People v. Ellis
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Bernardino County · No. FWV1003144, SCR50702, VCR6638
- Trial judge
- Katrina West
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Cynthia Aaron, William S. Dato
Analysis
The trial court denied Victor Lee Ellis's motion to vacate the deduction of his prison wages, ruling that the CDCR had authority to garnish his wages for a restitution fine from a prior sentence. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Penal Code section 2085.5, subdivision (a) allows the CDCR to deduct wages from any inmate who owes a qualifying restitution fine, regardless of whether they are currently serving the sentence for the underlying offense.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Ellis's motion to vacate restitution wage deductions“Because Ellis possesses those two qualifications, the superior court did not err in denying his motion” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied de novo review to the statutory interpretation question. The plain language of Penal Code section 2085.5, subdivision (a) requires only that the individual be a prisoner and owe a fine under an enumerated statute; it does not condition the deduction on the prisoner currently serving the sentence for the offense that generated the fine. The court correctly refused to read an implicit limitation into the unambiguous text, consistent with the principle that courts should not insert words into statutes. |
Authorities
- relied: Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327 — Interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.
- relied: People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964 — The fundamental task of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent; if language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.
- relied: People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 — Courts must determine the Legislature's intent to effectuate the law's purpose.
- relied: In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900 — Extrinsic aids like legislative history are only consulted when statutory language supports more than one reasonable construction.
- relied: In re Betts (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 821 — Section 2085.5 is akin to a garnishment statute calling for deductions from an inmate's wages to enforce a restitution fine.
- relied: Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1165 — It is not the province of the court to insert words or add provisions to an unambiguous statute.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the standard of review and applies a plain-meaning analysis to the unambiguous text of Penal Code section 2085.5, subdivision (a). The court effectively rejects the appellant's argument by demonstrating that the statute contains no language limiting deductions to fines associated with the current sentence, thereby adhering to the principle that courts should not read implicit restrictions into clear statutory text.
The San Bernardino County Superior Court denied Victor Lee Ellis's "Motion to Vacate Restitution," in which he argued the CDCR could not deduct prison wages under Penal Code section 2085.5, subdivision (a) to pay a 1992 section 1202.4 restitution fine because he had long since finished serving the sentence for that 1992 robbery and was now imprisoned on a 2011 conviction. The Court of Appeal, reviewing the statutory question de novo, held that the plain text of section 2085.5, subdivision (a) requires only that the person be a prisoner and owe a fine imposed under an enumerated statute, contains no requirement that the fine relate to the current commitment, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Ellis's motion to vacate restitution / challenge to CDCR deductions from his prison wages and trust account under Penal Code section 2085.5, subdivision (a) for a restitution fine imposed in a prior, fully served case“Again, the only prerequisites under the statute are that Ellis be an inmate in a California correctional facility and he owe money on a restitution fine imposed under one of a few enumerated statutes (here, section 1202.4).” | de novo | correct | agree with court The statutory text conditions deductions on two facts—that the person is a prisoner and that the prisoner owes a restitution fine imposed under Government Code section 13967(a), Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6(b), or Penal Code section 1202.4(b). Nothing in the text ties the fine to the commitment offense for which the prisoner is currently confined, and Ellis offered only bare assertions for his contrary reading. Under the plain-meaning rule stated in Cole and the no-insertion-of-words principle from Hudson, the court correctly declined to add an unwritten limitation. The result is also consistent with the statute's garnishment-like character recognized in In re Betts. The court did not discuss the appealability or procedural footing of a freestanding postjudgment 'motion to vacate restitution,' nor the provisions making restitution fines enforceable as civil judgments, but those omissions do not undermine the merits conclusion. |
Authorities
- relied: Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327 — Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964 — Fundamental task is to determine legislative intent; statutory language is given its plain and commonsense meaning, and if unambiguous the plain meaning controls.
- relied: People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 — In statutory interpretation the court's task is to effectuate the Legislature's intent and the law's purpose.
- relied: In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900 — Extrinsic aids such as legislative history may be consulted only when the statutory language supports more than one reasonable construction.
- relied: In re Betts (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 821 — Section 2085.5 is akin to a garnishment statute calling for deductions from an inmate's wages and trust account deposits to enforce a restitution fine or order.
- relied: Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1165 — It is not the province of a court to insert words or add provisions to an unambiguous statute.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied the plain-meaning rule to a statute whose two prerequisites (prisoner status and an outstanding fine under an enumerated statute) are plainly met, and Ellis supplied no textual hook for his proposed limitation. The opinion is thin, however: it does not address the appealability or jurisdictional basis for the postjudgment motion, nor the statutory provisions treating restitution fines as enforceable civil judgments that would have reinforced the conclusion that the fine survives completion of the original sentence.
Opinion
Filed 1/14/19; pub. order 2/1/19 (see end of opn.)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D074710
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. Nos. FWV1003144, SCR50702, VCR6638) VICTOR LEE ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Katrina West, Judge. Affirmed.
Renée Paradis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Lynne G.
McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The instant case requires us to interpret Penal Code1 section 2085.5, subdivision (a). That subdivision allows the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to deduct a portion of an inmate's prison wages if that inmate owes a restitution fine under certain enumerated statutes. (See § 2085.5, subd. (a).)
In 1992, Victor Lee Ellis was sentenced to prison for seven years and was accessed a fine under section 1202.4, which qualified for garnishment under section 2085.5, subdivision (a). In 1999, Ellis finished serving his prison sentence.
Ellis returned to prison in 2011. Under section 2085.5, subdivision (a), the CDCR resumed deducting a portion of Ellis's prison wages based on the fine arising out of his 1992 crime. Ellis now maintains the CDCR does not have authority to garnish his prison wages under section 2085.5, subdivision (a) because he no longer is in custody for the 1992 crime.
We disagree with Ellis's reading of section 2085.5, subdivision (a). As such, we affirm the superior court's order denying Ellis's motion challenging the deduction of his prison wages.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 14, 1992, in case number VCR6638, Ellis pled guilty to second degree robbery and admitted he had a prior serious felony conviction. The court sentenced Ellis to prison for seven years. As part of the sentence, the court imposed a $5,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4. Ellis represents that he completed his 1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 sentence and was discharged no later than 1999. The People do not dispute this representation.
On April 26, 2011, Ellis pled no contest to one count of robbery (§ 211). He also admitted he had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)- (d)) and one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Consistent with a plea agreement, the court sentenced Ellis to prison for 15 years.
Six years later, Ellis filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Vacate Restitution." In that motion, he argued the CDCR could not withdraw funds from his trust account because he had finished serving his prison term on case number VCR6638. The trial court issued a minute order denying the motion. Ellis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Here, we must determine whether section 2085.5, subdivision (a) allows the CDCR to withdraw funds from Ellis's trust account to pay a restitution fine when he is no longer serving the prison sentence for the crime on which the restitution fee was based.
We conclude the subdivision allows the CDCR to continue to deduct a portion of Ellis's prison wages until the restitution is paid.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo review.
(Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) " 'As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.' " (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974-975;
People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) We examine the statutory language and give it a plain and commonsense meaning. (Cole, supra, at p. 975.) If the statutory 3 language is unambiguous, then the plain meaning controls. (Ibid.) It is only when the language supports more than one reasonable construction that we may look to extrinsic aids like legislative history and ostensible objectives. (Ibid.; In re Young (2004)
32 Cal.4th 900, 906.)
Section 2085.5, subdivision (a) states:
"If a prisoner owes a restitution fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (b) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4 of this code, the secretary shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the fine amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, and shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund. The amount deducted shall be credited against the amount owing on the fine. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments."
Under the subdivision, the CDCR has the authority to deduct a portion of an inmate's wages (20 to 50 percent) if that inmate owes a restitution fine imposed under certain enumerated statutes. Here, Ellis does not dispute that he owes a fine that was imposed under section 1202.4, one of the enumerated statutes in section 2085.5, subdivision (a). Nor does he dispute that he is currently an inmate in a California state prison. However, Ellis insists that section 2085.5, subdivision (a) does not apply to him because he is no longer serving the prison sentence for the crime under which the subject fine was imposed. We disagree.
Section 2085.5 "is akin to a garnishment statute; it calls for deductions from an inmate's wages and trust account deposits of 20 percent or the amount of restitution 4 outstanding, whichever amount is less (and in no case to exceed a 50 percent deduction), in order to enforce a restitution fine or order." (In re Betts (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 821, 825.) Section 2085.5, subdivision (a) contains two prerequisites to its application. First, it only applies to prisoners. Second, the prisoner must owe a restitution fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) of section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (b) of section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of section 1202.4. The subdivision restricts the amount the CDCR can deduct. Also, it will not allow the CDCR to deduct any amount if such a deduction is prohibited by federal law. After the CDCR deducts a portion of the inmate's prison wages, the subdivision instructs the CDCR where it is to transfer those deductions (i.e., to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund).
There are no other restrictions on the CDCR's authority to garnish prison wages present in the text of subdivision (a) of section 2085.5.
Nevertheless, Ellis argues that he no longer falls under section 2085.5, subdivision (a). He claims that the subdivision "refers implicitly to the imposition of a fine and not to any prior outstanding balances; the plain language of the statute thus indicates that CDCR is not entitled to collect on an old fine connected to a prior term of imprisonment." Similarly, he asserts "[s]ection 2085.5 by its plain meaning only empowers the [CDCR] to collect fines connected with the current convictions of a prisoner." Yet, Ellis does little more than make these assertions to support his position.
In reviewing the plain text of subdivision (a) of section 2085.5, we see no restriction that limits the CDCR's authority in the manner Ellis suggests. Again, the only prerequisites 5 under the statute are that Ellis be an inmate in a California correctional facility and he owe money on a restitution fine imposed under one of a few enumerated statutes (here, section 1202.4). The fact that he is no longer serving his sentence associated with the offense that gave rise to the subject restitution fine is not of the moment. Indeed, there is no language in the statute that provides the restriction that Ellis asks us to impose.
Moreover, it is not the province of this court to insert words or add provisions to an unambiguous statute. (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172.)
In short, if Ellis still owes a portion of a qualifying fine and is an inmate in a California prison, the CDCR can deduct a portion of his prison wages under section 2085.5, subdivision (a). Because Ellis possesses those two qualifications, the superior court did not err in denying his motion
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
DATO, J.
6 Filed 2/1/19 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D074710
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. FWV1003144, v. SCR50702, VCR6638)
VICTOR LEE ELLIS, ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION Defendant and Appellant. FOR PUBLICATION THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed January 14, 2019, was not certified for publication.
It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and 7 ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All parties
Cites, in this corpus
- Hudson v. Superior Court of Orange County G052324 · 2017-01-26
- Goodman v. Lozano S162655 · 2010-02-04
- People v. Cole S121724 · 2006-06-12
- In Re Young S106706 · 2004-04-15
- People v. Murphy S075263 · 2001-03-29
- In Re Betts D029758 · 1998-03-26