gno.law

United States v. Roberto Ayala Amarillas

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 17-50033 · 2017-12-22 · Unpublished

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roberto Ayala AMARILLAS, Defendant-Appellant

Area
other
Panel
William T. Wallace (author), Jay S. Bybee, Barry G. Silverman

Analysis

No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-50033 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:16-cr-01755-DMS v. MEMORANDUM* ROBERTO AYALA AMARILLAS, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 18, 2017** Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Roberto Ayala Amarillas appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Ayala contends that the district court improperly relied on his criminal history as a reason to deny the parties’ joint request for a fast-track departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. The court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Rosales-Gonzales, 801 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court properly exercised its discretion to deny fast-track departure on the basis of defendant’s immigration and criminal history). Moreover, the 27-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including his failure to be deterred by a previous 37-month sentence. See Rosales-Gonzales, 801 F.3d at 1184-85.

AFFIRMED.

2 17-50033

Cites, in this corpus