation officer’s findings. Suffice to say that between November 2010 and January 2016, Bhakta worked with his codefendants as a notary, seminar participant, and document preparer of false bankruptcy and deed documents. Defendants offered to help distressed homeowners who attended mortgage relief seminars sue the mortgage-holding banks for fraud on their loans. They convinced homeowners to stop paying the banks on their mortgages and to start paying defendants a program entry fee (generally $3,000 to $3,500), a monthly fee ($1,000 to $1,500), and various fees for individual legal filings. At least 150 homeowners gave the defendants over a million dollars to perform the promised services; in fact, no attorneys were involved, and defendants failed to file lawsuits on the homeowners’ behalf. Instead, the defendants filed and recorded numerous fraudulent documents, including false grant deeds by relying on fake notarial acts, false bankruptcies, and false court filings, which delayed foreclosure and clouded the title on the homes. Investigation of the defendants’ bank accounts revealed over $1,000,000 dollars in homeowner deposits. The homeowners’ total economic loss was approximately $4,029,454.50.

3 All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 3 The parties never raised the issue of section 654 during the change of plea proceedings. Defense counsel stated Bhakta was “pleading to the sheet,” and referenced the proposed upper sentencing lid as specified on the plea bargain form: “Mr. Bhakta and I did discuss his maximum exposure. I did calculate that again with the People, we both did come up with the same number, and that is written on the plea form, and that would have been 82 years, 8 months with all charges and allegations, and that Mr. Bhakta and I did discuss that this plea to the sheet is an opportunity for the Court to consider whatever sentence may be appropriate. It’s no guarantee as to any one specific sentence.” The court immediately told Bhakta: “I’m going to try to do what I always do, sir, . . . listen to the attorneys and come up with a sentence that’s appropriate. [Defense counsel] has represented you very well so far. I have no doubt that she’ll continue to do that. [¶] The attorneys are going to file some written papers with me, suggest a sentence. And at this point, it’s—it’s open-ended.” DISCUSSION I. Bhakta contends: “The sentence on count 2 should have been treated as a subordinate term and stayed under [] section 654 because the only evidence related to [his] involvement in count 2 was that [he] met the victim once and did not have a conversation with her. His culpability on count 2 can only have been based on participation in the overall scheme for which he was punished in other counts.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Section 654 subdivision (a) states: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished 4 under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” The California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 (Hester) and rule 4.412(b) govern this case. Rule 4.412(b) states: “By agreeing to a specified term in prison or county jail under section 1170[, subdivision] (h) personally and by counsel, a defendant who is sentenced to that term or a shorter one abandons any claim that a component of the sentence violates section 654’s prohibition of double punishment, unless that claim is asserted at the time the agreement is recited on the record.” Similarly, rule 4.412(b) prevents a defendant from challenging the legality of a sentence to which he agreed and from which he derived benefit. The Advisory Committee comment to rule 4.412(b) states: “This subdivision is based on the fact that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expresses agreement to a specified prison term normally is acknowledging that the term is appropriate for his or her total course of conduct.” The court in Hester points out that rule 4.412(b) and its predecessor, former rule 412(b), are codifications of “the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed,” and acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of section 654 rights. (Hester, supra, at p. 295.) “When a defendant maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which would have required the imposition of a more lenient sentence, yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the defendant waived 5 any rights under such rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain.” (People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053, quoted in Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 295.) As stated, at the change of plea hearing, Bhakta did not raise the section 654 issue. By agreeing to the plea, he avoided a potentially harsher sentence of over 82 years. Therefore, this claim is forfeited under rule 4.412(b) and the holding in Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th 290. Bhakta in reply argues: “There was not any agreement to a ‘specified term in prison or county jail’ associated with this plea, and thus [rule] 4.412(b), which respondent cites, is not on point.” He adds, “[N]o guarantee was made to [him] that he would receive anything less than the maximum possible sentence.” We reject this claim and agree with the analysis of the court in People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735, addressing the terms of rule 4.412(b): “ ‘Specified’ and ‘maximum’ do not have mutually exclusive meanings. ‘Specified’ means ‘to name or state explicitly or in detail.’ (Merriam- Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2006.) p. 1198.) It is related, but not identical, to ‘specific,’ which means, among other definitions, ‘restricted to a particular individual, situation, relation, or effect.’ (Ibid.) Therefore, a term is ‘specified’ in a plea agreement even when it is a maximum term because it is identified explicitly. Therefore, use of the word ‘specified’ in [rule 4.412(b)] did not limit the rule to situations in which the plea agreement names the one and only term that may be imposed. Furthermore, the rule’s reference to sentences to the ‘term or a shorter one’ implies application to plea agreements involving a maximum term. [¶] In addition to the language of the rule, the cases discussing the concepts on which the rule is based support the conclusion that it applies to maximum, as well as exact, 6 sentences in plea agreements.” (Jones, supra, at p. 745.) Even if Bhakta was not informed of a specific term at the change of plea hearing, he was informed that the maximum possible term was 82 years 8 months. II. We accept the People’s concession that the court erred by imposing the court security assessment in the amount of $4,620. The assessment is based on section 1465.8, subdivision (a), which provides: “(1) To assist in funding court operations, an assessment of forty dollars ($40) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense.” As Bhakta was convicted of 113 counts, the correct assessment amount should be $4,520. The court is directed to correct this error on remand.

7 DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The matter is remanded and the trial court is directed to recalculate Prakashkumar Bhakta’s court security assessment consistent with this opinion, prepare an amended abstract of judgment, and forward a certified copy of it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

GUERRERO, J.

Cites, in this corpus