People v. McRae CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD261763
- Trial judge
- Louis R. Hanoian
- Outcome
- reversed in part — Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Cynthia Aaron (author), Judith D. McConnell, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 years in prison, staying a one-year prison prior enhancement under People v. Jones because it arose from the same case as a serious felony enhancement. The Court of Appeal reversed in part, holding that Jones requires striking, not staying, the prison prior enhancement, and remanded for a corrected abstract of judgment.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's decision to stay, rather than strike, the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) arising from case SCN181880.“We agree that, under Jones, the trial court erred in staying, rather than striking, the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) that arose from SCN181880.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that the trial court misapplied the remedy prescribed in People v. Jones. Jones explicitly directs that the one-year enhancement be 'struck,' not 'stayed,' to avoid double enhancement for a single prior conviction. The trial court's use of 'stayed' was a legal error that required reversal and remand for correction. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142 — A defendant cannot incur sentence enhancements under both sections 667 (serious felony) and 667.5 (prison prior) based on a single prior conviction; the proper remedy is to strike the one-year enhancement.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the holding of People v. Jones to the specific facts where the same prior conviction was used for both a serious felony and a prison prior enhancement. The court accurately notes that Jones mandates striking the lesser enhancement rather than staying it, leading to the correct disposition of remand for a corrected abstract.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court sentenced McRae to 11 years after a jury convicted him of aggravated assault and battery with serious bodily injury, and it stayed (rather than struck) a one-year prison prior enhancement that arose from the same prior conviction as the five-year serious felony enhancement. On appeal the People conceded error under People v. Jones, and the Court of Appeal reversed as to that enhancement, remanded with directions to strike it and correct the abstract of judgment, and otherwise affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Staying, rather than striking, the one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement that arose from the same prior conviction (SCN181880) as the five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1) serious felony enhancement.“We agree that, under Jones, the trial court erred in staying, rather than striking, the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) that arose from SCN181880.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Jones holds that a single prior conviction cannot support both a section 667 serious felony enhancement and a section 667.5 prison prior enhancement, and the Supreme Court's remedy in Jones was to strike, not stay, the one-year enhancement. The trial court's stay was therefore an unauthorized sentence, and the People's concession and the appellate court's order to strike follow directly from the controlling authority. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142 — A defendant cannot incur sentence enhancements under both section 667 (serious felony) and section 667.5 (prison prior) based on a single prior conviction; the proper remedy is to strike the one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies Jones, which both prohibits dual enhancements based on a single prior conviction and specifies striking as the remedy, and it orders the appropriate correction of the abstract of judgment. The issue was conceded and narrow, and the court's short analysis fully resolves it with the right authority.
Opinion
Filed 8/3/16 P. v. McRae CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068666
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD261763)
KEVIN McRAE, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Lynne G. McGinnis and Kristen A. Hernandez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I.
INTRODCUTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury found Kevin McRae, Jr. guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 1), and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) (count 2). The jury also found that McRae personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (count 1) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18) (counts 1 & 2). McRae admitted having suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12) and a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), both arising from case No. SCN181880 (SCN181880), and four prison prior convictions (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), one of which arose from SCN181880.
The trial court sentenced McRae to a determinate term of 3 years on count 1, plus 5 years for the serious felony prior and 3 years for the great bodily injury enhancement, for a total term of 11 years in prison. The court stayed execution of sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654. The trial court struck McRae's prior strike conviction in the interests of justice pursuant to section 1385. In addition, the court stayed the prison prior that arose from the same case as the serious felony prior (SCN181880) pursuant to People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142 (Jones).2 1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The court also struck the punishment on the three remaining prison priors. 2 On appeal, McRae contends that the trial court erred, under Jones, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 1153, in staying, rather than striking the prison prior that arose from the same case as the serious felony prior (SCN181880). The People concede the error, and request that we order the relevant prison prior enhancement stricken. We agree with the People's concession. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions to strike the prison prior enhancement and prepare a corrected abstract of judgment.
II.
DISCUSSION3
The trial court erred in failing to strike the one-year prison prior enhancement that arose from SCN181880 McRae contends that the trial court erred in failing to strike the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) that arose from SCN181880. He contends that the enhancement must be stricken because it arose from the same offense that formed the basis of the trial court's imposition of a serious felony enhancement (§§ 667, subd.
(a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)). The People agree.
In Jones, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 1153, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot incur sentence enhancements under both sections 667 (serious felony)
and 667.5 (prison prior) based on a single prior conviction. The Jones court concluded that where a five-year serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)
3 We omit any discussion of the facts underlying McRae's convictions since those facts are not relevant to the claim asserted on appeal. 3 and a one-year prison prior under section 667.5, subdivision (b) are imposed for the same prior conviction (see Jones, at pp. 1145-1146), the proper remedy is to remand the matter to "the trial court with directions to strike the one-year enhancement of defendant's sentence . . . under subdivision (b) of section 667.5." (Id. at p. 1153, italics added.)
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a five-year serious felony enhancement (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) based on McRae's conviction in SCN181880. The court then stated, "[S]ince a prison prior . . . serves as the basis for the serious felony prior . . . the first prison prior[4] is stayed pursuant to [Jones] . . . ."
(Italics added.)
We agree that, under Jones, the trial court erred in staying, rather than striking, the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) that arose from SCN181880.
4 The information listed the prison prior that arose from SCN181880 as the "First Prison Prior." (Capitalization altered.) 4 III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed with respect to the prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) premised on SCN181880. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to strike the prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) premised on SCN181880 and to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and forward the corrected abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Jones S027672 · 1993-09-13