gno.law

Marriage of A.P. & J.P. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D076146 · 2020-09-24 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 18FDV05478C
Trial judge
Daniel F. Link
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
family
Panel
O'Rourke (author), Judith D. McConnell, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:52Z · confidence high

The trial court issued a three-month domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) excluding the parties' minor child from protection based on a finding that the father did not intend to harm the child. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding the challenge to the order's duration moot due to a subsequent five-year renewal and finding no abuse of discretion in excluding the child because the appellant failed to provide reasoned argument or an adequate record.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Issuance of a three-month DVRO duration
“We conclude that A.P.’s contention that the court erred by issuing a three-month DVRO has been rendered moot by A.P. seeking and obtaining a renewal of the DVRO for a period of five years.”
mixedharmless erroragree with court
The court correctly identified that the issuance of a subsequent five-year DVRO rendered the specific challenge to the initial three-month duration moot, as the relief sought (longer protection) was already granted. The mootness doctrine applies because the original controversy no longer exists in a form that allows for effective relief regarding the initial order's length.
Exclusion of minor child from DVRO protected persons
“A.P. has not presented any reasoned argument explaining why the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.”
abuse of discretionnot reachedagree with court
The court applied the abuse of discretion standard but affirmed primarily on procedural grounds, noting the appellant's failure to present reasoned argument and provide an adequate record. While the trial court's specific findings regarding lack of intent to harm support the exclusion, the appellate court's reliance on the appellant's failure to brief the issue effectively treats the claim as forfeited or insufficiently developed for review.

Authorities

  • relied: Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1 — An action based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised have become moot by subsequent acts or events.
  • relied: Steiner v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1479 — A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.
  • relied: O’Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207 — An appeal from a temporary restraining order is moot following the trial court’s grant of a longer-term restraining order.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 — The standard of review governing a court’s issuance of a DVRO is abuse of discretion.
  • relied: Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140 — The standard of review for DVRO issuance is abuse of discretion.
  • relied: Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319 — An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason.
  • relied: Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 289 — The appellant bears the burden of showing a trial court abused its discretion.
  • relied: Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 — A party challenging a judgment has the burden on appeal to provide an adequate record to assess error.
  • relied: Brockway v. Heilman (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 807 — Error must be affirmatively shown by the record and will not be presumed on appeal; where no error appears, all presumptions support the judgment.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound in dismissing the duration claim as moot, citing appropriate authorities for the mootness doctrine. However, it is somewhat thin on the merits of the child exclusion, relying heavily on the appellant's failure to provide reasoned argument rather than a detailed substantive analysis of the trial court's findings, though the trial court's specific reasoning is quoted and appears consistent with the law.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The San Diego family court granted A.P. a three-month domestic violence restraining order against her husband J.P. but, after finding the parties' two-year-old child was not at risk of harm in J.P.'s care, excluded the child as a protected person. The Court of Appeal held the challenge to the three-month duration moot because A.P. later obtained a five-year renewal, held A.P. failed to show the exclusion of the child was an abuse of discretion, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Issuance of the DVRO for a three-month period rather than a longer duration
“We conclude that A.P.’s contention that the court erred by issuing a three-month DVRO has been rendered moot by A.P. seeking and obtaining a renewal of the DVRO for a period of five years.”
de novonot reachedagree with court
Mootness is a threshold justiciability question the appellate court decides for itself. The original order expired and A.P. obtained a five-year renewed DVRO covering the same parties, so no effective relief could be granted on the duration claim; Finnie, Steiner, and O'Kane support the conclusion. The court affirmed rather than dismissing the moot portion, which is a minor procedural wrinkle but does not affect the result.
Exclusion of the parties' minor child as a protected person under the DVRO
“The court articulated specific reasons for not including the minor child in the DVRO. A.P. has not presented any reasoned argument explaining why the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
Issuance and scope of a DVRO are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Nadkarni, Burquet), and the appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error (Chalmers, Ketchum). The trial court made express findings that J.P. did not intentionally harm the child and that the child was not unsafe in his care, and the opinion states A.P. offered no reasoned argument to the contrary. The result is supported, though the court's invocation of judgment-roll presumptions from Brockway is somewhat inapt where the record included the court's oral findings, and the opinion does not engage the Family Code standard for including family members as protected persons.

Authorities

  • relied: Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1 — An action based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised have become moot by subsequent acts or events.
  • relied: Steiner v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1479 — A case is moot when the reviewing court's decision can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief; appellate courts will not decide moot controversies.
  • relied: O'Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207 — An appeal from a temporary restraining order is moot once the trial court grants a longer restraining order.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 — A trial court's issuance of a DVRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • relied: Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140 — Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for a DVRO ruling.
  • relied: Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319 — An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason; the test for renewing a restraining order is objective.
  • relied: Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 289 — The appellant bears the burden of showing a trial court abused its discretion.
  • relied: Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 — A party challenging a judgment has the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal to assess error.
  • relied: Brockway v. Heilman (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 807 — Error must be affirmatively shown by the record and will not be presumed; all intendments and presumptions support the judgment.
  • relied: Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 — A court should renew a protective order only if it finds by a preponderance that the protected party has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The mootness ruling is well supported by Finnie, Steiner, and O'Kane, and the abuse-of-discretion analysis correctly places the burden on the appellant, who offered no reasoned argument against the trial court's express findings about the child. The opinion is thin, however: it relies on judgment-roll presumptions from Brockway despite having the trial court's oral findings before it, does not discuss the Family Code standard for protecting a child under a DVRO, and affirms rather than dismisses the moot claim.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 9/24/20 Marriage of A.P. & J.P. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of A.P. and J.P. D076146 A.P., Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 18FDV05478C)

v. J.P., Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed. Antonyan Miranda and Anthony J. Boucek, for Appellant. Linda Cianciolo for Respondent. A.P. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), contending the court erred in issuing the order for three months duration rather than a longer period. She further contends the court erred by excluding their minor child as a protected person under the DVRO. J.P. contends that the claim that the court erred by issuing a DVRO for a three-month period is moot because A.P. applied for and obtained a five- year renewal of the DVRO. J.P. further argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the minor child from the DVRO. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 On December 21, 2018, A.P. filed an application for a DVRO against her husband, J.P., seeking to cover A.P., their two-year old minor child, and A.P.’s mother and father. On May 17, 2019, the court evaluated the evidence and concluded the minor child was not at risk of harm from J.P.: “I do not feel that [J.P.] clipping his daughter on the leg, I do not believe that he knowingly did that and purposely did that and meant to cause his child harm. I do not feel that by putting a diaper on too tightly that he meant to cause his daughter harm. I do not feel that [the minor] is unsafe in father’s care. I’m taking [her] off the restraining order.” The court granted the DVRO for three months, covering everyone except the couple’s minor child. In July 2019, A.P. filed the instant appeal challenging the three-month DVRO. A.P. subsequently requested a renewal of the DVRO. On September 23, 2019, following a hearing, the family court (Judge Enrique Camarena) issued a first amended renewed DVRO against the same parties for five years under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a).2 1 We grant A.P.’s request for judicial notice of court documents under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)(1).

2 A DVRO “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party.” (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) The test for 2 DISCUSSION I. We conclude that A.P.’s contention that the court erred by issuing a three-month DVRO has been rendered moot by A.P. seeking and obtaining a renewal of the DVRO for a period of five years. (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [“an action which originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised therein have become moot by subsequent acts or events”].) “Appellate courts generally will neither decide controversies that are moot nor render decisions on abstract propositions. [Citations.] ‘A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court “can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.” ’ ” (Steiner v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1485.) A.P.’s contentions have been rendered moot by the expiration of the first DVRO and the issuance of the five-year DVRO. (See O’Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207, 210, fn. 4 [“[the] appeal from the TRO, following the trial court’s grant of the three-year restraining order, is moot”].) II. The standard of review governing a court’s issuance of a DVRO is abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. (Lister v. renewing a restraining order is objective. (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 332; Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.) “A trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse.” (Ritchie, at p. 1290.) 3 Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333.) “ ‘The appellant bears the burden of showing a trial court abused its discretion.’ ” (Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 289, 299.) A party challenging a judgment has the burden on appeal to provide an adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) The court articulated specific reasons for not including the minor child in the DVRO. A.P. has not presented any reasoned argument explaining why the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. “Error must be affirmatively shown by the record and will not be presumed on appeal [citation]; the validity of the judgment on its face may be determined by looking only to the matters constituting part of the judgment roll [citation]; where no error appears on the face of a judgment roll record, all intendments and presumptions must be in support of the judgment [citations]; the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings is not open to consideration by a reviewing court [citation]; and any condition of facts consistent with the validity of the judgment will be presumed to have existed rather than one which would defeat it.” (Brockway v. Heilman (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 807, 810; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163.)

4 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear its costs on appeal.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus