Floyd Morrow v. City of San Diego
- Proceeding
- appeal
- Trial court
- United States District Court for the Southern District of California
- Trial judge
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (district judge)
- Outcome
- affirmed — AFFIRMED.
- Area
- civil
Analysis
No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 21 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FLOYD L. MORROW; MARLENE No. 17-56642 MORROW, individually, as taxpayers of the City of San Diego, State of California, and D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01497-BAS-KSC on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a charter city, Defendant-Appellee, and MANDEL E. HIMELSTEIN, an individual; DOES 1-100, Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 12, 2018** Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Floyd L. Morrow and Marlene Morrow appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an equal protection claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because the Morrows failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s actions did not have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, or whether it had a discriminatory effect or purpose. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2012) (to succeed on a selective enforcement claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that enforcement had a discriminatory effect and [that those enforcing the statute] were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990) (a law that does not implicate a fundamental right or suspect classification need only some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 2 17-56642 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-56642