gno.law

People v. Franklin CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D077233 · 2020-09-24 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN404482
Outcome
affirmed — The order denying Franklin’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.18 is affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:22Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Franklin's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, finding him ineligible because he admitted the property value exceeded $950. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, finding no arguable issues for reversal after a Wende/Anders review of the record.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18
“The court found Franklin, who had admitted the property taken was valued in excess of $950, was not eligible for relief under section 1170.18.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The trial court correctly applied the statutory eligibility requirements of Penal Code section 1170.18. Franklin’s admission that the property value exceeded $950 rendered him ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 47, as the statute applies only to offenses involving property of a value of $950 or less. The appellate court correctly affirmed the denial based on this statutory ineligibility.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires appointed appellate counsel to review the record for arguable errors when no issues are identified, and the court to conduct an independent review.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to withdraw from representation in an appeal where no arguable issues exist, requiring a brief identifying potential issues and a court review of the record.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the Wende/Anders framework to review the record and affirms the trial court's statutory determination that Franklin was ineligible for Proposition 47 relief due to the property value. The court properly rejected Franklin's out-of-record allegations of fraud and misconduct as unsupported by the appellate record.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The trial court denied Robert Lee Franklin's three pro per petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 (Proposition 47), finding him ineligible because he had admitted in his guilty plea to grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) that the property taken was worth more than $950. On appeal, counsel filed a Wende brief, Franklin filed a supplemental brief alleging fraud and prosecutorial misconduct based on matters outside the record, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issues, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 (Proposition 47) on the ground that Franklin was ineligible because he admitted the stolen property exceeded $950 in value
“The court found Franklin, who had admitted the property taken was valued in excess of $950, was not eligible for relief under section 1170.18.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
Proposition 47 reduces theft offenses to misdemeanors only where the value of the property taken does not exceed $950 (Pen. Code, §§ 490.2, 1170.18). Franklin pleaded guilty to grand theft of property worth more than $950 and stipulated to a four-year term, so on the face of the plea he is categorically ineligible and the trial court's ruling follows directly from the statute. The appellate court did not articulate a standard of review because it proceeded under Wende/Anders independent review, but the result is compelled by the admitted facts. Franklin's supplemental claims of fraud in the plea rest on matters outside the appellate record and could not be raised in an appeal from a postjudgment Proposition 47 order in any event.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record for arguable error.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Counsel who finds no meritorious issues may file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal to assist the court's independent review.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly recognizes that a defendant who admitted taking property worth more than $950 is ineligible for Proposition 47 relief, and it properly declined to credit supplemental-brief allegations unsupported by the record. It does not discuss whether Wende review even applies to an appeal from a postjudgment Proposition 47 order (People v. Serrano), and it does not cite section 490.2 or any Proposition 47 case law to explain the eligibility threshold, but these gaps do not undermine the plainly correct result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 9/24/20 P. v. Franklin CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D077233

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN404482)

ROBERT LEE FRANKLIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J. Danielsen (Retired Judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.). Affirmed. Robert Lee Franklin, in pro. per.; and Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. On September 16, 2019, Robert Lee Franklin pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft of property of a value greater than $950 (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)).1 The parties stipulated to a four-year term in local prison.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed. Franklin was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. Franklin did not appeal from the plea and sentence. Thereafter, Franklin filed three pro per forms for resentencing under section 1170.18 (Proposition 47). In January 2020, the court denied the petitions by written order. The court found Franklin, who had admitted the property taken was valued in excess of $950, was not eligible for relief under section 1170.18. Franklin filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his petition for resentencing. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating he has not identified any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Franklin the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. Franklin has responded with a lengthy document. We will discuss his submission below.

DISCUSSION2 As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified one possible issue which was considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Whether the court erred in finding Franklin was not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18.

2 This appeal is from a postjudgment motion following a guilty plea and the facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to assessment of the record on appeal from the denial of Proposition 47 relief. We will omit a statement of facts. 2 In his supplemental brief, Franklin relies on alleged facts and events that are not contained in the record on appeal. Although he did not appeal or challenge his guilty plea following the entry of judgment, Franklin now contends his signature on the change of plea was obtained by fraud. At base, he accuses the prosecutor of misconduct because the charge to which he pleaded guilty was a fraud. Franklin now contends his plea was a product of a scheme by his attorney to “get a black man to sign the plea form.” Suffice to note, we have not discovered anything in the record on appeal that even remotely supports Franklin’s current accusations. The supplemental brief does not raise any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record as mandated by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has represented Franklin on this appeal. DISPOSITION The order denying Franklin’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.18 is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus