People v. Pedregon CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD274253
- Trial judge
- Robert F. O'Neill
- Outcome
- dismissed — Appeal dismissed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court imposed various fines and fees upon the defendant following the revocation of probation, without conducting an ability-to-pay hearing. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the defendant failed to raise the Dueñas error in the trial court as required by Penal Code section 1237.2.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Dismissal of appeal based on failure to comply with Penal Code section 1237.2“Because the sole issue in this appeal concerns the imposition of fines and fees, and Pedregon did not present this issue in the trial court, Penal Code section 1237.2 compels that we dismiss the appeal.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the plain language of Penal Code section 1237.2, which mandates that an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the imposition of fines unless the claim was first presented in the trial court. The court properly rejected the defendant's attempt to characterize the ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a separate issue, noting that both arguments substantively concerned the same error in the imposition of fines. This aligns with the holding in People v. Hall, which interprets section 1237.2 broadly to cover any claim that the trial court wrongly imposed fines. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 — Established the requirement that trial courts must determine a defendant's ability to pay before imposing fines and fees, which was the basis for the defendant's appeal.
- relied: People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 502 — Held that Penal Code section 1237.2 broadly applies to errors in the imposition of fees and requires defendants to present claims in the trial court first, even if the error is not merely mathematical.
- relied: People v. Jenkins (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 30 — Clarified that the requirement to seek relief in the trial court first under section 1237.2 does not apply if issues other than the imposition of fines are being appealed.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound because it correctly identifies that the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantively identical to the Dueñas claim, thus falling within the scope of Penal Code section 1237.2. The court properly relied on People v. Hall to interpret the statute's broad application to any error in the imposition of fines, not just mathematical errors.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court revoked Pedregon's probation on his felony stalking conviction, sentenced him to the three-year upper term, and reimposed a criminal conviction assessment, court operations assessment, criminal justice administration fee, restitution fine, and stayed revocation restitution fines without an ability-to-pay determination, to which Pedregon never objected. On appeal, Pedregon raised only a Dueñas challenge (and a derivative ineffective-assistance claim); the Court of Appeal held Penal Code section 1237.2 required him to first seek correction in the trial court and dismissed the appeal.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of fines, fees, and assessments (Gov. Code §§ 70373, 29550.1; Pen. Code §§ 1465.8, 1202.4, 1202.44, 1202.45) at probation revocation sentencing without an ability-to-pay determination“Because the sole issue in this appeal concerns the imposition of fines and fees, and Pedregon did not present this issue in the trial court, Penal Code section 1237.2 compels that we dismiss the appeal.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court The appellate court did not evaluate the merits of the Dueñas claim; it construed section 1237.2 and held that because the fines-and-fees error was the sole issue on appeal and was never presented to the trial court, the appeal must be dismissed. The statute's plain text supports this, and Hall applied it to an identical Dueñas-only appeal. The trial court also retains jurisdiction to correct the fines on an informal written motion, so the defendant is not left without a remedy. |
Appellant's attempt to avoid section 1237.2 by framing a second issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise Dueñas“We are not persuaded, given that the arguments are nearly identical in substance.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court The court reasonably treated the ineffective-assistance claim as a repackaging of the same fines-and-fees error, since the only prejudice alleged is the imposition of the fines without an ability-to-pay finding. Allowing an IAC label to defeat section 1237.2 would nullify the statute in every case where counsel failed to object. The reasoning is brief but consistent with the statute's purpose and Hall. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 502 — Penal Code section 1237.2 applies broadly to any claimed error in imposition of fines or fees, including a Dueñas ability-to-pay claim, and requires dismissal of a single-issue appeal where the claim was not first presented to the trial court.
- relied: People v. Jenkins (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 30 — A defendant need not first seek relief in the trial court under section 1237.2 when issues other than the imposition or calculation of fines, assessments, and fees are being appealed.
- relied: People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 — Due process requires an ability-to-pay determination before imposing court facilities and operations assessments and requires staying execution of a restitution fine until ability to pay is determined; cited as the basis of appellant's claim, not reached on the merits.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied the plain text of Penal Code section 1237.2 and the directly on-point decision in Hall to dismiss an appeal raising only a Dueñas fines-and-fees claim that was never presented to the trial court. It also sensibly rejected the attempt to manufacture a second issue through an ineffective-assistance label, leaving appellant free to seek correction in the trial court by informal written motion.
Opinion
Filed 11/17/20 P. v. Pedregon CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D076282
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD274253)
JOHN JOSEPH PEDREGON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert F. O’Neill, Judge. Appeal dismissed. Charles R. Khoury, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Robin Urbanski and Mary Katherine Strickland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant John Joseph Pedregon entered a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to one count of felony stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)) in exchange for dismissal of the balance of the charges against him and a “No Opposition to Local Time” (NOLT) stipulation from the People. The trial court accepted the plea agreement, granted probation, and suspended imposition of sentence. Further, it imposed the following fines and fees: (1) a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373); (2) a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8); (3) a $154 criminal justice administration fee (Gov. Code, § 29550.1); and (4) a $300 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)); and it imposed and stayed (5) a $300 probation revocation restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.44). Pedregon violated the terms and conditions of his probation and the trial court therefore revoked probation. The court sentenced Pedregon to prison for the upper term of three years and re-imposed the criminal conviction assessment, the court operations assessment, the criminal justice administration fee, the restitution fine, and the previously-suspended probation revocation restitution fine. It also imposed, but stayed, a parole/postrelease community supervision revocation restitution fine of $300 (Pen. Code, § 1202.45). Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, Pedregon appeals the judgment solely on grounds that the trial court imposed the fines and fees at issue without determining he had the ability to pay them. Pedregon did not object to the fines and fees at the probation hearing, the sentencing hearing following the revocation of probation, or any time thereafter based on his alleged inability to pay. Penal Code section 1237.2 provides that “[a]n appeal may not be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the 2 defendant first makes a motion for correction in the trial court, which may be made informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs upon the defendant’s request for correction. This section only applies in cases where the erroneous imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs are the sole issue on appeal.” (Italics added.) As our colleagues in the Second District have noted, Penal Code “section 1237.2 broadly applies to an error in the imposition or calculation of fees. The plain language of the statute ‘does not limit [its] reach only to situations where the fee simply did not apply at all or was a result of mathematical error.’ [Citation.] Section 1237.2 applies any time a defendant claims the trial court wrongly imposed fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs without having first presented the claim in the trial court ….” (People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 502, 504 (Hall).) Because the sole issue in this appeal concerns the imposition of fines and fees, and Pedregon did not present this issue in the trial court, Penal Code section 1237.2 compels that we dismiss the appeal. (Hall, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 505 [applying Penal Code section 1237.2 and dismissing single-issue appeal in which the defendant alleged a Dueñas violation]; cf. People v. Jenkins (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 30, 38 [a defendant need not seek relief in the trial court first “if issues other than the imposition or calculation of such fines, assessments, and fees are being appealed”].) Pedregon contends Penal Code section 1237.2 does not apply because he purportedly raises two issues in this appeal—(1) whether the trial court erred in imposing fines and fees without determining he had the ability to pay them; and (2) whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 3 failing to alert the trial court about the Dueñas decision. We are not persuaded, given that the arguments are nearly identical in substance. Both arguments concern an alleged “error in the imposition … of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs ….” (Pen. Code, § 1237.2.) Under Penal Code section 1237.2, Pedregon was required to seek relief in the trial court in the first instance before pursuing this single-issue appeal. Because he has failed to do so, we must dismiss the appeal. DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
IRION, J.