gno.law

Aframian v. Superior Court CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D077736 · 2020-08-18 · Unpublished

Proceeding
writ
Trial judge
Joel R. Wohlfeil
Outcome
writ granted — Petition granted.
Area
civil
Panel
Patricia D. Benke (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:24Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the Aframians' ex parte application to calendar their motion for summary judgment, finding they lacked the diligence of another defendant. The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ of mandate, holding that the trial court erred because the motion was timely filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and local practices cannot prevent the hearing of a timely motion.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of the Aframians' ex parte application to calendar their motion for summary judgment.
“The superior court therefore erred by refusing to calendar the Aframians’ motion for a hearing.”
abuse of discretionerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the settled law that a trial court may not refuse to hear a summary judgment motion filed within the statutory time limits of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. The court accurately calculated that the motion was served 75 days before the tentative hearing date and 30 days before the new trial date, satisfying the statutory requirements. The trial court's reliance on the petitioners' lack of diligence compared to another party was legally insufficient to override the mandatory nature of the statutory deadline for hearing timely motions.

Authorities

  • relied: Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 526 — A trial court may not refuse to hear a summary judgment filed within the time limits of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, and local rules may not prevent such filing and hearing.
  • relied: Green v. Bristol Myers Co (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 604 — The 30-day time limit on summary judgment hearings is calculated based on the trial date in existence when the motion is noticed, regardless of whether it is the original trial date.
  • relied: Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute, the law is settled, and the petitioner is clearly entitled to relief.
  • relied: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — Procedural authority for notifying parties when a court considers issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the mandatory statutory deadlines of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c to the specific dates in the record. It properly cites binding authority establishing that local practices or comparative diligence cannot justify refusing to hear a timely summary judgment motion.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence medium

The superior court, after continuing trial to October 23, 2020 because of the pandemic, denied the Aframians' ex parte application for leave to file and calendar a motion for summary judgment, finding they had been less diligent than a co-defendant whose motion was recalendared. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance, holding the motion was timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and the court could not refuse to hear it, and ordered the court to set the motion for hearing on September 23, 2020 or as soon thereafter as possible but before trial.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of the Aframians' ex parte application for leave to file a motion for summary judgment and refusal to calendar the motion for hearing before the October 23, 2020 trial date
“The superior court therefore erred by refusing to calendar the Aframians’ motion for a hearing.”
de novoerroragree with court
The court did not expressly label a standard but treated the question as one of law: whether a motion served and noticed within section 437c's time limits may be refused a hearing. Measured against the operative trial date (October 23), a September 23 hearing is 30 days before trial and personal service on July 10 gives exactly 75 days' notice, so the motion was timely under subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3); Green confirms the trial date in existence when the motion is noticed controls. Sentry, First State, and Wells Fargo hold a trial court may not use local rules or calendar practices, including a stale motion cutoff from a vacated trial date, to deny a hearing on a timely motion, so the diligence comparison with the co-defendant was legally irrelevant. The arithmetic and the authorities support the result.

Authorities

  • relied: Green v. Bristol Myers Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 604 — The 30-day limit on summary judgment hearings before trial is calculated from the trial date in existence when the motion is noticed, whether or not that is the original trial date.
  • relied: Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 526 — A trial court may not refuse to hear a summary judgment motion filed within section 437c's time limits, and local rules and practices may not be applied to prevent its filing and hearing.
  • relied: First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 324 — A timely summary judgment motion must be heard; a court cannot deny a hearing on a motion that satisfies the statutory timing requirements.
  • relied: Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918 — Local rules or court practices cannot be applied to bar a hearing on a summary judgment motion that complies with section 437c.
  • relied: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — Procedure for issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance after notice to the parties and an opportunity to respond.
  • relied: Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate where the facts are undisputed, the law is settled, entitlement to relief is clear, and urgency or lack of any useful purpose makes plenary consideration unnecessary.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly computes the 75-day and 30-day periods from the operative trial date and applies settled authority that a timely section 437c motion cannot be denied a hearing on calendar or diligence grounds. It is brief and does not discuss whether the court's retention of the old motion cutoff could itself be a 'good cause' order under subdivision (a)(3), but the cited cases foreclose that reading and the result is well supported.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 8/18/20 Aframian v. Superior Court CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

HOUSHANG AFRAMIAN et al., D077736 Petitioners, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00078078- v. CU-BT-CTL)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,

Respondent;

OVERLAND DIRECT, INC., Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Petition granted.

Epport, Richman & Robbins, LLP, Stephen C. Huskey, and Christopher R. Nelson, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent. Blanchard, Krasner & French and John F. Whittemore for real party in interest.

Houshang, Maria, and Amir Aframian petition for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to calendar their timely motion for summary judgment for a hearing. We grant the petition. BACKGROUND The Aframians are defendants in one of several consolidated actions pending in the superior court that were commenced by Overland Direct, Inc. (Overland), to recover real property it alleges the Aframians and others obtained by a fraudulent scheme. Trial was initially set for March 20, 2020, but had to be continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At a hearing on June 22, the superior court set trial for October 23 and took all motions off calendar based on the motion cutoff date that had been set for the original trial date. On July 6, another defendant in the underlying actions applied ex parte to recalendar the motion for summary judgment that it had filed earlier and that the court had taken off calendar at the June 22 hearing. The court granted the application and reset the hearing and also advised the parties they could seek leave to file new motions on a showing of good cause. On July 8, the Aframians applied ex parte for leave to file a motion for summary judgment and have it heard before trial. Finding the Aframians had not been so diligent as the other defendant who was given a hearing date, the superior court denied the application. The Aframians nevertheless filed the motion and personally served it on Overland on July 10 with a tentative hearing date of September 23.

2 Two weeks later the Aframians petitioned this court for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying their application and to schedule a hearing on their summary judgment motion. We notified the parties we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance and obtained a response from Overland. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180.) DISCUSSION A party may move for summary judgment by serving the motion “at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing,” and the “motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a)(2), (3).) “[T]he 30-day time limit on summary judgment hearings should be calculated based on the trial date in existence when the motion is noticed regardless of whether that date is the original trial date or not.” (Green v. Bristol Myers Co (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 604, 609.) The applicable trial date here is October 23, 2020. Unless the superior court for good cause orders otherwise any motion for summary judgment must be heard by September 23, the date tentatively calendared by the Aframians. With that hearing date and with personal service, the motion had to be served by July 10, the date they personally served their motion on Overland. The Aframians therefore satisfied the time requirements of Code of Civil Procedures section 437c, albeit with no time to spare. “A trial court may not refuse to hear a summary judgment filed within the time limits of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c. [Citation.] Local rules and practices may not be applied so as to prevent the filing and hearing of such a motion.” (Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 526, 529 (Sentry); accord, First State Inc. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 3 Cal.App.4th 324, 330; Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918, 923.) The superior court therefore erred by refusing to calendar the Aframians’ motion for a hearing. To correct the error, a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. There are no material facts in dispute, the applicable law is settled, the Aframians are clearly entitled to relief, the impending trial date requires prompt resolution, and no useful purpose would be served by plenary consideration of the issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241.) DISPOSITION Let a writ issue commanding respondent, immediately upon receipt of the writ, to vacate its July 9, 2020 order refusing to calendar petitioners’ motion for summary judgment for hearing and to enter a new order setting the motion for hearing on September 23, 2020, or as soon thereafter as the motion may be heard, but no later than the date set for trial. The parties are to bear their own costs of this writ proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)

4 BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus