People v. Christie CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD274207
- Trial judge
- Melinda J. Lasater
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author), O'Rourke, Cynthia Aaron
Analysis
The trial court revoked defendant's probation for failing to report to probation as directed and sentenced him to two years in state prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding the revocation was supported by substantial evidence that the defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Revocation of probation for failure to report to probation as directed“Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation is supported by substantial evidence that defendant willfully violated the terms of probation.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437 — Proof of a violation of probation is sufficient if it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; review of trial court's findings is for abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840 — Reviewing courts must give deference to the trial court and resolve all inferences in favor of the judgment.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court, after a contested hearing, revoked Jeffrey Christie's probation on a finding that he willfully failed to report to his probation officer as directed and sentenced him to two years in state prison. On appeal, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support revocation; the Court of Appeal applied the preponderance standard and deferential review, found substantial evidence of a willful violation, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Revocation of probation based on finding that defendant failed to report to probation as directed, and imposition of a two-year state prison sentence“Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation is supported by substantial evidence that defendant willfully violated the terms of probation.” | mixed | correct | agree with court Under Rodriguez a probation violation need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and the revocation decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion with inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. The record described shows defendant signed a letter on December 4, 2018 requiring him to call within 14 days and then contact his assigned officer, that Officer Ortuno testified he enters notes every time and had none reflecting any contact by defendant, and that defendant offered no evidence of compliance or of inability to comply. That is enough to support a finding of a willful failure to report; defendant's cross-examination suggestion that other officers might not enter notes merely created a credibility/inference question the trial court was entitled to resolve against him. The opinion's phrasing that there was 'no evidence' defendant complied reads somewhat as burden-shifting, but the officer's affirmative testimony independently satisfies the People's preponderance burden, so the result is correct. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437 — A probation violation may be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and a trial court's decision to revoke probation is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840 — Reviewing courts defer to the trial court's findings on a probation violation and resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies the preponderance standard and deferential review from Rodriguez and Kurey, and the officer's testimony that he logs every contact and had none from defendant supports the finding of a willful failure to report. It is terse, however: it does not expressly discuss the willfulness element or the authorities defining it, and its statement that there was 'no evidence' defendant complied is loosely phrased in a way that could be read as placing a burden on the probationer rather than on the People.
Opinion
Filed 8/27/20 P. v. Christie CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D076272
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD274207)
JEFFREY CHRISTIE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Mary Katherine Strickland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. BACKGROUND On November 10, 1994, defendant was convicted of lewd or lascivious acts with a child aged 14 or 15, in violation of Penal Code1 section 288, subdivision (c), and orally copulating a child under the age of 16 in violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(2). As a result, he was ordered to register as a sex offender for life in California. He was required to register on his birthday, October 16, 2017. He did not do so. Officers telephoned defendant on October 19, 2017, to remind him to register. They learned he was no longer living at the address they had for him. He had not notified law enforcement of the change in his residence. Defendant was arrested on November 9, 2017, for failing to register. On January 3, 2018, defendant entered a plea of guilty to two counts of failing to register as a sex offender. (§ 290.018 subd. (b)). He also admitted that he had two strike priors. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, & 668.) The court at sentencing on September 7, 2018, dismissed defendant’s two strike priors pursuant to section 1385. Defendant was placed on formal probation for 18 months. One of his conditions of probation was a requirement to “report to the [probation officer] as directed.” Following a contested hearing on April 30, 2019, the trial court revoked defendant’s probation after finding he failed to report to probation as directed. Defendant was sentenced to two years in state prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. ANALYSIS Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to revoke his probation. We disagree.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Proof of a violation of probation is sufficient if it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 446 (Rodriguez).) Reviewing courts must give deference to the trial court and resolve all inferences in favor of the judgment. (People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849.) We review the trial court’s findings for an abuse of discretion. (Rodriguez, at p. 443.) On April 30, 2019, the trial court reviewed its file and determined defendant’s probation had been revoked and reinstated on November 29, 2018, for failing to report to probation, as required. On that day the trial court ordered defendant to report to the Hall of Justice within 72 hours of his release from custody. On December 4, 2018, defendant reported to the Hall of Justice and met with San Diego County Probation Officer Eduardo Ortuno. Officer Ortuno at that time gave defendant a letter explaining his obligation to report to the probation office. The trial court received the letter as Exhibit 1. The letter required defendant to call the probation office at a specific telephone number within the following 14 days to find out the name of his probation officer. Upon receiving this information, he was required to immediately contact that officer. The letter which he signed, and which incorporated these requirements, further noted that if he did not comply, a warrant would be issued for his arrest. There was no evidence before the trial court establishing defendant actually complied with the requirements. Although defendant solicited from Officer Ortuna that other probation officers are required to, but might not, enter their contact notes, Officer Ortuna testified that he puts in notes “every time.” He had no notes related to any attempt by defendant to contact him, or anyone else.
3 Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation is supported by substantial evidence that defendant willfully violated the terms of probation. The evidence demonstrating such a showing was well beyond the preponderance of the evidence standard. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Kurey B 141119 · 2001-03-28
- People v. Rodriguez S011326 · 1990-09-06